To what extent do economic preferences and institutional trust predict compliance with physical distancing rules during the COVID-19 pandemic? We reexamine this question by introducing the ...theoretical and empirical distinction between individual health behaviors in the public and in the private domain (e.g., keeping a distance from strangers vs. abstaining from private gatherings with friends). Using structural equation modeling to analyze survey data from Germany's second wave of the pandemic (N = 3350), we reveal the following major differences between compliance in both domains: Social preferences, especially (positive) reciprocity, play an essential role in predicting compliance in the public domain but are barely relevant in the private domain. Conversely, individuals' degree of trust in the national government matters predominantly for increasing compliance in the private domain. The clearly strongest predictor in this domain is the perception pandemic-related threats. Our findings encourage tailoring communication strategies to either domain-specific circumstances or factors common across domains. Tailored communication may also help promote compliance with other health-related regulatory policies beyond COVID-19.
Abstract
When rapid economic growth catapults a country within a few years from the margins of the global economy to middle power status, does global regulatory governance need to brace for a ...challenge to the status quo? To answer this question, we extend the power transition theory of global economic governance to middle powers: A rising middle power should be expected to challenge the international regulatory status quo only if increasing issue‐specific strength of its regulatory state coincides with preferences that diverge from the preferences of the established powers, which are enshrined in the status quo. We examine this argument empirically, focusing on South Korea in the realm of competition law and policy. We find that South Korea, a non‐participant in the international competition regime until the 1980s, developed in the 1990s substantial regulatory capacity and capability and thus “spoiler potential.” At the same time, however, its policy preferences converged upon the norms and practices established by the United States and the European Union, albeit with some distinct elements. Under these conditions, we expect a transition from rule‐taker to rule‐promoter. We find that South Korea has indeed in recent years begun to actively promote well‐established competition law and policy norms and practices – supplemented by its distinct elements – through technical assistance programs, as well as various bilateral channels and multilateral institutions. The findings suggest that the power transition theory of global economic governance is usefully applicable to middle powers, too.
A large and increasing share of international humanitarian and development aid is raised from nongovernmental sources, allocated by transnational NGOs. We know little about this private foreign aid, ...not even how it is distributed across recipient countries, much less what explains the allocation. This article presents an original data set, based on detailed financial records from most of the major U.S.-based humanitarian and development NGOs, which allows us for the first time to map and analyze the allocation of U.S. private aid. We find no support for the common claim that aid NGOs systematically prioritize their organizational self-interest when they allocate private aid, and we find only limited support for the hypothesis that expected aid effectiveness drives aid allocation. By contrast, we find strong support for the argument that the deeply rooted humanitarian discourse within and among aid NGOs drives their aid allocation, consistent with a view of aid NGOs as principled actors and constructivist theories of international relations. Recipients' humanitarian need is substantively and statistically the most significant determinant of U.S. private aid allocation (beyond a regional effect in favor of Latin American countries). Materialist concerns do not crowd out ethical norms among these NGOs.
Die transatlantischen Beziehungen des frühen 21. Jahrhunderts sind von einem hohen Grad komplexer Interdependenz gekennzeichnet, was sie wenig störanfällig machen sollte. Trotzdem haben die Wahl und ...der Beginn der Präsidentschaft Donald Trumps die transatlantischen Beziehungen stark beeinträchtigt und drohen sie nachhaltig zu beschädigen. Wie konnte dies geschehen? Für zwei wichtige Teilbereiche, die transatlantischen Sicherheits- und Handelsbeziehungen, stellt dieser Aufsatz zunächst den Status Quo dar und analysiert dann, weshalb (und wie) Entscheidungen und Handlungen der neuen US-Administration seit der Wahl von Trump – trotz hoher wirtschaftlicher Verflechtung und vielfältiger Institutionalisierung – die transatlantischen Beziehungen gestört haben. Wenn der zugrundeliegende »Primat der Politik« erkannt ist, lässt sich aber auch feststellen, dass sowohl binnenländische wie internationale Institutionen (bisher) durchaus »funktionieren«. Darauf aufbauend entwickelt der Aufsatz für beide Themengebiete konkrete Vorschläge, wie Regierungen, trans-gouvernementale und private Akteure in Deutschland und Europa ihre Interessen gegenüber der Trump-Regierung wahren und die transatlantischen Beziehungen sichern bzw. stärken können. Transatlantic relations in the early 21st century strongly exhibit the characteristics of "complex interdependence;" they are highly institutionalized and involve a large and diverse set of actors across multiple issue areas. These characteristics should make transatlantic cooperation extraordinarily resilient. Yet, transatlantic relations have suffered markedly in the first few months since the election of Donald Trump. This article seeks to advance our understanding of why, focusing on the transatlantic security community and transatlantic trade relations. For each, I first establish the status quo before Trump, then analyze the changes that have taken place since the U.S. election, seeking to explain why, despite long traditions, deep economic ties, and a high degree of institutionalization, the election of a major state's head of government with a disruptive political agenda can deeply affect transatlantic relations. At the same time, once this primacy of politics is recognized, we see that domestic and international institutions (so far) work largely as expected. Based on that insight, I suggest for each issue area specific steps that policymakers and private actors in Gemany and Europe can take to safeguard their interests vis-a-vis the Trump administration, as well as to safeguard or strengthen transatlantic relations.
Artificial Intelligence raises new, distinct governance challenges, as well as familiar governance challenges in novel ways. The governance of AI, moreover, is not an issue of distant futures, it is ...well underway - and it has characteristics akin to 'herding cats' with a mind of their own. This essay introduces the contributions to the special issue, situating them in broader political and social science literatures. It then provides a sketch of an interdisciplinary research agenda. It highlights the limits of 'explainable AI', makes the case for considering AI ethics and AI governance simultaneously, identifies as an underappreciated risk 'system effects' that arise from the introduction of AI applications, and calls for policymakers to consider both the opportunities and the risks of AI. Focusing on the (ab)uses of AI, rather than the complex, rapidly changing and hard-to-predict technology as such, might provide a superior approach to governing AI.
We examine heterogeneity in COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy across eight European countries. We reveal striking differences across countries, ranging from 6.4% of adults in Spain to 61.8% in Bulgaria ...reporting being hesitant. We experimentally assess the effectiveness of different messages designed to reduce COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. Receiving messages emphasizing either the medical benefits or the hedonistic benefits of vaccination significantly increases COVID-19 vaccination willingness in Germany, whereas highlighting privileges contingent on holding a vaccination certificate increases vaccination willingness in both Germany and the United Kingdom. No message has significant positive effects in any other country. Machine learning-based heterogeneity analyses reveal that treatment effects are smaller or even negative in settings marked by high conspiracy beliefs and low health literacy. In contrast, trust in government increases treatment effects in some groups. The heterogeneity in vaccine hesitancy and responses to different messages suggests that health authorities should avoid one-size-fits-all vaccination campaigns.
