Parrhesia, the concept on which Foucault gave lectures at the College de France, is essentially a Greek concept and literally means to say everything. With parrhesia, the relation between the ...individual who practices parrhesia and the truth is the most important, whereat he at the same time realizes the relation with himself, and then also with other people. In ancient Greece, parrhesia was mainly realized either in the democratic or the autocratic form of government, as witnessed in some of Euripides' tragedies like Ion, or Plato's The Seventh Letter. Parrhesia in ancient Greece also appears as a kind of care of the self (егацеХаа еаитоЬ), and Foucault considers that very important. In the first two cases parrhesia was related to philosophy only indirectly - the emphasis in the mentioned cases was always on the political, on the very political action. Parrhesia as the care of the self is undoubtedly directly related to philosophy and one may say that in some way it is realized as philosophy itself. In this sense, parrhesia can be considered as alethurgic practice - as an act of producing truth, truth as the happening of the subject itself. This alethurgic practice rests on the importance of the principle of truth-telling about oneself as the assumption of the care for singularity. Aside from his lectures, parrhesia as an explicit concept absents from Foucault's other works, but this is exactly the way in which it is present in them. As a new care of the self, it is just one possible answer to the procedures of power that occur through apparatus in the modern age.
Richard Rorty suvremeni je filozof analitičke filozofijske tradicije koji je svoje karijerno usmjerenje skrenuo na metafilozofijsku kritiku epistemologije. Osnova Rortyjeve kritike leži u njegovu ...odbijanju kartezijanskog dualizma, što ga dovodi do zaključka da je svaki pokušaj dosezanja istine putem znanja o bitima osuđen na propast. Umjesto toga, Rorty argumentira u korist traženja razumijevanja putem razgovora – postupka koji zove eidifikacija – koji bi vodio do potpunog uklanjanja epistemologijskog problema znanja. Njegov metafilozofijski poduhvat želi
hermeneutikom zamijeniti epistemologiju i time je uspostaviti kao temeljni filozofijski pristup. Međutim, Rorty nedovoljno naglašava važnost istine za hermeneutiku. To je manjak koji će ovo istraživanje pokušati nadoknaditi da bi pokazalo kako je Rortyjev skepticizam po pitanju istine problematičan za njegovu vlastitu poziciju bliskosti s hermeneutikom. Nakon opisivanja Rortyjeva metafilozofijskog programa, temeljno uspostavljenog u Filozofija i ogledalo prirode, rad istražuje (ne)kompatibilnost Rortyjeve pozicije s hermeneutikom, prvenstveno s Gademerovom. Dolazimo do zaključka da bi pogrešno bilo smatrati Rortyjevu (meta)filozofiju izdankom hermeneutike ili potpuno kompatibilnu s njome, uzimajući u obzir da prednost pred istinom daje društvenim problemima.
Richard Rorty ist ein zeitgenössischer Philosoph der analytischen philosophischen Tradition, der seine berufliche Ausrichtung auf die metaphilosophische Kritik der Epistemologie richtete. Das Fundament von Rortys Kritik liegt in seiner Ablehnung des kartesianischen Dualismus, was ihn zu der Schlussfolgerung führt, dass jeder Versuch, durch das Wissen über die Wesen zur Wahrheit zu gelangen, zum Scheitern verurteilt
ist. Stattdessen argumentiert Rorty dafür, durch Konversation nach Verständnis zu suchen – ein Prozess, den er als Edifikation bezeichnet –
der zur vollständigen Beseitigung des epistemologischen Problems des Wissens führen würde. Sein metaphilosophisches Bestreben ist es, die Epistemologie durch die Hermeneutik zu ersetzen und sie damit als grundlegenden philosophischen Ansatz zu etablieren. Allerdings betont Rorty die Wichtigkeit der Wahrheit für die Hermeneutik nur unzureichend.
Dies ist ein Nachteil, den diese Studie auszugleichen sucht, um aufzuweisen, wie problematisch Rortys Skeptizismus in puncto Wahrheit für seine eigene Position der Nähe zur Hermeneutik ist. Nach der Darlegung von Rortys metaphilosophischem Programm, das in Der Spiegel der Natur gründlich verankert ist, erforscht die Arbeit die (In-)Kompatibilität von Rortys Position mit der Hermeneutik, in erster Linie mit der von Gadamer. Wir kommen zu dem Fazit, dass es unzutreffend
wäre, Rortys (Meta-)Philosophie als Ableger der Hermeneutik zu betrachten oder sie als vollständig damit kompatibel einzuschätzen, wenn
man bedenkt, dass er den gesellschaftlichen Problemen den Vorrang vor der Wahrheit gewährt.
Richard Rorty est un philosophe contemporain de tradition analytique qui
a orienté sa carrière professionnelle vers une critique philosophique de la métaphilosophie. Le fondement de la philosophie de Rorty repose sur son rejet du dualisme cartésien, ce qui le mène à la conclusion que toute tentative d’atteindre la vérité par la connaissance des essences est vouée à l’échec. Au lieu de cela, Rorty argumente en faveur d’une recherche de la compréhension par le biais de la conversation – procédé qu’il nomme édification – qui serait censée complètement remédier au problème épistémologique de la connaissance. Son entreprise métaphilosophique se donne pour ambition de remplacer l’herméneutique par l’épistémologie et ainsi de l’instituer en tant qu’approche philosophique fondamentale. Cependant, Rorty ne met pas suffisamment l’accent sur l’importance de la vérité pour l’herméneutique, insuffisance que cette recherche va tenter de pallier en vue de montrer que son scepticisme, pour ce qui est de la vérité, est problématique en ce qui concerne la relation d’affinité qu’entretient sa propre position avec l’herméneutique. Après avoir décrit le programme métaphilosophique de Rorty, clairement établi dans La philosophie et le miroir de la nature, ce travail examine la (non) compatibilité de la position de Rorty avec l’herméneutique, principalement avec Gadamer. Nous arrivons à
la conclusion qu’il serait fallacieux de considérer la (méta)philosophie de Rorty comme une branche de l’herméneutique, ou de penser qu’elle serait complètement compatible avec elle, tout en gardant
en vue qu’il donne la priorité aux problèmes sociétales et non à la vérité.
Richard Rorty is a contemporary philosopher of analytic philosophical tradition who shifted his career to a metaphilosophical critique of epistemology. The basis for Rorty’s critique lies in his rejection of Cartesian dualism, which leads him to a conclusion that every attempt at
achieving truth by the way of knowing essences is destined for failure.
Instead, Rorty argues for a search for understanding via conversation –
a process which he called edification – and which would lead to the elimination of the epistemological problem of knowledge altogether. His metaphilosophical endeavor wants hermeneutics to supplant epistemology and become the fundamental philosophical approach. However, Rorty underemphasizes the importance of truth for hermeneutics, a deficiency of his which the paper will try to amend in order to show that Rorty’s skepticism regarding truth makes it problematic for his position to claim rapport with hermeneutics. After detailing Rorty’s metaphilosophical programme, which was mainly established in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, the paper will explore the (in)compatibility of his position with hermeneutics, most notably with Gadamer’s. This leads to the conclusion that it would be a mistake to consider Rorty’s (meta)philosophy as an offshoot of hermeneutics or being completely compatible with it, considering he gives primacy to social problems over
truth.
Smisao slobode još od Kanta filozofski se ne sagledava toliko iz unutarnjeg iskustva, koliko iz potrebe razumijevanja svijeta. Djelo slobode time nije tek jedno među mnogim ljudskim djelima, već ...njihova pretpostavka i razlog. U svojim najvišim dosezima sloboda na taj način egzistenciji ostavlja krajnju mogućnost u kojoj se ona sama pojavljuje kao estetski monolit. Estetika slobode, naime, sagledava njenu uzvišenost – uzvišenost koja se suprotstavlja svakoj bijedi trpljenja njenog izostanka. Sinkopa slobode u sebi sadrži njenu estetsku izvodljivost kao trzaj koji je ravan domaku, ali ne i otkriću slobode, one slobode koju su mnogi u nizanju epoha u brojnim navratima težnje različito razmatrali, ali koju zbog bijega od odgovornosti za nju nikada
u cjelini njene uzvišenosti nisu do kraja otkrili. Ovo izlaganje pokušat će utoliko dati svoj doprinos u razumijevanju pitanja je li filozofsko poimanje slobode doista poput domišljanja kvadrature kruga (Arendt).
After Kant the meaning of freedom is considered not so much as inner experience, but rather as a requisite to understand the world. In this regard an act of freedom is not one among many human acts, but their precondition and cause. In its highest reaches freedom thus provides existence with a final possibility in which it presents itself as an aesthetic monolith. Aesthetics of freedom considers its sublimity, one that confronts the misery of suffering its deprivation. The syncope of freedom consists in itself its aesthetic feasibility as a lunge equal to
reaching, but not discovering freedom, the same freedom many have viewed differently in numerous moments of aspiration through the ages, but have never discovered it in the entirety of its sublimity due to evading responsibility for it. This presentation attempts to contribute to understanding whether the philosophical concept of freedom is in fact
comparable to a square circle (Arendt).
After Kant the meaning of freedom is considered not so much as inner experience, but rather as a requisite to understand the world. In this regard an act of freedom is not one among many human acts, ...but their precondition and cause. In its highest reaches freedom thus provides existence with a final possibility in which it presents itself as an aesthetic monolith. Aesthetics of freedom considers its sublimity, one that confronts the misery of suffering its deprivation. The syncope of freedom consists in itself its aesthetic feasibility as a lunge equal to reaching, but not discovering freedom, the same freedom many have viewed differently in numerous moments of aspiration through the ages, but have never discovered it in the entirety of its sublimity due to evading responsibility for it. This presentation attempts to contribute to understanding whether the philosophical concept of freedom is in fact comparable to a square circle (Arendt).
Ako odgovornost shvaćamo kao zadovoljavajući čovjekov odgovor na situaciju u kojoj se nalazi i takav pojam barem djelomično izuzmemo od paradigmatskog pravno-etičkog obrasca, mogli bismo lako ući u ...njegovo posve drukčije značenjsko polje koje svoj teorijski diskurs u mnogome zahvaljuje Hanni Arendt. Pojam osobne odgovornosti koji pritom najviše dolazi do izražaja Arendt će u takvom okružju suprotstaviti pojmu političke odgovornosti, napose u njenom rasponu od kolektivne nevinosti do kolektivne krivnje. Osobna odgovornost o kojoj se ovdje radi zapravo počiva na moći prosudbe. Nevolja prosudbe, kako ju naziva Arendt, događa se onda kada ona svoju moć ne nalazi u opće usvojenim pravilima ponašanja. Čovjek kao egzistencija tada neumitno pristupa posebnom ispitu svoje autentičnosti. Koliko osobna odgovornost predstavlja ključ filozofskog razumijevanja egzistencije, pogotovo s obzirom na današnje otežane uvjete u kojima nije jednostavno prepoznati nove znakove uzdizanja totalitarnosti, središnje je pitanje kojega se dohvaća ovo izlaganje.
If the responsibility is understood as a satisfying response to man’s situation, and if we at least partially remove such a notion from the paradigmatic legal and ethical pattern, then we could ...easily enter into its completely different semantic field with a theoretical discourse largely due to Hannah Arendt. The concept of personal responsibility that especially becomes apparent in this process Arendt opposes to the notion of political responsibility, in a range from collective innocence to collective guilt. In fact, the personal responsibility in question is based on the power of judgment. The predicament of judgment, as Arendt calls it, happens when its power is not rooted in generally adopted codes of conduct. Man as existence then inexorably approaches a special test of his authenticity. The central issue discussed in this article is thus the following: how much the personal responsibility represents a key to the philosophical understanding of existence, especially regarding the non-triviality of contemporary difficulties in identifying new signs of raising totalitarianisms.
Namjera ovog članka jest ukratko prikazati elementarne postavke Heideggerove kritike metafizike kao ontoteologije i prikazano iskušati u prostoru demitološkog pristupa problemu. Uvođenjem ontološke ...razlike kao metodološke smjernice, Heidegger je nastojao osujetiti metafizičku interferenciju bitka i bića, naime da se bitak u takvom jednom okružju uvijek iznova iskazuje kao biće. No, sama ta razlika kao nihilistički rezultat svoje vrste koliko god filozofijski opravdana, čini se, još uvijek olako podcjenjuje snagu filozofsko-teološke formule 'έν κaΐ πlν, pogotovo u slučajevima kada u njoj postaje razvidno pitanje identičnosti bitka i sudbine. Koliko god Heideggerovo (ali i svako drugo) filozofsko mišljenje ovo pitanje uspijeva plodonosno obesnažiti, ono ni danas nimalo nije izgubilo na svom egzistencijalnom značenju, a utoliko se predležeće razmatranje na njega motivacijski posebice usredotočuje.
Slučaj Richtmann-Podhorsky Uzunić, Mislav; Pešić, Boško
Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine,
12/2024, Volume:
50, Issue:
1 (99)
Journal Article, Paper
Open access
Rad se bavi intelektualnim te ideološkim sukobom jugoslavenskih komunista sa Zvonimirom Richtmannom i Rikardom Podhorskim 1930-ih godina. Sukob je proizašao iz pokušaja Richtmanna i Podhorskog da ...saznanjima tadašnje znanosti i logičkog pozitivizma kritički promisle marksističku teoriju i da dodatno dokažu njezinu ispravnost. Međutim, njihov je projekt ostao neostvaren zato što su pripadnici Komunističke partije takovrsna promišljanja marksizma uzimali kao političku prijetnju te je racionalno i argumentirano rješavanje pitanja ostalo otvoreno. Rad stoga istražuje kompatibilnost teorije Richtmanna i Podhorskog s teorijom logičkog pozitivizma. Cilj je pokazati da su njihovi pokušaji bili argumentirani i opravdani jer logički pozitivizam i marksizam dijele kritiku metafizike i filozofije te zagovaraju kauzalna objašnjenja pojava. Međutim, u radu se argumentira da bi iz suvremene perspektive polazište Richtmanna i Podhorskog bilo neuvjerljivo iz dva razloga. Prvi se razlog odnosi na suvremena saznanja u općoj filozofiji znanosti koja pokazuju da je princip verifikacije logičkog pozitivizma, kojeg su Richtmann i Podhorsky inkorporirali u svoju teoriju, neuvjerljiv kao kriterij znanstvenosti. Drugi se razlog odnosi na fundamentalnu metodološku razliku između marksizma, koji polazi od makro objašnjenja povijesti i društva, i logičkog pozitivizma koji zagovara metodološki atomizam i redukcionizam.
The article delves into the intellectual and ideological clash between Yugoslav communists and Zvonimir Richtmann and Rikard Podhorsky during the 1930s. This conflict emerged from Richtmann and Podhorsky’s endeavour to critically reassess Marxist theory, leveraging contemporary scientific knowledge and logical positivism to further substantiate its validity. Nevertheless, their initiative remained unrealized due to Communist Party members perceiving such scrutiny of Marxism as a political menace, thereby leaving the rational and reasoned resolution of the matter unresolved. Consequently, the paper delves into the compatibility of Richtmann and Podhorsky’s theory with logical positivism. Its objective is to illustrate that their endeavors were both justified and reasoned, as logical positivism and Marxism converge in critiquing metaphysics and philosophy while advocating for causal explanations of phenomena. Nonetheless, the paper contends that, viewed from a contemporary standpoint, Richtmann and Podhorsky’s premise would lack persuasiveness for two reasons. Firstly, contemporary insights in the general philosophy of science undermine the verifiability principle of logical positivism, which they incorporated into their theory, as an inadequate criterion of scientific rigor. Secondly, the fundamental methodological disparity between Marxism, grounded in macro-level explanations of history and society, and logical positivism, which promotes methodological atomism and reductionism, underscores the divergence.
Nietzsche’s stance that it is to be written only of that which has been successfully handled may prove thematically ambiguous in a number of ways. Given that relevant interpreters of Nietzsche may ...consider this title as nothing but a forgery, a genuine approach to the thematic development of such a title has to establish a possible subtitle: what could religious life without religion even mean? Indeed, does this title contain anything but an unsuccessful provocation?! Is it too little to say that religious life as discussed here, understood through the key of Nietzsche’s philosophy, has nothing to do with the life of religiosity?! Nietzsche presents this “cheapest and most innocent mode of life” as bodying forth of the great mind in the pervasive intoxication. His language becomes a dance with things, while wisdom in
such a dance appears as belonging to that which is infinite. This examination will, in comparison with the contemporary, attempt to shed light on such a thought landscape.
FILOZOFIJA KAO STVAR MIŠLJENJA Pešić, Boško
Logos – časopis za filozofiju i religiju,
2016, Volume:
4, Issue:
2
Journal Article
Open access
Naslov u iščekivanju svoga opravdanja sabire niz poteškoća. Najveća među njima sa sobom, čini se, iznosi pitanje mogućnosti oblikovanja i opravdanosti jedne takve teme. Stoga je istom potrebno ...zacrtati da tema koju isporučuje naslov ove razrade ne upućuje toliko na dugovječni problem podrijetla filozofije koliko na sam izvor filozofijskog mišljenja. Naime, riječ je o potrebi da stvari promislimo drukčije od toga kako ih uobičajeno vidimo, ali to u čemu se sastoji drukčije viđenje stvari izostajat će nam sve dok samo mišljenje kao viđenje ostaje ovakvo kakvo jest. Mišljenje se, prema Heideggeru, udaljuje od svoje biti što se više pokazuje kao računajuće mjerljivo, matematičko, u svojoj osnovi kao ono tehničko. Na koncu, takva vrsta misaonosti nije ništa drugo nego volja da se stvar kao predmet dovede pod svoju vlast.
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