VSE knjižnice (vzajemna bibliografsko-kataložna baza podatkov COBIB.SI)
  • The Singaporean model in public goods dilemmas with benevolent leaders and bribery
    Fang, Yinhai ; Perc, Matjaž ; Xu, Haiyan
    Public goods dilemmas are at the heart of some of the greatest challenges of our time, including climate inaction, growing inequality, and the overuse of natural resources. The public goods game in ... which cooperators contribute to a common pool that is then shared equally with defectors who contribute nothing captures the gist of the problem. Cooperators therefore cannot prevail, which ultimately leads to the tragedy of the commons. Actions such as punishment, rewards, and exclusion have been shown to help, but they are costly, therefore rendering cooperators second-order free-riders due to their lack of participation in these actions. In the search for a remedy, we study the public goods game with benevolent leaders who, at a personal cost, have the ability to exclude defectors from using common pool resources. We also consider bribers who can pay the leaders to relax their exclusion efforts. In a traditional setting, this setup yields the standard second-order free-rider problem, where, ironically, the leaders are overcome by cooperators, who then themselves succumb to defectors. We show, however, that the Singaporean model - where a leader's payoff is determined not only by the regular sharing income from the firm production but also by the success of gross firm production as an incentive - can resolve the second-order free-rider problem. We also show that the detrimental effect of bribery can always be, no matter how high the bribe, held in check as long as the number of individuals engaged in this activity is low compared to the number of benevolent leaders. Otherwise, an abrupt transition to a cooperator-less state becomes unavoidable. We discuss the implications of our research for designing successful cooperation and anti-corruption strategies in public goods dilemmas.
    Vir: Journal of theoretical biology. - ISSN 0022-5193 (Vol. 501, Sep. 2020, str. 1-9)
    Vrsta gradiva - članek, sestavni del
    Leto - 2020
    Jezik - angleški
    COBISS.SI-ID - 23085059
    DOI

Vnos na polico