This article addresses the ways in which Turkish nationalism has perceived the Kurdish question. It is shown that both Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish question have passed through some ...paradigmatic moments in the twentieth century. This, I argue, has shaped the way that the Kurdish question has been perceived by Turkish nationalism. While the Kurdish question had been seen by Turkish nationalism mostly in terms of a fatal rivalry between the backward, pre-modern and tribal past and the prosperous present in the first half of the century, it was perceived in terms of a tension between the peripheral economy and national market in the fifties and sixties. In the 1970s, the Kurdish unrest was believed to be a product of communist incitement. Despite this impurity in perception, one thing has remained nearly unchanged for Turkish nationalism: Kurds could become Turkish. In other words, Turkish nationalism of the republican era has principally perceived Kurds as future-Turks. However, the signs in circulation at present indicate that the confidence of Turkish nationalism as to Kurds' potential of becoming Turkish is not as firm as it used to be. At present, Turkish nationalism seems to be getting prepared to abandon its contention that Kurds are future-Turks.
The Kurdish-led autonomous entity called Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (NES) – also known as Rojava – considers women’s liberation an imperative condition for shaping a democratic ...society. The practice of autonomy in NES shares strong resemblances with Non- Territorial Autonomy (NTA) models; however, it introduces a novelty in the role of women as active agents in building a plurinational democracy. This paper examines (1) the intellectual and political origins of the political role ascribed to women in autonomous administrations and (2) how the practice of autonomy in Rojava has advanced women’s rights by shedding light on both institutional implementation of women’s rights, as well as the creation of (non)-territorial spaces of women’s emancipation within the autonomous model. The argument made is that the conceptual framework of the Rojava model goes beyond the Kurdish question and can be considered an attempt to resolve a democratic deficit of liberal democratic nation-states through bringing together solutions that address the intertwined subordination of minorities and women.
Throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, its military and political elites in Ankara have regarded the Kurdish question as a security issue. Therefore, initiating the 'peace process' with the ...PKK and developing intimate relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have been regarded as deviations from the Turkish state's traditional policy toward the Kurdish question. However, the optimism that the peace process generated gradually has disappeared as the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the Kurdistan Regional Government have resorted to increasingly authoritarian policies. The declining democratization performance of the AKP and the KDP has deepened the internal divisions in both societies and bilateral relations between Turkey and the KRG have transformed into inter-governmental solidarity rather than institutional peace. Since the end of the 'peace process' following the June 7 national elections in 2015, the AKP has refused to deal with its country's Kurdish actors, which, it says, are linked to the PKK and its ideology. Meanwhile, the AKP's increasingly authoritarian policies have excluded non-AKP voters' views from the policy-making process. Therefore, the cooperation between Turkey and the KRG has excluded half of the Turks and the Kurds at best. Consequently, the traditional ethnicity-based confrontation between the Turks and Kurds has been replaced, on the one hand, by an alignment among the AKP, the conservative Kurds of Turkey, the KDP and its allies in Northern Syria, and on the other hand, are the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Gorran, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and some sections of the secular, middle class and Turks discontented with the AKP regime.
This paper is based on an empirical study examining Turkish and Kurdish teachers' perception of the national ideology of Kemalism and its effects on Kurdish pupils. A semi-structured interview was ...conducted with 30 teachers working in the east/southeast provinces of Turkey, which are predominantly inhabited by Kurds. The findings revealed that the Kemalist ideology has serious negative effects on Kurdish pupils, as it directly excludes and alienates the Kurdish identity. This paper also showed that the dominance of Kemalism in education seems to trigger a lot of other issues existing in society such as the exclusion of non-Turks and polarisation.
Until the very early 2000s, the Kurds had suffered from numerous Turkification policies; however, after the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) came into power in 2002, a ...new political process aimed at enhancing Kurdish ethno-cultural rights was initiated. As a result of this process, the historical harm done by the early republican regime, the three military administrations and their successor governments has been reduced. Notwithstanding, there are still some restrictions that can be removed through a new constitutional reform package. By employing the methods of comparative politics and constitutional law, this article gives the following suggestions for the reform package. First, in the name of laying a foundation for bilingual education, the reform package may delete or amend Article 42(9) of the Turkish Constitution, according to which the Kurds are now obliged to receive education in Turkish, hindering them from being taught in their mother tongue. Second, it may revise Article 3(1) of the Constitution, under which Turkish is the sole language of the state. The new version of Article 3(1) may recognise the Kurdish language and its dialects as national or regional official languages. Finally, the constitutional reform package may expand the scope of Article 134, pursuant to which only Turkish cultural, historical and linguistic features can now receive public funding and be protected constitutionally, and it may grant the same privilege to Kurdish characteristics.
I. Interview Interview conducted by Marie Le Ray, Istanbul, 30th October, 2006 EJTS: Could you introduce yourself and detail your academic career in Turkey and outside? Can you tell us how and when ...you got interested in the Kurdish question as a scholar? ZG: I studied economics as an undergraduate at Boğaziçi University between 1983 and 1987. After graduation, I worked as a journalist until 1992. I first became a correspondent for Arts and Features. I spent my time going to the movies, shows,...
Turkey's Kurdish language policy Zeydanlioglu, Welat
International journal of the sociology of language,
2012, Volume:
2012, Issue:
217
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
This article examines the Turkish state's assimilationist policy towards the Kurds and the Kurdish language in Turkey. It studies how the Turkish nationalist elites, the Kemalists, have throughout ...the 20th century systematically suppressed the Kurdish language as part of their aim to construct a homogenous nation-state of Turkish speakers. It shows that this linguicidal policy was strongly informed by the traumatic collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the consequent Kemalist emphasis on complete ethno-linguistic homogeneity as criteria for being “Turkish”, “Western” and “civilised”. The article discusses the various “Turkification” strategies of the authorities, such as banning the Kurdish language, the denial of the existence of the Kurds, changing the names of towns and villages, the forced re-settlement of Kurds and the assimilation of Kurdish children. It critically analyses the recent developments in Turkey's Kurdish language policy and the reform efforts of the current government as part of the country's EU candidacy. The article reflects however, that whilst looking good on paper, these reforms have had little impact in reality and Kurdish speakers in Turkey are still systematically denied their basic human and linguistic rights.
This article reports the findings of an ethnographic study of families with members involved in the armed struggle for Kurdish nationalism led by the Kurdistan Workers' Party. Based on in-depth, ...semi-structured interviews and observations with a theoretical sample of six families in the area of Yüksekova, detailed discussions were held with twelve members of families with children, partners, or siblings involved in the conflict. Ethno-national exceptionalism plays a significant role in determining the motivations of political violence among groups, but with the additional background of the perceptions and realities of systematic racialization, de-territorialization, disenfranchisement, and cultural exclusion that affect certain Kurdish groups. The findings in this article offer critical sociological and anthropological accounts of the localized drivers of ethno-nationalism, and the motivations for and the experiences of conflict among families with members involved in the armed conflict and the "Kurdish question" in Turkey.
This article discusses the role of women in the contemporary ethno-territorial struggle of Kurdish Question in Turkey. I argue that gendered development has become the primary terrain where Turkish ...and pro-Kurdish political groups articulate their nationalist interests. The Kürt Sorunu (Kurdish Question) - the enduring debate over the political status and rights of Turkey's Kurdish population - is Turkey's largest geopolitical challenge to date. In the last decade, Turkish government policy towards the predominantly Kurdish south-east region has shifted from military intervention to gendered and socio-economic development. Simultaneously, the popularity and growth of a formal pro-Kurdish political movement has given the campaign for Kurdish rights an institutionalized voice and stronger role in regional affairs. The primary work of both the Turkish national government and local pro-Kurdish municipality of late has focused on women. Drawing on historical analysis and participant observation of development activities, I describe the symbolic and physical role women play in the contemporary Kurdish Question. Geographically, this pointed focus on women marks a territorialization of political power upon gendered spaces of the home and neighbourhood. I describe this process of territorialization through an examination of education curriculum, neighbourhood mapping and nationalist landscapes.