We examined the role of conflict monitoring processes in forming metacognitive judgements of confidence while performing base rate tasks. Recently proposed models of dual-process reasoning, as well ...as research, have shown that conflict detection might represent a link between Type 1 and Type 2 processing. Conflict detection has also been shown to affect metacognitive processes in reasoning tasks. By varying base rate probability and congruence, we generated base rate tasks of four distinct levels of congruence. The results of two experiments showed that participants were slower and less confident in conflict conditions regardless of their response. However, there were two distinct subsets of participants with different levels of sensitivity to conflict which resulted in different patterns of results when using low base rate ratios. In-depth analyses showed that the impact of base rate information in the formation of metacognitive judgements depended on congruence and response type. Base rate information was a more salient cue for metacognitive processes when responding according to base rates compared with responding according to belief. There is evidence that base rate information may serve as a direct cue for metacognition, independent of fluency.
Traditionally, paradigms used to study conflict in reasoning (and metacognition during reasoning) pit heuristic processes against analytical processes. Findings indicate that the presence of conflict ...between processes prolongs reasoning and decreases accuracy and confidence. In this study, we aimed to explore reasoning and metacognition when only one type of heuristic process is exploited to cue multiple responses. In two experiments, a novel modification of the Base Rate neglect task was used to create versions in which one belief-based heuristic competes, or works in concert, with another of the same type to provide a response. Experiment 1 results reveal that the presence of conflict between cued responses does not affect meta-reasoning, which indicates that reasoning defaulted to a single process. An alternative explanation was that the effect of conflict was masked due to an imbalance in the strength of the dominant response between conflicting and congruent versions. Experiment 2 was designed to test hypotheses based on these competing explanations. Findings show that when the strength of a response was no longer masking the effect, the conflict did result in longer reasoning times and lower confidence. The study provides more robust evidence in favor of the dual-process account of reasoning, introduces a new methodological approach, and discusses how conflict may be modulated during reasoning.
Until recently, studies within the dual-process approach were mainly focused on group differences in processing, and individual differences were neglected. However, individual differences have proven ...to be a significant factor in conflict detection efficiency and the overall success in base-rate neglect and similar tasks. This should be taken into consideration within the framework of the Hybrid Model of Dual Processing. New tendencies in the development of this model have focused attention on the degree of mindware instantiation as a predictor of base-rate neglect task efficiency. This study aimed to examine the relationship between mindware and base-rate neglect task efficiency and to test and explore the relationship between base-rate response frequency and conflict detection efficiency and the degree of mindware instantiation. All participants solved base-rate neglect tasks, made judgments of confidence in their responses, and solved the Statistical Reasoning Test, Cognitive Reflection Test and Numeracy Scale. We used the Statistical Reasoning Test as a measure of mindware instantiation. The degree of mindware instantiation was found to be the only significant predictor of base-rate neglect task efficiency and the results showed that participants with a higher degree of mindware instantiation generally made more base-rate responses. No correlation was found between the degree of mindware instantiation and conflict detection efficiency. These findings support the hypothesis that the power of logical intuition depends on the individual’s degree of mindware instantiation. Therefore, the results of this research indicate the importance of further research into the role of statistical reasoning in base-rate neglect task efficiency. However, we discuss that there are some methodological limitations in this research which might explain why the degree of mindware instantiation had no relationship with conflict efficiency.
Donedavno su istraživanja unutar pristupa dvojnoga procesiranja uglavnom
bila usmjerena na grupne razlike u procesiranju, a individualne su razlike bile zanemarene. Međutim, individualne su se razlike pokazale značajnim čimbenikom u objašnjenju učinkovitosti detekcije konflikta i ukupnoga uspjeha u zadatku temeljnoga omjera i sličnim zadacima. Navedeno treba uzeti u obzir u okviru Hibridnoga modela dvojnoga procesiranja. Nove tendencije u razvoju toga modela usmjerile su se na stupanj usvojenosti mindwarea kao prediktora uspješnosti u zadatku temeljnoga omjera. Slijedom navedenoga, cilj je ovoga istraživanja bio ispitati odnos mindwarea i uspjeha u zadatku temeljnoga omjera te ispitati i istražiti odnos između frekvencije odgovora temeljnoga omjera, učinkovitosti detekcije konflikta i stupnja usvojenosti mindwarea. Svi su sudionici rješavali zadatke temeljnoga omjera, donosili metakognitivne procjene sigurnosti u svoje odgovore te rješavali Test statističkoga rasuđivanja, Test kognitivne refleksije i Skalu numeričnosti. Test statističkoga rasuđivanja bio je korišten kao mjera stupnja usvojenosti mindwarea. Utvrđeno je da je stupanj usvojenosti mindwarea jedini značajan prediktor uspješnosti u zadatku temeljnoga omjera, a rezultati su ujedno pokazali i da su sudionici s višim stupnjem usvojenosti mindwarea općenito dali više odgovora temeljnoga omjera. Nije utvrđena povezanost između stupnja usvojenosti mindwarea i detekcije konflikta. Dobiveni nalazi podupiru hipotezu da moć logičke intuicije ovisi o stupnju usvojenosti mindwarea. Stoga rezultati ovoga istraživanja ukazuju na važnost daljnjega istraživanja uloge statističkoga rasuđivanja u objašnjenju uspješnosti u zadacima temeljnoga omjera. Nadalje, u radu se raspravlja i o određenim metodološkim ograničenjima koja bi mogla objasniti zašto nije utvrđena povezanost stupnja usvojenosti mindwarea i detekcije konflikta.
The control architecture guiding simple movements such as reaching toward a visual target remains an open problem. The nervous system needs to integrate different sensory modalities and coordinate ...multiple degrees of freedom in the human arm to achieve that goal. The challenge increases due to noise and transport delays in neural signals, non-linear and fatigable muscles as actuators, and unpredictable environmental disturbances. Here we examined the capabilities of hierarchical feedback control models proposed by W. T. Powers, so far only tested
in silico
. We built a robot arm system with four degrees of freedom, including a visual system for locating the planar position of the hand, joint angle proprioception, and pressure sensing in one point of contact. We subjected the robot to various human-inspired reaching and tracking tasks and found features of biological movement, such as isochrony and bell-shaped velocity profiles in straight-line movements, and the speed-curvature power law in curved movements. These behavioral properties emerge without trajectory planning or explicit optimization algorithms. We then applied static structural perturbations to the robot: we blocked the wrist joint, tilted the writing surface, extended the hand with a tool, and rotated the visual system. For all of them, we found that the arm
in machina
adapts its behavior without being reprogrammed. In sum, while limited in speed and precision (by the nature of the do-it-yourself inexpensive components we used to build the robot from scratch), when faced with the noise, delays, non-linearities, and unpredictable disturbances of the real world, the embodied control architecture shown here balances biological realism with design simplicity.
The aim of this study was to introduce a modified version of the covariation detection task to the meta-reasoning framework. This task has been used to assess scientific reasoning through the ...evaluation of fictitious experiment outcomes and hypothesis testing. The traditional covariation detection task was modified to include only the magnitude versus ratio-bias. The participants' task was to evaluate the effectiveness of an experimental manipulation in a series of fictitious experiments. Experiment 1 (N = 61) consisted of twenty covariation detection tasks. In half of the tasks, normative and heuristic responses were congruent, and for the other half they were incongruent. Experiment 2 (N = 48) had the same experimental design, however, the fictitious data was modified to increase the relative strength of the normative response. After each trial participants provided a judgment of confidence. Results confirmed that the main manipulation of congruence was successful. Participants were more accurate, faster and more confident in the congruent condition. The manipulation from Experiment 2 had a larger impact on response times than on confidence judgments and accuracy. Correct responses were faster in Experiment 2 when compared to Experiment 1, with higher confidence for correct congruent responses. Analyses by response type revealed large individual differences in the relative strength of the processes which generate normative and biased responses. Participants were faster and more confident when rationalizing in favour of their dominant response while they were slower and less confident when decoupling from that dominant response. The covariation detection task provides new valuable insight into meta-reasoning processes.
Deontic Moral Reasoning Task Sudić, Mislav; Valerjev, Pavle; Ćirić, Josip
Psihologijske teme,
12/2019, Volume:
28, Issue:
3
Journal Article
Open access
Domain theory suggests that moral rules and conventions are perceived differently and elicit a different response. A special procedure was designed to test this hypothesis in a laboratory setting ...using a deontic reasoning task. The goal was to gain insight into the cognitive and metacognitive processes of deontic reasoning from simple deontic premises. In the 3x2x2 within-subjects design, we varied rule-content (moral, conventional, abstract), rule-type (obligation, permission) and the induced dilemma (punishment dilemma, reward dilemma). Participants (N = 78) were presented with 12 laws. After memorizing a law, eight cases were presented to participants so that they make a quick judgment. Participants were tasked with punishing rule-violators, ignoring rule-conformists, and rewarding rule-supererogation. Response times (RT) and accuracy were measured for each judgment, and final confidence was measured after a set of judgments. No differences were expected between rule-types, except for superior performance for moral content and punishment dilemmas. RT correlated negatively with confidence levels, while accuracy correlated positively. Moral reasoning was more accurate than conventional and abstract reasoning, and produced higher confidence levels. Better performance was found for punishment dilemmas than reward dilemmas, likely due to the presence of a cheater-detection module; but the differences were not found in moral reasoning. Moral reasoning was also independent of rule-type, while conventional and abstract reasoning produced superior performance in obligation-type than in permission-type rules. A large drop-off in accuracy was detected for rules that allowed undesirable behaviour, a phenomenon we termed the "deontic blind spot". However, this blind spot was not present in moral reasoning. Three lines of evidence indicate a qualitative difference between the moral and other deontic domains: (1) performance for moral content was independent of rule-type, (2) moral content produced an equal activation of violator- and altruist-detection modules, and (3) moral content produces higher levels of confidence.
Teorija domena pretpostavlja da se moralna i konvencionalna pravila drugačije percipiraju i rezultiraju različitim odgovorima. Osmišljena je procedura za testiranje ove hipoteze u laboratorijskim uvjetima koristeći zadatak deontičkog rasuđivanja. Cilj je bio dobiti uvid u kognitivne i metakognitivne procese deontičkog rasuđivanja polazeći od jednostavnih deontičkih premisa. Korištenjem nacrta 3x2x2 s ponovljenim mjerenjima manipulirali smo sadržajem pravila (moralna, konvencionalna, apstraktna), tipom pravila (obaveze, dopuštenja) i induciranom dilemom (dilema kažnjavanja, dilema nagrađivanja). Sudionicima (N = 78) prikazano je 12 zakona. Nakon što su zapamtili zakon, prezentirano im je osam slučajeva za koje su morali donijeti brzu odluku. Zadatak im je bio kažnjavanje prekršitelja, ignoriranje konformista i nagrađivanje supererogatornih. Mjereno je vrijeme odgovora i točnost za svaku odluku te konačna sigurnost nakon jednog niza odluka. Nisu očekivane razlike između tipova pravila, ali je očekivana bolja izvedba kod moralnih sadržaja i dilema kažnjavanja. Vrijeme je odgovora bilo negativno, a točnost pozitivno povezana s razinom sigurnosti. Moralno rasuđivanje bilo je točnije od konvencionalnog i apstraktnog te je dovelo do više razine sigurnosti. Bolja je izvedba utvrđena pri dilemama kažnjavanja u usporedbi s nagrađivanjem, vjerojatno zbog prisutnosti modula za detekciju varalica, ali te razlike nisu utvrđene pri moralnom rasuđivanju. Moralno je rasuđivanje također bilo neovisno o tipu pravila, dok su konvencionalno i apstraktno rasuđivanje doveli do bolje izvedbe pri obavezama nego dopuštenjima. Velik je pad u točnosti utvrđen za pravila koja su dopuštala nepoželjna ponašanja, što je fenomen koji smo nazvali "deontička slijepa pjega". Ipak, ova slijepa pjega nije bila prisutna pri moralnom rasuđivanju. Zaključno, rezultati upućuju na kvalitativne razlike između moralne domene i ostalih: (1) izvedba pri moralnom sadržaju nije ovisila o tipu pravila, (2) moralni je sadržaj proizveo jednaku aktivaciju modula detekcije varalica i altruista te (3) moralni je sadržaj proizveo viši stupanj sigurnosti
Localisation of simple stimuli such as angle vertices may contribute to a plethora of illusory effects. We focus on the Müller-Lyer illusion in an attempt to measure and characterise a more ...elementary effect that may contribute to the magnitude of said illusion. Perceived location error of angle vertices (a single set of Müller-Lyer fins) and arcs in a 2D plane was measured with the aim to provide clarification of ambiguous results from studies of angle localisation and expand the results to other types of stimuli. In three experiments, we utilised the method of constant stimuli in order to determine perceived locations of angle vertices (Experiments 1 and 2) as well as circular and elliptical arcs (Experiment 3). The results show significant distortions of perceived compared to objective vertex locations (all effect sizes d > 1.01, p < .001). Experiment 2 revealed strong effects of angle size and fin length on localisation error. Mislocalization was larger for more acute angles and longer angle fins (both ηp2 = .43, p < .001). In Experiment 3, localisation errors were larger for longer arcs (ηp2 = .19, p = .001) irrespective of shape (circular or elliptical). We discuss the effect in the context of modern trends in research of the Müller-Lyer illusion as well as the widely popular centroid theory.
La localisation de stimuli simples tels que les sommets d'un angle peut contribuer à une pléthore d'effets illusoires. Nous nous concentrons sur l'illusion de Müller-Lyer pour tenter de mesurer et de caractériser un effet plus élémentaire qui pourrait contribuer à l'ampleur de cette illusion. L'erreur de localisation perçue des sommets d'angle (un seul ensemble d'ailettes de Müller-Lyer) et des arcs dans un plan 2D a été mesurée dans le but de clarifier les résultats ambigus des études sur la localisation des angles et d'étendre les résultats à d'autres types de stimuli. Dans trois expériences, nous avons utilisé la méthode des stimuli constants afin de déterminer les positions perçues des sommets d'angles (expériences 1 et 2) ainsi que des arcs circulaires et elliptiques (expérience 3). Les résultats montrent des distorsions significatives des positions perçues par rapport aux positions objectives des sommets (toutes les tailles d'effet > 1,01, p < 0,001). L'expérience 2 a révélé des effets importants de la taille de l'angle et de la longueur de l'ailette sur l'erreur de localisation. L'erreur de localisation était plus importante pour les angles plus aigus et les ailettes plus longues (tous deux ηp2 = 0,43, p < 0,001). Dans l'expérience 3, les erreurs de localisation étaient plus importantes pour les arcs plus longs (ηp2 = 0,19, p = 0,001), quelle que soit leur forme (circulaire ou elliptique). Nous discutons de cet effet dans le contexte des tendances modernes de la recherche sur l'illusion de Müller-Lyer ainsi que de la théorie largement répandue du centroïde.
Public Significance Statement
This study shows that people misperceive the location angle vertices at a location toward the inner surface formed by fins of the angle. Furthermore, we show how fin angle and length impact the effect size as well as demonstrating the effect for a set of different stimuli (circular and elliptical arcs). This low-level effect may be one of the major mechanisms giving rise to one the oldest and most researched perceptual effects-the Müller-Lyer illusion.
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CEKLJ, FFLJ, NUK, ODKLJ, PEFLJ
Natural language quantifiers are used to express information about quantity. Many psychological studies researched the subjective meaning of such expressions, as well as individual and contextual ...differences in their interpretation. Quantifiers differ in the property of focus, i.e. in focusing attention on different aspects of the described situation (Sanford, Dawydiak, & Moxey, 2007). The aim of the present study was to explore this property of quantifiers in Croatian. Eighty-three students participated in an experiment. Focus effect was tested for three quantifiers (malo/few, puno/many, nekoliko/a few) using sentence continuation procedure. Participants read 18 sentences, each combined with one of the three quantifiers. Type of continuation was also manipulated: one group was required to produce anaphoric continuation, and the other to produce an explanation. Produced continuations were classified as referring to reference or complementary set. The results showed strong focus effect: continuations for sentences with positive quantifiers (puno, nekoliko) referred to reference set, and continuations for the quantifier malo referred to complementary set. A significant effect of the type of continuation, as well as the interaction between the type of continuation and the quantifier were also obtained: participants produced more complementary set continuations when they were asked to produce explanations.
In this study we examined the relationship between metacognitive judgments and accuracy in syllogistic reasoning. In three experiments, the participants made different types of metacognitive ...judgments: confidence judgments, judgments of performance and judgments of task difficulty. The confidence judgments were made (a) after producing a conclusion that logically followed from given premises (Experiment 1) and (b) after choosing the conclusion from a list of choices (Experiment 2), and judgments of performance were made (c) after a quick overview of a problem (Experiment 3). Judgments of difficulty were made before (Experiment 3) and after (Experiment 2) solving syllogistic problems. A total of 166 psychology students participated in the experiments. In all three experiments, participants were generally overconfident. The relative accuracy of judgments was generally low, with the exception of Experiment 1. The results do not indicate clearly that judgments made after solving tasks are more accurate than judgments made before solving them. The additional analysis by items showed positive correlations between different metacognitive judgments but lower correlations between judgments and reasoning accuracy, and negative correlations between metacognitive judgments and response times. PUBLICATION ABSTRACT
S razvojem industrije videoigara, mnogi istraživači nastoje identificirati kako karakteristike igrača, igre i njihova interakcija utječu na pojavu iskustva potpune zanesenosti u videoigrama. Stoga je ...cilj istraživanja ispitati odnos zadovoljenja osnovnih psiholoških potreba i frekvencije igranja igara s doživljajem zanesenosti pri igranju videoigara s visokim razinama nagrada ili kazni. Glavni problemi istraživanja su bili utvrditi postoji li razlika u kompetentnosti, autonomiji i doživljaju zanesenosti između aktivnih igrača i neigrača u situaciji nagrade i kazne te utvrditi prediktivni doprinos frekvencije igranja videoigara i osnovnih psiholoških potreba u objašnjenju varijance doživljaja zanesenosti. Sudionici (N = 69) su sudjelovali u eksperimentu u kojem su igrali dvije igre, od kojih je jedna igra imala izraženo visoke razine nagrade, a druga izraženo visoke razine kazni. Po završetku igranja pojedine igre, sudionici su ispunili Kratku skalu stanja zanesenosti i dvije subskale PENS upitnika. Analizom rezultata utvrđeno je da su svi sudionici doživjeli više razine kompetentnosti, autonomije i zanesenosti dok su igrali nagrađujuću igru, a igrači su doživljavali više razine kompetentnosti i zanesenosti od neigrača u obje situacije. Značajni prediktori zanesenosti su bili frekvencija igranja videoigara te zadovoljenje potrebe za kompetentnošću u situaciji igranja igre s izrazitim kaznama, a u situaciji igranja igre s izrazitim nagradama značajni prediktor bila je potreba za kompetentnošću. Konačno, zadovoljenje potrebe za kompetencijom tijekom igranja nagrađujućih igara može doprinijeti osjećajima zanesenosti, dok je kod kažnjavajućih igara uz kompetenciju prediktivno prijašnje iskustvo s igrama. Ključne riječi: videoigre, nagrade i kazne, zanesenost, psihološke potrebe
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