Abstract In this paper, I analyse the discussion about perceptual conceptualism and non-conceptualism transferred to the phenomena of aspect perceptions presented by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Part ...titled “Philosophy of Psychology” ofPhilosophical Investigations. In doing so, I will reconstruct these positions by collecting some of the main theses of those who have taken a position in the contest. I will focus on the contributions of Sonia Sedivy and Charles Travis on behalf of conceptualism and the non-conceptualist defence of Avner Baz about aspects of these phenomena. As a result, the examination calls into question the terms of the debate between conceptualism and non-conceptualism. In this sense, the primary purpose of this research is negative since I will limit myself to sustain that neither of the presented positions is an adequate characterisation of the content of Wittgensteinian aspect perception.
Resumen En el presente artículo analizo la discusión acerca del conceptualismo y el no-conceptualismo perceptual transferida al fenómeno de la percepción de aspectos presentado por Ludwig Wittgenstein en la Parte titulada “Filosofía de la Psicología” de las Investigaciones Filosóficas. Al hacerlo, reconstruiré estas posiciones colectando algunas de las tesis principales de aquellos que han tomado posición en el debate. Me enfocaré en las contribuciones de Sonia Sedivy y Charles Travis en representación del conceptualismo y en las propias de Avner Baz en su defensa no-conceptualista de los aspectos de estos fenómenos. Como resultado, este examen pone en cuestión los términos del debate entre conceptualismo y no-conceptualismo. En este sentido, el propósito primario de esta indagación es negativo, desde que me limitaré a sostener que ninguna de las posiciones presentadas es una caracterización adecuada de la percepción de aspectos wittgensteiniana.
Resumo Neste artigo analiso a discussão sobre o conceitualismo e o não-conceitualismo perceptual transferido para o fenômeno da percepção de aspectos apresentado por Ludwig Wittgenstein na parte intitulada “Filosofia da Psicologia” das Investigações Filosóficas. Ao fazê-lo, reconstruirei estas posições recolhendo algumas das principais teses daqueles que se posicionaram no debate. Centrar-me-ei nas contribuições de Sonia Sedivy e Charles Travis na representação do conceptualismo e nas de Avner Baz na sua defesa não-conceitualista dos aspectos destes fenómenos. Como resultado, este exame questiona os termos do debate entre conceitualismo e não-conceitualismo. Nesse sentido, o objetivo principal desta investigação é negativo, uma vez que me limitarei a sustentar que nenhuma das posições apresentadas é uma caracterização adequada da percepção de aspecto wittgensteiniana.
One of the most pleasurable aspects of video games is their ability to induce immersive experiences. However, there appears to be a tentative conceptualization of what an immersive experience is. In ...this short review, we specifically focus on the terms of flow and immersion, as they are the most widely used and applied definitions in the video game literature, whilst their differences remain disputable. We critically review the concepts separately and proceed with a comparison on their proposed differences. We conclude that immersion and flow do not substantially differ in current studies and that more evidence is needed to justify their separation.
De acuerdo con una interpretación conceptualista de la filosofía teórica de Kant, el uso de conceptos es una condición necesaria de la percepción. Una objeción frecuente de los no-conceptualistas ...kantianos en contra de esta posición señala que Kant aceptaba que las percepciones no requieren conceptos porque sostuvo que los animales no-humanos carecen de ellos. El objetivo de este artículo es responder a esta objeción mostrando que Kant imaginaba la vida mental de los animales no-humanos, sin uso de conceptos, como un mecanismo natural que coordina sensaciones, impulsos y respuestas, en el cual no hay representación de objetos en sentido estricto
This work examines Kant's remarkable decision to rewrite the core argument of the first Critique, the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. I identify a two-part structure common to both ...versions: first establishing an essential role for the categories in unifying sensible intuitions; and then addressing a worry about how the connection between our faculties asserted in the first part is possible. I employ this structure to show how Kant rewrote the argument, focusing on Kant's response to the concerns raised in an early review by Johann Schultz. Schultz's dissatisfaction with the original Deduction lies in its second part, and Kant's subsequent revisions are focused on providing a better answer to this how-possible question. The new Deduction offers a more direct and convincing account of how our faculties work together to make experience possible.
Este escrito gira en torno al libro de poesía visual Fuera de trabajo de Esteban Valdés, libro singular en la historia de Puerto Rico que representa la corriente de la poesía visual. En un presente ...donde los medios de comunicación acaparan gran parte de nuestra cotidianidad y ecología visual e imaginaria la exploración con el lenguaje y los libros de artista pueden servir para proponer otra lógica, fuera de la capitalista colonial. Poniendo énfasis en ejemplos lúdicos y de compromiso social, veremos cómo procesos de experimentación nos ayudan a visionar y trazar distintas maneras de pensar-accionar. Basándome en el discurso artístico, exploro la función poética como herramienta productora de realidades. Partiendo de la premisa de que es a través de la exploración del lenguaje, rompiendo y experimentando con sus límites, es que se forman “otros mundos posibles”.
The article is devoted to the work of the Ural conceptual artist Vladimir Georgievich Zhukov in the period from 1970 to the 2020s. The master works mainly with installations, creating works from ...various materials (metal, wood, stone), develops unique ideas and experiments with form. The articles highlights the little-studied aspects of the artist's creative path, examines significant works, and analyzes the activities of Vladimir Zhukov in the context of the modern artistic process, and the contribution of the master to the art of the Ural underground.
Percepción y mentes animales Kalpokas, Daniel E
Revista de filosofía (Madrid),
12/2018, Volume:
43, Issue:
2
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
En este artículo propongo una variedad de conceptualismo contra la objeción no conceptualista de acuerdo con la cual los enfoques no conceptualistas no serían capaces de explicar apropiadamente la ...percepción animal. En primer lugar, sintetizo la posición de McDowell sobre las mentes animales. En segundo lugar, señalo algunos problemas conceptuales en ella. En tercer lugar, sugiero una extensión del conceptualismo al reino animal a fin de resolver las inconsistencias de McDowell y de acomodar cierta evidencia empírica acerca de algunas capacidades intelectuales atribuidas a algunos animales. Finalmente, presento dos argumentos para rechazar el no conceptualismo. La posición resultante es una versión mínima o deflacionada de conceptualismo de acuerdo con la cual ciertos animales no humanos son capaces de participar del espacio lógico de las razones aun cuando no sean capaces de justificar sus creencias o acciones.
In the 3rd Analogy, Kant claims that I can perceive that things coexist by synthesizing my perceptions in an order-indifferent way. Reigning orthodoxy holds that I first successively perceive ...different things, and then (through some further act) determine that the things I perceive coexist. Focusing on prominent examples of this approach, I argue that these accounts fail to do justice to the order-indifferent synthesis that Kant describes: Strawson explains the synthesis in a way which renders Kant’s argument in the 3rd Analogy obviously unconvincing, Watkins makes the synthesis irrelevant to Kant’s argument, while Longuenesse and Allison make the unity of the synthesis obscure. The problems with these views, I contend, show that Kant thinks the rule for synthesizing my perceptions is already operative in the successive perceptions, such that the fundamental act of perception already involves ‘objective time-determinations.’ This connects with the recent dispute about whether Kant is a conceptualist: my argument provides additional evidence that Kant is a conceptualist, while also extending the conceptualist reading to the 3rd Analogy in a novel way. For those who think conceptualism is wrong, my argument serves as a critical notice that non-conceptualists have yet to offer a satisfying interpretation of the 3rd Analogy.
The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde by Robert Louis Stevenson recounts the story of a man divided against himself, oscillating between two identities - one decent (named Jekyll) and one ...wicked (named Hyde). This short essay by Christian Bök examines the transitions that occur in the narrative, when the proper names shift from one moniker to the other in reference to the protagonist: each name vying for 'citation' in the story, thereby attempting to predominate, as a signifier, throughout the course of events. The narrative (perhaps coincidentally) maintains an almost equal usage of these two names, as if preserving an equilibrium of tensions between their contrarian identities, balancing them almost perfectly, giving each character 100 chances to be mentioned. The form of the story thus seems to perform the idea of eponymic division, indicated within the plot.
A central objection to McDowell’s conceptualism about empirical content concerns the fine-grained phenomenology of experience, which supposedly entails that the actual content of experience cannot be ...matched in its particularity by our concepts. While McDowell himself has answered this objection in recourse to the possibility of demonstrative concepts, his reply has engendered a plethora of further objections and is widely considered inadequate. I believe that McDowell’s critics underestimate the true force of his reply because they tend to read unrecognized empiricist presuppositions into his account of experience. To show this, I introduce a new hylomorphic reading of McDowell’s account of experience and argue that the objections to his reply all rest on a specific empiricist assumption, which is untenable because it conflates the form of experience with its content. Consequently, conceptualism so understood can resist all of these objections, as I attempt to show by systematizing and answering them.
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