Forward-looking activities: incorporating citizens’ visions Gudowsky, Niklas; Peissl, Walter; Sotoudeh, Mahshid ...
Poiesis & praxis : international journal of ethics of science and technology assessment,
11/2012, Volume:
9, Issue:
1-2
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
Looking back on the many prophets who tried to predict the future as if it were predetermined, at first sight any forward-looking activity is reminiscent of making predictions with a crystal ball. In ...contrast to fortune tellers, today’s exercises do not predict, but try to show different paths that an open future could take. A key motivation to undertake forward-looking activities is broadening the information basis for decision-makers to help them actively shape the future in a desired way. Experts, laypeople, or stakeholders may have different sets of values and priorities with regard to pending decisions on any issue related to the future. Therefore, considering and incorporating their views can, in the best case scenario, lead to more robust decisions and strategies. However, transferring this plurality into a form that decision-makers can consider is a challenge in terms of both design and facilitation of participatory processes. In this paper, we will introduce and critically assess a new qualitative method for forward-looking activities, namely CIVISTI (Citizen Visions on Science, Technology and Innovation;
www.civisti.org
), which was developed during an EU project of the same name. Focussing strongly on participation, with clear roles for citizens and experts, the method combines expert, stakeholder and lay knowledge to elaborate recommendations for decision-making in issues related to today’s and tomorrow’s science, technology and innovation. Consisting of three steps, the process starts with citizens’ visions of a future 30–40 years from now. Experts then translate these visions into practical recommendations which the same citizens then validate and prioritise to produce a final product. The following paper will highlight the added value as well as limits of the CIVISTI method and will illustrate potential for the improvement of future processes.
Beratungspraxis in der TA Karen Kastenhofer; Anja Bauer; Leo Capari ...
TATuP - Zeitschrift für Technikfolgenabschätzung in Theorie und Praxis (Online),
03/2018, Volume:
27, Issue:
1
Journal Article
Modern societies are vulnerable. We have known this long before the attacks of 11 September 2001, but they made it clear to everyone. The second lesson learned from the attacks was that it is ...impossible to foresee such events. Although these attacks to the real world were “low‐tech”, now there are attempts around the globe to control especially the electronic or virtual world. However, does more surveillance really lead to more security? If so, what will be the price we have to pay?
National states try to provide their citizens with a high level of security, but the effort for better security often gets mixed up with the claim for more surveillance. This is one reason why, over the past few months, governmental activities seemed to jeopardise the internationally acknowledged fundamental right of privacy. Societal security versus personal freedom is an old and well‐known area of conflict. In the light of the incidents of 11 September 2001 some old ideas for surveillance and for measures restricting privacy got on the agenda again – and new ones keep emerging.
This article will give an overview of what happened on a governmental level after 11 September 2001 in the EU, in some EU‐member states and in the USA. Apart from political actions, we already face even direct socio‐economic implications as some anonymiser services were shut down. They empowered Internet users to protect their right of privacy, and they were the first targets of investigation and suspicion. Shutting down these services reduces the potential room for users to protect their privacy by using Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs). This is an indicator for a serious societal problem: democracy has already changed.
In the second part I will analyse the relationship between surveillance and security and I will argue that, and give reasons why, these international over‐reactions will not lead to the intended effects. Rather, they will have long‐term implications for the respective societies. So in the end this has to be acknowledged in a necessary appreciation of values.
Modern societies are vulnerable. We have known this long before the attacks of 11 September 2001, but they made it clear to everyone. The second lesson learned from the attacks was that it is ...impossible to foresee such events. Although these attacks to the real world were “low‐tech”, now there are attempts around the globe to control especially the electronic or virtual world. However, does more surveillance really lead to more security? If so, what will be the price we have to pay?
National states try to provide their citizens with a high level of security, but the effort for better security often gets mixed up with the claim for more surveillance. This is one reason why, over the past few months, governmental activities seemed to jeopardise the internationally acknowledged fundamental right of privacy. Societal security versus personal freedom is an old and well‐known area of conflict. In the light of the incidents of 11 September 2001 some old ideas for surveillance and for measures restricting privacy got on the agenda again – and new ones keep emerging.
This article will give an overview of what happened on a governmental level after 11 September 2001 in the EU, in some EU‐member states and in the USA. Apart from political actions, we already face even direct socio‐economic implications as some anonymiser services were shut down. They empowered Internet users to protect their right of privacy, and they were the first targets of investigation and suspicion. Shutting down these services reduces the potential room for users to protect their privacy by using Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs). This is an indicator for a serious societal problem: democracy has already changed.
In the second part I will analyse the relationship between surveillance and security and I will argue that, and give reasons why, these international over‐reactions will not lead to the intended effects. Rather, they will have long‐term implications for the respective societies. So in the end this has to be acknowledged in a necessary appreciation of values.
PDF
