A positive political analysis of global governance, both theoretically and in a particular empirical context, is presented. Such a positive analysis should precede deliberation about which ...administrative norms and mechanisms can and should be instituted, because a discussion of effective remedies presupposes a clear understanding of actual deficiencies and their causes. To gain such an understanding, Mattli and Buthe ask a series of analytical questions: Why is rulemaking authority implicitly granted or explicitly delegated to an international or transnational body? What are the consequences of such a delegation of authority for the domestic and international distribution of power and resources (including information and expertise)? Why do some actors rather than others supply such governance? Do all those who are affected in a given realm have a voice in the governance institution (and if not, why not)? And what are the prospects for the comprehensive adoption and the likely effectiveness of administrative law procedures?
International trade in food increases real and imagined risks to food safety. These risks primarily arise either from noncompliance with existing food safety standards or from substantive differences ...in sanitary and related standards for agriculture or food processing industries, which may differ across countries in stringency or due to differences in the fundamental principles embodied in the standards (Ansell and Balsiger 2009; Ansell and Vogel 2006; Echols 2001; Levi et al. 2009; Pollack and Shaffer 2009).
As noted in chapter 1, one way to deal with the governance issues that arise from cross-national differences in food safety standards is for
Buthe examines why states delegated regulatory authority in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, an integral part of the founding treaty of the World Trade ...Organization (WTO). Buthe argues that, to explain this case of international delegation, principal-agent theory must be complemented by an analysis of cost-benefit calculations of the relevant domestic interest groups. Given these domestic interests, governments decided to institutionalize international cooperation on SPS measures outside of the WTO because they believed that such delegation would minimize the political costs of the loss of policymaking autonomy. Buthe notes, however, that in retrospect it appears that the widespread positive association of international standards with multilateralism and international consensus led many countries to underestimate those autonomy losses. Material and ideational factors thus interacted to shape the definition of national interests and the outcome of international delegation.
This article examines the distinctiveness of Brazil, India and China in international regulatory governance by asking whether the European Union (EU)’s dedicated antitrust agreements (ATAs) with ...Brazil, India and China (BICs) differ significantly from the EU’s other ATAs, and whether observable differences are attributable to these emergent powers’ increased influence in global regulatory governance. We address these questions through a multi-method comparative analysis, using an original dataset of international ATAs. These bilateral inter- and trans-governmental agreements seek to avoid or ameliorate conflicts and establish cooperation between government agencies responsible for competition law and policy. Our quantitative and qualitative analyses both point to a striking ability of the BICs (and Russia) to insist on quite distinctive agreements with regard to both what is covered by these agreements and how any mutual commitments to conflict resolution and regulatory cooperation are articulated. This finding is based on various overall metrics and a computer-assisted comparative textual analysis of all dedicated ATAs to which the EU is a signatory, using inter alia plagiarism detection software, complemented by qualitative content analyses of the agreements and information drawn from interviews with regulatory officials, to gain a better understanding of similarities and differences between the agreements and thus address in more detail the question how unique the BICs are in their ability to pursue distinctive regulatory objectives in the realm of competition law and policy. We conclude that the distinctiveness of the BIC R agreements is indeed indicative of these emergent economies’ increased power in global economic governance—and, more tentatively, that the increased influence of Brazil, China, and India in global regulatory governance is unlikely to be fully matched by other developing countries.
Human Autonomy in Algorithmic Management Unruh, Charlotte Franziska; Haid, Charlotte; Johannes, Fottner ...
Proceedings of the 2022 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society,
07/2022
Conference Proceeding
Algorithmic management tools support or replace managerial decision making in areas such as task allocation, shift planning, or team formation. These tools can have a significant impact on the lives ...of workers. In this paper, we contribute to the emerging literature on the ethics of algorithmic management by developing a conceptual framework for autonomy at work. Further, we use this framework to discuss risks and opportunities for autonomy in the context of work decision algorithms in Industry 4.0.
On 28 August 2008, the world financial community awoke to stunning headline news: the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the powerful U.S. financial market regulator, had put forth a timetable ...for switching to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), produced by the International Accounting Standards Board—a private-sector regulator based in London. SEC-regulated U.S. corporations were to be required to use IFRS, possibly as soon as 2014.¹ Only a decade earlier, the suggestion that the United States might adopt IFRS “would have been laughable,”² as many experts expected U.S. standards to become the de facto global standards.
The SEC’s decision to
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