Aesthetic Injustice Hofmann, Bjørn
Journal of business ethics,
2024/1, Volume:
189, Issue:
2
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
In business as elsewhere, “ugly people” are treated worse than ”pretty people.” Why is this so? This article investigates the ethics of aesthetic injustice by addressing four questions: 1. What is ...aesthetic injustice? 2. How does aesthetic injustice play out? 3. What are the characteristics that make people being treated unjustly? 4. Why is unattractiveness (considered to be) bad? Aesthetic injustice is defined as unfair treatment of persons due to their appearance as perceived or assessed by others. It is plays out in a variety of harms, ranging from killing (genocide), torture, violence, exclusion (social or physical), discrimination, stigmatization, epistemic injustice, harassment, pay inequity, bullying, alienation, misrecognition, stereotyping, and to prejudice. The characteristics that make people treated unjustly are (lack of) attractiveness, averageness, proportion, and homogeneity. Furthermore, prejudice, psychological biases, logical fallacies, and unwarranted fear of disease are some reasons why unattractiveness is (considered to be) bad. In sum, this study synthesizes insights from a wide range of research and draws attention to aesthetic injustice as a generic term for a form of injustice that deserves more systematic attention. Having a definition, description, and explanation of the concept makes it easier to target the problems with aesthetic injustice. As the business world is an arena of ubiquitous aesthetic injustice business ethics can take the lead in identifying, explaining, and addressing the problem.
Epidemiologic studies of overdiagnosis are challenged by unclear definitions and the absence of unified measures. This spurs great controversies. Etymologically, overdiagnosis means too much ...diagnosis and stems from the inability to distinguish what is important from what is not. Accordingly, in order to grasp, measure, and handle overdiagnosis, we should revive medicine's original goal and reconnect diagnosis to what matters to professionals and patients: knowledge and suffering, respectively. This will make overdiagnosis easier to define and measure, and eventually less difficult to reduce.
Diseases change the life of individuals, the social status of groups, the obligations of professionals, and the welfare of nations. Disease classifications function as a demarcation of access to ...care, rights, and duties. Disease also fosters social stigmatization and discrimination, and is a personal, professional, and political matter. It raises a wide range of ethical issues that are of utmost importance in patient communication and education. Accordingly, the objective of this article is to present and discuss a range of basic ethical aspects of this core concept of medicine and health care. First and foremost, disease evokes compassion for the person suffering and induces a moral impetus to health professionals and health policy makers to avoid, eliminate or ameliorate disease. The concept of disease has many moral functions, especially with respect to attributing rights and obligations. Classifying something as disease also has implications for the status and prestige of the condition as well as for the attitudes and behavior towards people with the condition. Acknowledging such effects is crucial for avoiding discrimination and good communication. Moreover, different perspectives on disease can create conflicts between patients, professionals and policy makers. While expanding the concept of disease makes it possible to treat many more people for more conditions - earlier, it also poses ethical challenges of doing more harm than good, e.g., in overdiagnosis, overtreatment, and medicalization. Understanding these ethical issues can be difficult even for health professionals, and communicating them to patients is challenging, but crucial for making informed consent. Accordingly, acknowledging and addressing the many specific ethical aspects of disease is crucial for patient communication and education.
Disease radically changes the life of many people and satisfies formal criteria for being a transformative experience. According to the influential philosophy of Paul, transformative experiences ...undermine traditional criteria for rational decision-making. Thus, the transformative experience of disease can challenge basic principles and rules in medical ethics, such as patient autonomy and informed consent. This article applies Paul’s theory of transformative experience and its expansion by Carel and Kidd to investigate the implications for medical ethics. It leads to the very uncomfortable conclusion that disease involves transformative experiences in ways that can reduce people’s rational decision-making ability and undermine the basic principle of respect for autonomy and the moral rule of informed consent. While such cases are limited, they are crucial for medical ethics and health policy and deserve more attention and further scrutiny.
The expansion of the concept of disease poses problems for epidemiology. Certainly, new diseases are discovered and more people are treated earlier and better. However, the historically unprecedented ...expansion is criticised for going too far. Overdiagnosis, overtreatment, and medicalization are some of the challenges heatedly debated in medicine, media, and in health policy making. How are we to analyse and handle the vast expansion of disease? Where can we draw the line between warranted and unwarranted expansion? To address this issue, which has wide implications for epidemiology, we need to understand how disease is expanded. This article identifies six ways that our conception of disease is expanded: by increased knowledge (epistemic), making more phenomena count as disease (ontological), doing more (pragmatic), defining more (conceptual), and by encompassing the bad (ethic) and the ugly (aesthetic). Expanding the subject matter of medicine extends its realm and power, but also its responsibility. It makes medicine accountable for ever more of human potential dis-eases. At the same time it blurs the borders and undermines the demarcation of medicine. Six specific advices can guide our action clarifying the subject matter of medicine in general and epidemiology in particular. To avoid unlimited responsibility and to keep medicine on par with its end, we need to direct the expansion of disease to what effectively identifies or reduces human suffering. Otherwise we will deplete medicine and undermine the greatest asset in health care: trust.
Is disease demotion more important than health promotion? The question is crucial for the ethos of medicine and for priority setting in healthcare. When things get tough, where should our attention ...and resources go: to health or disease? This study investigates two general perspectives on health and disease to address whether there is a stronger moral appeal from people's disease than from their health. While naturalist conceptions of health and disease are mute on moral appeal, normativist conceptions give diverse answers. Classical utilitarianism provides a symmetrical view of health and disease, according to which we have an equally strong moral appeal to further health as we have to reduce disease. Other normativist positions argue that there is an asymmetry between health and disease providing substantial support for a stronger moral appeal from disease than from health. This has a wide range of radical implications, especially within priority setting. In particular, treatment, palliation, and prevention of disease should have priority to the promotion and enhancement of health. Keywords: Health, Disease, Wellbeing, Suffering, Moral appeal, Duty, Imperative
Biases distorting priority setting Hofmann, Bjørn
Health policy,
January 2020, 2020-01-00, 20200101, 2020, Volume:
124, Issue:
1
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
•Practical priority setting fails to provide effective outcomes despite explicit priority setting principles and elaborate systems.•One reason for this is that biases are distorting priority ...setting.•Biases result in overuse, underuse, overinvestment, hampered disinvestment and huge opportunity costs.•A wide range of low-value care is provided while high-value care is not.•Biases must be addressed to provide just and effective health care.
Modern health care faces an ever widening gap between technological possibilities and available resources. To handle this challenge we have constructed elaborate systems for health policy making and priority setting. Despite such systems many health care systems provide a wide range of documented low-value care while being unable to afford emerging high-value care. Accordingly, this article sets out asking why priority setting in health care has so poor outcomes while relevant systems are well developed and readily available. It starts to identify some rational and structural explanations for the discrepancy between theoretical efforts and practical outcomes in priority setting. However, even if these issues are addressed, practical priority setting may still not obtain its goals. This is because a wide range of irrational effects is hampering priority setting: biases. By using examples from the literature the article identifies and analyses a wide range of biases indicating how they can distort priority setting processes. Overuse, underuse, and overinvestment, as well as hampered disinvestment and undermined priority setting principles are but some of the identified implications. Moreover, while some biases are operating mainly on one level, many are active on the micro, meso and on the macro level. Identifying and analyzing biases affecting priority setting is the first, but crucial, step towards improving health policy making and priority setting in health care.
Providing high quality and user oriented information about mammographic screening is no easy task, as screening has been subject to heated professional and public debates. Although the information ...has to be developed and provided in context for each screening program, the basic challenges are very much the same for all programs. Accordingly, the objective of this article is to analyze key ethical challenges in informing about mammographic screening, and based on these, to suggest some guiding principles for practical solutions. A literature review identifies five crucial issues with respect to informing women about mammographic screening. By analyzing and addressing these issues, five guiding principles are suggested: the content and the form of information should be developed through open and transparent processes with strong stakeholder involvement. Facts should be presented in a balanced way and uncertainties should be acknowledged, e.g., by presenting outcomes in ranges. Information should be layered without attempts to frame information. Attending mammographic screening should be as easy as not attending. Although apparently trivial, the suggested principles can be useful for elaborating specific information material about mammographic screening in a field of great ethical controversy.
There is a profound paradox in modern medical knowledge production: The more we know, the more we know that we (still) do not know. Nowhere is this more visible than in diagnostics and early ...detection of disease. As we identify ever more markers, predictors, precursors, and risk factors of disease ever earlier, we realize that we need knowledge about whether they develop into something experienced by the person and threatening to the person’s health. This study investigates how advancements in science and technology alter one type of uncertainty, i.e., temporal uncertainty of disease diagnosis. As diagnosis is related to anamnesis and prognosis it identifies how uncertainties in all these fields are interconnected. In particular, the study finds that uncertainty in disease diagnosis has become more subject to prognostic uncertainty because diagnosis is more connected to technologically detected indicators and less closely connected to manifest and experienced disease. These temporal uncertainties pose basic epistemological and ethical challenges as they can result in overdiagnosis, overtreatment, unnecessary anxiety and fear, useless and even harmful diagnostic odysseys, as well as vast opportunity costs. The point is not to stop our quest for knowledge about disease but to encourage real diagnostic improvements that help more people in ever better manner as early as possible. To do so, we need to pay careful attention to specific types of temporal uncertainty in modern diagnostics.
New technologies facilitate the enhancement of a wide range of human dispositions, capacities, or abilities. While it is argued that we need to set limits to human enhancement, it is unclear where we ...should find resources to set such limits.
Traditional routes for setting limits, such as referring to nature, the therapy-enhancement distinction, and the health-disease distinction, turn out to have some shortcomings. However, upon closer scrutiny the concept of enhancement is based on vague conceptions of what is to be enhanced. Explaining why it is better to become older, stronger, and more intelligent presupposes a clear conception of goodness, which is seldom provided. In particular, the qualitative better is frequently confused with the quantitative more. We may therefore not need "external" measures for setting its limits - they are available in the concept of enhancement itself. While there may be shortcomings in traditional sources of limit setting to human enhancement, such as nature, therapy, and disease, such approaches may not be necessary. The specification-of-betterment problem inherent in the conception of human enhancement itself provides means to restrict its unwarranted proliferation. We only need to demand clear, sustainable, obtainable goals for enhancement that are based on evidence, and not on lofty speculations, hypes, analogies, or weak associations. Human enhancements that specify what will become better, and provide adequate evidence, are good and should be pursued. Others should not be accepted.
PDF
