Third-Party intervention in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has become increasingly significant in contemporary international law. In September 2020, Canada and the Netherlands issued a ...joint statement suggesting their intention to intervene in an ongoing contentious case at the ICJ. This was a case on the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar). As reflected in their joint statement, the intervention was to support efforts that concerned all of humanity. The right of a third party to intervene accrues, if interest is of a legal nature, that may be affected by the decision of the ICJ (Article 62) or construction of a Convention to which States other than those concerned parties is in question (Article 63). The ICJ has strictly interpreted applications by third states. To put it into perspective, it has merely entertained 20 and 29 percent of applications and declarations under Article 62 and Article 63, respectively.
The ICJ in its order dated 16 March 2022, decided that the legality of the unilateral use of force to prevent acts of genocide is 'doubtful'. Based on this order, it is possible to say that the ICJ ...provides a yellow light to unilateral use of force for the prevention of acts of genocide. But the ICJ expressed its opinion in this respect in 2007, underlining that every state may only act within the limits permitted by international law. The doctrine underscored that the unilateral use of force for the prevention of genocide was forbidden. In this situation, the following question arises: is it really doubtful? To find the answer to this question, it is necessary to examine the legal basis and means for the prevention of genocide. In this article, the legality of the unilateral use of force for the obligation to prevent genocide has been comprehensively discussed.
Uluslararası Adalet Divanı (UAD), 16 Mart 2022 tarihli kararında, soykırım fiillerinin önlenmesi için tek taraflı kuvvet kullanımının hukukiliğinin 'belirsiz' olduğuna karar vermiştir. Bu karardan hareketle, UAD'nin soykırımın önlenmesi için tek taraflı kuvvet kullanımına sarı ışık yaktığını söylemek mümkündür. Aslında UAD bu konudaki görüşünü, her Devletin ancak uluslararası hukukun izin verdiği sınırlar içinde hareket edebileceğinin altını çizdiği 2007 tarihli kararında açıklamıştı. Doktrin, bu tespiti, soykırım fiillerini önlemek için tek taraflı kuvvet kullanımının yasaklanması olarak değerlendirmişti. Bu durumda akla şu soru gelmektedir: Gerçekten soykırımın önlenmesi için tek taraflı kuvvet kullanımının hukukiliği 'şüpheli' midir? Bu sorunun cevabını bulabilmek için soykırımın önlenmesinin hukuki zeminini ve araçlarını incelemek gerekir. Bu makalede, tek taraflı kuvvet kullanımı ile soykırımı önleme yükümlülüğü kapsamlı bir şekilde tartışılmıştır.
This paper is a follow-up to a debate on the book “The Nature of International Law” by Miodrag A. Jovanović. First, the approach towards erga omnes obligations adopted in the book is analyzed, after ...which a different perspective towards the concept is offered. The curious case of erga omnes obligations can be summed up by stating that there has hardly been more elucidated concept in international law but with so little clarification achieved. With the aim of shedding more light on this conundrum, the concept is compared to others of a similar nature, primarily jus cogens norms, only to identify that erga omnes obligations could be defined as jus cogens in statu nascendi. Respectively, it is argued that according to the current state of affairs in the international community, the International Court of Justice is an instance of last resort when distinguishing between jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes. Finally, the view concerning the three-layered nature of the international legal hierarchy is accepted, with jus cogens norms having the highest rank, followed by erga omnes obligations and with the jus dispositivum of international law in third place.
Climate change is forcing us to consider the right of people to leave their disappearing homelands, and the shape this right should take. Climate Change, Disasters and People on the Move proposes ...international protection as a solution with three pillars: granting protection against return to the country of origin (non-refoulement); preventing future displacement; and facilitating safe, orderly, and regular migration in the context of disasters and climate change. Dr. Aylin Yildiz Noorda uses the theories of common concern of humankind and community interests to operationalise her proposal, providing a blueprint for future claims.
Twenty years have passed since the author's delivery in 2000 of the general course of public international law at the Hague Academy of International Law, titled 'The Unity of the International Legal ...Order'. That course was designed to combat the all-too-common idea that international law was in the process of 'fragmentation'. It did so by developing a theory focused on the existence of and tension between two forms of unity in the international legal order: the formal unity (concerning the procedures by which primary norms are created and interpreted, and their non-compliance adjudicated) and the material unity (based on the content of certain norms of general international law, peremptory norms). Twenty years later, the time is ripe to revisit this theory to determine the extent to which it is still valid as a framework for the analysis of international law, particularly as an increasing number of 'populist' leaders very much seem to ignore, or voluntarily deny, the validity of some of the key substantial principles on which the international legal order was re-founded within and around the United Nations in 1945. When confronted with the factual reality of the present state of international relations as well as with the evolution of the law, one can conclude that the validity of the unity of the international legal order is unfailingly maintained, and that its role in upholding the international rule of law is more important now than ever.
This article aims to contribute to the current academic debate concerning the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine, by offering a critical perspective of the legal grounds and effectiveness of ...this doctrine. In the first part of this article, the emergence and evolution of the doctrine is examined, through the analysis of reports and documents written under the auspices of the United Nations. According to this early perspective, R2P was intended to act as an 'obligation' for states, as members of a new 'human-centred' international community. However, this ambitious vision was soon at odds with reality. The second part of this article is focused on a tentative deconstruction of R2P, by analysing the definition of 'responsibility' and the weaknesses of the doctrine as a whole. While the first and the second pillars do not pose particular concerns relating to their accordance with international law-even if their content does not add much in respect of the existent international instruments promoting or protecting human rights-the third pillar is very vague and unclear in terms of legitimate legal basis and effectiveness. Therefore, the third part of this article underlines the inconsistencies of the third pillar, by criticising its application within the context of the UN. The aim of this section is to determine whether or not the recent references to R2P doctrine contained in Security Council resolutions since 2006 can contribute to the consolidation of the R2P principle in practice. In concluding, a tentative approach to finding new legal grounds for R2P is presented. This restyling of an old-fashioned theory on intervention in case of erga omnes obligations is aimed at reinvigorating the doctrine in order to achieve the primary objective to reconcile universal legitimacy and effectiveness in defence of human rights.
The content of peremptory norms is always erga omnes obligations. The mirror conclusion is also correct: erga omnes obligations always mean the content of peremptory norms.It is impossible to give a ...list of peremptory norms and the content of erga omnes obligations. The principles of international law can be regarded as peremptory norms. It does not rule out the interpretation of them. Some provisions of the Declaration of principles of International law (1970) can also be regarded as concretizing peremptory norms.The concluding of an international treaty creating more favorable conditions for its participants which does not contradict peremptory norms should not be related to the violation of peremptory norms.The hierarchy of peremptory norms should not be understood as the priority of some norms in comparison with other ones. The development of inter-State relations and the development of international law make possible collisions between peremptory norms.It is possible to suppose the existence of regional peremptory norms or a linking group of States by another indication, on the condition that they do not contradict global peremptory norms.The Commission of International Law took a decision not to use the term “international crimes” preferring the term having a broader meaning “serious breach of a peremptory norm”.
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