Abstract
In what follows, I attempt to reconstruct Fichte’s and Hegel’s reasons for developing at almost the same time two very different conceptions of a rational economic order. Whereas Hegel, on ...the basis of his objective notion of reason, would recommend that a rational state, founded on the notion of right, should include a strictly confined, socially embedded market economy, Fichte, on the basis of his subjective notion of reason, thought instead that the very same state must adopt an economic order that might well be described as a ‘planned economy’. Throughout the article I discuss whether it is the stark differences in their methodological premisses or their very different ideas about the individual freedom to be institutionalized in the economic sphere that helps us understand their respective notions of a rational economy.
This paper aims at focusing on Cassirer's relationship with Hegel during the crucial period when Cassirer is outlining and completing the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms in the early 1920s. The main ...thesis is that Cassirer has never abandoned his original Neo‐Kantian approach, despite the fact that it has been enriched within the perspective of a philosophy of culture indebted to some extent also to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. However, Cassirer maintains that Kant's critical idealism must be contrasted with Hegel's absolute idealism, keeping thereby open the process of the spirit that cannot close itself in a definitive logical structure. This critical stance is shared by some contemporaries of Cassirer such as Dilthey, Windelband, und above all Natorp. We have thus to read Cassirer's project against the historical backdrop of the ‘Hegel‐Renaissance’ in Germany, a circumstance that, according to the author, can contribute to a more adequate understanding of Cassirer's opus magnum.
In this paper, I raise a question concerning the place of ‘Teleology’ in Hegel's system of logic and ask whether ‘Teleology’ as a logical category can and should come immediately before ‘Life’. I ...offer two main reasons to think that the category of ‘Teleology’ might be misplaced. The first and the indirect reason is inspired by a difference between the logical system and the Philosophy of Nature concerning the immediate precursors and the emergence of life as a logical category and real determinacy. In Hegel's Logic, ‘Teleology’ is interposed between ‘Chemism’ and ‘Life’, while in his Philosophy of Nature, ‘Organics’ immediately follows ‘The Chemical Process’. Although the systematic order of the natural determinacies laid out in the Philosophy of Nature has no authority over the sequence of logical determinacies, and although there does not have to be a one-to-one correspondence between the logical categories and natural determinacies of Hegel's system, I argue that the smooth transition from the chemical process to the self-sustaining totality of the geological organism in the Philosophy of Nature, is an incentive to consider a parallel transition in the logical exposition, which I show to be workable. The second and the direct reason is that Hegel's category of ‘Teleology’ cannot but make a crucial reference to the initial determinacy of the category of ‘Life,’ without which it is inconceivable. By explaining why this reference is untenable and how, by contrast, the initial determinacy of life is conceivable independently of the process in which some subjective end is realized in objectivity through external means, I conclude that the logic of ‘Life’ and internal teleology should precede the logic of external teleology, allowing for a direct passage from ‘Chemism’ to ‘Life’.
This article offers a constructive reading of the ‘Teleology’ chapter in Hegel's Science of Logic. I argue that it contains an apparently conclusive case for the abstract concepts of means and end ...(in the sense of ‘purpose’), which has remained unrecognized in the literature. I then show some implications of the fact that the argument is entirely abstract in Hegel's system.
This article is an investigation into Hegel's claim that teleology is the truth of mechanism, which Hegel puts forward in the objectivity section in the Science of Logic. Contrary to most accounts of ...this section of the Logic, I make a case for a reading of Hegel's conception of external purposiveness according to which the latter makes a positive contribution to the structural development of the concepts of the Logic. I argue that external purposiveness plays a major role in understanding the Hegelian claim of teleology as the truth of mechanism. More specifically, I argue that structures of external purposiveness provide the conditions for the individuation of mechanical objects.
Hegel, more than any other modern Western philosopher, produced the most systematic case for the superiority of Western white Protestant bourgeois modernity. He established a racially structured ...ladder of gradation of the peoples of the world, putting Germanic people at the top of the racial pyramid, people of Asia in the middle, and Africans and indigenous peoples of the Americas and Pacific Islands at the bottom. In Hegel and the Third World, Tibebu guides the reader through Hegel’s presentation on universalism and argues that such a classification flows in part from Hegel’s philosophy of the development of human consciousness. Hegel classified Africans as people arrested at the lowest and most immediate stage of consciousness, that of the senses; Asians as people with divided consciousness, that of the understanding; and Europeans as people of reason. Tibebu demonstrates that Hegel’s views were not his alone but reflected the fundamental beliefs of other major figures of Western thought at the time.
This article investigates Hegel's later theory of perception and cognition, identifying and analysing its general assumptions about the relation among the mind's activities. These often unremarked ...upon assumptions, I claim, continue to underwrite recent interpretive controversies. I demonstrate how a correct understanding of such assumptions points us toward an alternative interpretation of Hegel's model of the mind. I argue that this new model changes how we understand (a) Hegel's later notion of ‘non-conceptual content’ and (b) his distinction between human and animal minds—two areas that constitute the fault line dividing interpretations of late Hegel. To isolate the relevant assumptions, I use Matthew Boyle's influential conceptual distinction between ‘additive’ and ‘transformative’ models of rationality. I demonstrate that Hegel himself addresses the basic issues characterizing this distinction and clarify how approaching his work in these terms presents considerable interpretative and conceptual advantages, including allowing us to defend the position that Hegel adopts a ‘transformative’ framework of mind. To support this argument, this paper closely analyses Hegel's treatment of sensation (Empfindung), which has not yet been systematically addressed by scholars. I show how sensation can be best understood as part of Hegel's later ‘transformative’ framework for cognition. I also show how this framework can be extended to other parts of Hegel's theory.
In Objektiver und absoluter Geist nach Hegel Oehl and Kok offer an extensive selection of papers by established Hegel scholars exploring the wide spectrum of Hegel's philosophy of spirit from the ...viewpoint of the distinction between objective and absolute spirit.
This article is a contribution to the occasional series dealing with a major book that has influenced the author. Previous contributors include Stewart Macaulay, John Griffith, William Twining, Carol ...Harlow, Geoffrey Bindman, Harry Arthurs, André‐Jean Arnaud, Alan Hunt, Michael Adler, Lawrence O. Gostin, John P. Heinz, Roger Brownsword, Roger Cotterrell, Nicola Lacey, Carol J. Greenhouse, David Garland, Peter Fitzpatrick, David Nelken, Lynn Mather, and Terence C. Halliday.
PDF
