Disabilities are people who experience physical, intellectual, mental, and / or sensory limitations for a long period of time who in interacting with the environment may experience obstacles and ...difficulties to participate fully and effectively with other citizens based on equal rights. For this reason, disabilities must be given access to public facilities that are more compared to normal humans, in order to fulfill a sense of justice. This research aims to find out the meaning of accessibility for persons with disabilities to achieve John Rawls's version of justice in Demak Regency. The research method used in this research is this type of research is qualitative legal research using a juridical-empirical (non-doctrinal) approach, which is this type of research to find out how the law is implemented. In this case the author wants to know how the implementation of the theory of justice according to John Rawls in fulfilling the accessibility for persons with disabilities to achieve the version of Justice John Rawls in Demak district. The results of this study indicate that: first, accessibility for persons with disabilities is the fulfillment of proper public facilities for persons with disabilities to facilitate their activities. Secondly, accessibility for persons with disabilities in Demak Regency is still minimal because public facilities are still focused on normal humans and there are several public facilities that not yet available so that John Rawls' version of the theory of justice has not been achieved.
El siguiente artículo se inscribe dentro de los problemas de la deliberación y constituye un análisis de la razón pública rawlsiana. Apoyados en una concepción ralwsiana de razón pública entendemos ...que se pueden dar respuesta a las principales objeciones que se han planteado contra este modelo, particularmente, desde el modelo habermasiano. De allí que buscamos dar cuenta de lo propicio que es el umbral de apertura que propone el modelo.
This article aims to recommend a new innovative solution to the problem of low awareness of judges who rule in water law cases. The examination of case studies revealed that the challenge does not ...invariably reside within the legal framework; rather, it is intricately linked to the environmental awareness of the judiciary. Judges often hesitate to prioritize environmental concerns as paramount, a hesitation grounded in discernible reasons. In the concluding section, a potential solution was advanced, positing that an imperative shift in environmental education, grounded in John Rawls's theory of justice, could serve as a transformative paradigm in judicial cognition. This proposed solution facilitates a shift in judges' perspectives from the immediate 'right here, right now' to a broader consideration of 'future generations.' Additionally, potential training measures were recommended in the final section as a means to instigate such a transformative change in perspective.
En este artículo presento y analizo el argumento de la igualdad política para defender el impuesto a la herencia de riquezas a partir de la teoría de justicia de John Rawls. Según Rawls, todos los ...ciudadanos deben tener una oportunidad aproximadamente igual de acceder a cargos de autoridad y de influir en el proceso político. Estas iguales oportunidades se ven amenazadas cuando las desigualdades económicas superan cierto límite. Como las transmisiones hereditarias explican una parte importante de las desigualdades económicas, es necesario un impuesto progresivo a las recepciones hereditarias para evitar concentraciones de riqueza que amenacen la igualdad política. Para prevenir la conformación de dinastías de poder político, este tributo debe incorporar alícuotas agravadas a las transmisiones intrafamiliares y un sistema de progresividad en el tiempo.
Gerechtigkeit und Moralismus Ulrich, Amadeus
Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie,
01/2022, Volume:
8, Issue:
2
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Der neue politische Realismus erkennt in John Rawls einen Erzfeind. In jüngeren Debatten scheint oft evident zu sein, dass gerade Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit exemplarisch für einen Moralismus sei, ...der die politische Wirklichkeit verzerre. Doch die Sache ist kompliziert. In diesem Aufsatz blicke ich zurück auf sein Frühwerk im Lichte dieser Kritik. Dabei geht es mir um vier Einwände: dass Rawls’ Idealtheorie (i) kein Ratgeber für das politische Handeln und ideologisch verblendet sei; (ii) Macht und ihre Legitimierbarkeit nicht überzeugend konzipiere; (iii) die Bedeutung politischer Konflikte und Uneinigkeit über den Inhalt der Gerechtigkeit unterschätze; und (iv) verkenne, dass eine wahrlich politische Theorie auf die Geschichte eingehen müsse. Wie stichhaltig sind diese Vorwürfe und was fördern sie zutage? Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass selbst Rawls’ erstes Hauptwerk nicht so einfach eines Moralismus überführt werden kann, wie es auf den ersten Blick den Anschein hat. Damit meine ich nicht, dass die Einwände allesamt keinen Biss hätten. Doch werden die Rechtfertigungslasten der Rawls’schen Gerechtigkeitstheorie nicht immer gebührend berücksichtigt; und manche Konterpunkte sind gerade bei wichtigen philosophischen Weggabelungen nicht ausreichend mit argumentativer Substanz untermauert. Wer einen Anti-Moralismus verficht, wofür es gute Gründe gibt, sollte weiterhin das konstruktive Gespräch auch mit dem frühen Rawls suchen und auf die internen Spannungen sowie realistischen Konzessionen seines Egalitarismus achten.
Gerechtigkeit und Moralismus Amadeus Ulrich
Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie,
01/2022, Volume:
8, Issue:
2
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
Der neue politische Realismus erkennt in John Rawls einen Erzfeind. In jüngeren Debatten scheint oft evident zu sein, dass gerade Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit exemplarisch für einen Moralismus sei, ...der die politische Wirklichkeit verzerre. Doch die Sache ist kompliziert. In diesem Aufsatz blicke ich zurück auf sein Frühwerk im Lichte dieser Kritik. Dabei geht es mir um vier Einwände: dass Rawls’ Idealtheorie (i) kein Ratgeber für das politische Handeln und ideologisch verblendet sei; (ii) Macht und ihre Legitimierbarkeit nicht überzeugend konzipiere; (iii) die Bedeutung politischer Konflikte und Uneinigkeit über den Inhalt der Gerechtigkeit unterschätze; und (iv) verkenne, dass eine wahrlich politische Theorie auf die Geschichte eingehen müsse. Wie stichhaltig sind diese Vorwürfe und was fördern sie zutage? Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass selbst Rawls’ erstes Hauptwerk nicht so einfach eines Moralismus überführt werden kann, wie es auf den ersten Blick den Anschein hat. Damit meine ich nicht, dass die Einwände allesamt keinen Biss hätten. Doch werden die Rechtfertigungslasten der Rawls’schen Gerechtigkeitstheorie nicht immer gebührend berücksichtigt; und manche Konterpunkte sind gerade bei wichtigen philosophischen Weggabelungen nicht ausreichend mit argumentativer Substanz untermauert. Wer einen Anti-Moralismus verficht, wofür es gute Gründe gibt, sollte weiterhin das konstruktive Gespräch auch mit dem frühen Rawls suchen und auf die internen Spannungen sowie realistischen Konzessionen seines Egalitarismus achten.
The purpose of this article is to draw a distinction between the political conception of justice and comprehensive doctrine in the discussion of public education, focusing on John Rawls's concept of ...public reason in his political liberalism. Through this process, the article addresses two educational interests, and considers public education as enabled by Rawlsian deliberative theory and his theory of the public. Public reason refers to the reasoning that people employ to justify their claims during deliberation. Individuals aim for public justification based on political values and the like, contained in political conception, by which they provide reasons for their claims. In this procedure, justification simply based on comprehensive doctrines is not permissible. Rawls's distinction between political conception and comprehensive doctrine is widely utilized as a conceptual tool to represent the aspects that can be shared (political conception) and those that cannot (comprehensive doctrine) in contemporary pluralistic societies. This article addresses two educational interests that arise when incorporating this distinction into discussions about public education. The first interest concerns the “justification of education,” and the second the “potentiality of education.” The former interest considers what kinds of public education are justified in deliberation by public reason, while the latter interest considers the effects of the justified education. This article approaches these interests by interpreting Rawls's public reason from two points of view. In summary, the article's conclusion can be stated as follows: during deliberation, individuals publicly justify their claims in ways that are acceptable to others in accordance with political values (proviso). At this time, individuals can introduce not only political conception but also comprehensive doctrines, such as religion, into deliberation. This has a positive significance. In deliberation based on public reason, fundamental political questions should be examined within political conception, but there are also other questions where more active deliberation can take place through the introduction of comprehensive doctrines. Based on the above, this article argues that for the first interest, we can justify certain conceptions of education based on not only political conception but also some comprehensive doctrines as public education, provided that public reasons can be presented. For the second interest, we can encourage the formation of the public sphere and of individual identity and society in the non-public sphere through education on public reasons. Depending on the course of deliberations, we can publicly justify specific conceptions of education based on specific comprehensive doctrines if public reasons can be presented, potentially further encouraging interaction between political conception and comprehensive doctrines and transforming the spheres. Nevertheless, this article recognizes only that the realization of the formation of individual and society is an outcome of the process of public justification; caution is required when aiming for this realization in education.
Peut-on justifier l’emploi de procédures démocratiques de décision en invoquant le désaccord irrémédiable qui existe entre les citoyen·nes sur les questions sociales, de justice et de droit ? Forgé ...par Rawls pour penser le statut des conceptions morales, philosophiques et religieuses dans une société libérale, le concept de « désaccord raisonnable » a été étendu par certain·es théoricien·nes de la démocratie, notamment Jeremy Waldron, pour englober toutes les questions politiques et juridiques. Cet article montre qu’une telle extension a des effets contre-productifs pour la justification de la démocratie. D’une part, elle aboutit à relativiser l’importance de la décision démocratique. D’autre part, elle fait paradoxalement apparaître le mode de décision démocratique comme injustifié.
Despite the rapidly growing literature on realism, there's little discussion of the ideology critique of John Rawls offered by one of its leading lights, Raymond Geuss. There is little understanding ...of what (most of) this critique consists in and few discussions of how Rawls' approach to political theorising may be defended against it. To remedy this situation, this article reconstructs the realist ideology critique of Rawls advanced by Raymond Geuss, which has three prongs: (1) Rawls' political theory offers insufficient tools to uncover and address distortions of our political values, beliefs, and intuitions; (2) it unacceptably reinforces these distortions by unduly legitimating them; and (3) it diverts attention from important features of real politics. With this done, I finish by considering how Rawlsians can respond, chiefly by employing a kind of reflective equilibrium, or reflective endorsement, broad enough to encompass different forms of genealogy and ideology critique.
In his paper "Public Reason and the Justification of Punishment," Zachary Hoskins develops and defends an idea of "public reason" that might be applicable to debates over punishment in the Western ...world. This short reply takes issue with some of Hoskins' conclusions (while agreeing with many of his premises), and suggests that contra Hoskins, many versions of retribution are not compatible with the ideal of public reason as Rawls articulated it. Instead, debates over criminal justice and punishment should properly revolve around the goods of public safety and harm reduction-rather than around any of the supposed metaphysical goods achieved by retributive punishment.
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