Contemporary debates on Russian nuclear strategy focus on making sense of Russia's nuclear capabilities, signalling and nuclear declarations. This paper argues that understanding how nuclear ...capabilities and strategy interact with conventional capabilities is fundamental to understanding nuclear strategy. It offers the Conventional Balance of Forces thesis for explaining change in Russia's nuclear strategy after the Cold War. It shows how Russian nuclear debates and strategy decisions have been affected by perceived conventional vulnerabilities, and how the orthodox Western interpretation of Russian nuclear strategy today as one of 'escalating to de-escalate' comes short of explaining when Russia would go nuclear in conflict, and why.
The use of conventional armed forces in a deterrent role merits close consideration. Instability in weak or failing states can have global ramifications, while efforts to build stability take time. ...In principle, conventional deterrence can be used to buy the time required for such stabilization efforts. Attempts at deterrence will, however, need to overcome credibility problems stemming from the technical limitations associated with conventional armed forces, and with the likely requirement for multiple external actors to deter multiple intrastate audiences. While deterrence might work under certain circumstances, it will not play as central a role in strategy as it did during the Cold War.
Договор об обычных вооруженных силах в Европе (ДОВСЕ) был подписан в ноябре 1990 года государствами-членами НАТО и тогда еще не распавшейся Организации Варшавс- кого договора (ОВД). Нейтральные и ...неприсоеди- нившиеся участники Совещания по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе (СБСЕ, с 1995 года - ОБСЕ) в нем не участвовали, а сам Договор носил закрытый характер. Присоединение к нему государств, не вхо- дивших тогда в НАТО и ОВД, не предполагалось. Это обстоятельство важно для понимания современных дискуссий относительно контроля над обычными вооруженными силами в Европе.
Договор об обычных вооруженных силах в Европе (ДОВСЕ) был подписан в ноябре 1990 года государствами-членами НАТО и тогда еще не распавшейся Организации Варшавс- кого договора (ОВД). Нейтральные и ...неприсоеди- нившиеся участники Совещания по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе (СБСЕ, с 1995 года - ОБСЕ) в нем не участвовали, а сам Договор носил закрытый характер. Присоединение к нему государств, не вхо- дивших тогда в НАТО и ОВД, не предполагалось. Это обстоятельство важно для понимания современных дискуссий относительно контроля над обычными вооруженными силами в Европе.
With the end of the cold war, the military posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has entered a period of profound change. Prior to the recent dramatic political events in Europe, ...however, NATO conventional force levels in the Central Region had been remarkably stable for some three decades. This article seeks to explain this record of stability in terms of three widely used theories of international relations. It argues that balance-of-power theory and public goods theory cannot alone provide a satisfactory account. Rather, these traditional approaches for understanding alliance behavior must be supplemented by regime theory, which emphasizes the constraining effects of enduring institutional factors even in the face of structural change. Specifically, it shows how an international regime has influenced the provision of conventional forces in the Central Region by alliance members. More generally, this analysis seeks to contribute to the literature on international regimes in three ways. First, it demonstrates that regimes do matter by providing an example of their importance for explaining state behavior and international outcomes. Second, it extends regime theory to relations among military allies. Third, it elaborates a comprehensive model for understanding why states actually comply with regime injunctions. The model stresses both the ways in which regimes effectively modify the international environment within which states operate, altering the costs and benefits associated with different courses of action, and the ways in which participating states may internalize regime norms and rules, thereby making compliance increasingly automatic.
The Ottawa Conference began on February 12, 1990. The ministers arrived the day before, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ministers spent part of the evening in an alliance caucus. ...The primary focus of their attention had been on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) issues. A select group of ministers and their senior staffs were also working secretly on the question of German reunification and would announce a breakthrough formula in Ottawa. The breakthrough on the German reunification question would be the event for which the conference would be most remembered.¹
Attention turned to Open Skies the next morning,
NATO's decision to expand in Eastern Europe has been met with opposition by Russia. Initially, the inclusion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the organization was opposed by Boris Yeltsin ...but he relented in the end since the presence of Belarus and Ukraine created a buffer zone between Russia and NATO. However, the next round of expansion, which will include the Baltics, is being opposed adamantly by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. On the other hand, Lithuania sees NATO's indecision as a sign that Moscow is more important than Lithuania.
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