Logical Intuition Is Not Really About Logic Ghasemi, Omid; Handley, Simon; Howarth, Stephanie ...
Journal of experimental psychology. General,
09/2022, Volume:
151, Issue:
9
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
Recent research suggests that reasoners are able to draw simple logical or probabilistic inferences relatively intuitively and automatically, a capacity that has been termed "logical intuition" (see, ...e.g., De Neys & Pennycook, 2019). A key finding in support of this interpretation is that conclusion validity consistently interferes with judgments of conclusion believability, suggesting that information about logical validity is available quickly enough to interfere with belief judgments. In this study, we examined whether logical intuitions arise because reasoners are sensitive to the logical features of a problem or another structural feature that just happens to align with logical validity. In three experiments (N = 113, 137, and 254), we presented participants with logical (determinate) and pseudological (indeterminate) arguments and asked them to judge the validity or believability of the conclusion. Logical arguments had determinately valid or invalid conclusions, whereas pseudological arguments were all logically indeterminate, but some were pseudovalid (possible strong arguments) and others pseudoinvalid (possible weak arguments). Experiments 1 and 2 used simple modus ponens and affirming the consequent structures; Experiment 3 used more complex denying the antecedent and modus tollens structures. In all three experiments, we found that pseudovalidity interfered with belief judgments to the same extent as real validity. Altogether, these findings suggest that while people are able to draw inferences intuitively, and these inferences impact belief judgments, they are not logical intuitions. Rather, the intuitive inferences are driven by the processing of more superficial structural features that happen to align with logical validity.
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•Intuitive processing led to more helping behavior.•Intuitive prosocial behavior is context-dependent.•Prosocial behavior is more likely to emerge in emergency situations.•Individuals with high SVO ...or HH exhibit stable prosocial behavior.•Reflection have made individuals low in SVO or HH more focused on self-interest.
While prosocial behavior is suggested to be a central feature of human life, there is an ongoing debate as to whether individuals have developed a general intuitive tendency to act prosocially or not. We show that prosocial behavior is better described as a person × situation interaction. In two studies (total N = 170), we tested the influence of processing mode on helping behavior in emergency and non-emergency situations and the moderating effect of prosocial traits (i.e., Honesty–Humility and social value orientation) using different experimental manipulations. These studies were conducted among Chinese samples, and provide evidence on prosocial behaviors beyond the “WEIRD” population. Consistent with the existing experimental literature on spontaneous cooperation, we consistently found intuitive processing led to more helping behavior. Moreover, this intuitive prosociality is context-dependent, moderated by the emergency and prosocial traits. Overall, we find clear evidence that the role of intuition and deliberation varies across both situations and individuals as predicted by the social heuristics hypothesis. Our findings reconcile previous diverging results by demonstrating these moderators, and extend our understanding of the model of intuitive prosociality based on social heuristics.
Morality is thought to underlie both ideological and punitive attitudes. In particular, moral foundations research suggests that group-oriented moral concerns promote a conservative orientation, ...while individual-oriented moral concerns promote a liberal orientation (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Drawing on classical sociological theory, we argue that endorsement of group-oriented moral concerns also elicits higher levels of punitiveness by promoting a view of crime as being perpetrated against society, while endorsement of individual-oriented moral concerns reduces punitiveness by directing attention toward the welfare of offenders as well as victims. Data from 2 independent samples (N = 1,464 and N = 1,025) showed that endorsement of group-oriented moral concerns was associated with more punitive and more conservative attitudes, while endorsement of individual-oriented moral concerns was associated with less punitive and less conservative attitudes. These results suggest that the association between conservatism and punitiveness is in part spurious because of their grounding in the moral foundations. Consequently, studies that do not take the moral foundations into account are at risk of overstating the relationship between conservatism and punitiveness.
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Theories proposing that how one thinks and feels is influenced by feedback from the body remain controversial. A central but untested prediction of many of these proposals is that how well ...individuals can perceive subtle bodily changes (interoception) determines the strength of the relationship between bodily reactions and cognitive-affective processing. In Study I, we demonstrated that the more accurately participants could track their heartbeat, the stronger the observed link between their heart rate reactions and their subjective arousal (but not valence) ratings of emotional images. In Study 2, we found that increasing interoception ability either helped or hindered adaptive intuitive decision making, depending on whether the anticipatory bodily signals generated favored advantageous or disadvantageous choices. These findings identify both the generation and the perception of bodily responses as pivotal sources of variability in emotion experience and intuition, and offer strong supporting evidence for bodily feedback theories, suggesting that cognitive-affective processing does in significant part relate to "following the heart."
Resumen: A partir de los aspectos más relevantes del origen y desarrollo del principio de visualización en la didáctica general se realizó una fundamentación de la validez del principio heurístico de ...visualización clínica. Abstract: On the basis of the most relevant aspects of the origin and development of the visualization principle in general teaching, a foundation was made on the validity of the heuristic clinical visualization principle.
Worry is an intuitive sense that goes beyond logical reasoning and is valuable in situations where patients’ conditions are rapidly changing or when objective data may not fully capture the ...complexity of a patient’s situation. Nurse anesthetists’ subjective reasons for worry are quite vague as they are valued inconsistently and not accurately expressed. This study aimed to identify factors playing a role in the emergence of worry during anesthesia practice to clarify its concept.
Mixed-methods design consisting of quantitative online surveys followed by qualitative focus group interviews including Dutch nurse anesthetists.
Both quantitative and qualitative thematic analyses were performed, followed by data and methodological triangulation to enhance the validity and credibility of findings and mitigate the presence of bias.
Surveys (N = 102) were analyzed, and 14 nurse anesthetists participated in the focus group interviews. A total of 89% of the survey respondents reported that at least once have had the feeling of worry, of which 92% use worry during clinical anesthesia practice. Worry was mentioned to be a vital element during anesthesia practice that makes it possible to take precautionary actions to change the anesthetic care plan in a changing situation or patient deterioration.
While a clear definition of worry could not be given, it is a valuable element of anesthesia practice as it serves as a catalyst for critical thinking, problem-solving, clinical reasoning, and decision-making. Use of the feeling of worry alongside technological systems to make an informed decision is crucial. Technology has significantly improved the ability of health care providers to detect and respond to patient deterioration promptly, but it is crucial for nurse anesthetists to use their feeling of worry or intuition alongside technological systems and evidence-based practice to ensure quick assessments or judgments based on experience, knowledge, and observations in clinical practice.
The goal conflict between short-term indulgence and long-term health considerations is at the heart of unhealthy food choices and is thus a key contributor to increased adiposity prevalence. Policy ...makers often attempt to promote healthy eating behaviors by raising consumers' health consciousness. Given that previous health campaigns have fallen short of expectations, this article examines the potential of health consciousness to resolve the so-called unhealthy = tasty intuition (UTI). Study 1 explores whether health consciousness attenuates belief in the UTI and its detrimental consequences for food choice and body mass. Study 2 applies the Implicit Association Test to disentangle the UTI's implicit and explicit processes. The results show that health consciousness operates only through cognitively controlled processes. Using real food products, Study 3 analyzes how health consciousness colors the influence of composition and labeling on tastiness and healthiness perceptions. The studies jointly demonstrate that the UTI partly works implicitly and independently of health consciousness. Thus, the obesity epidemic should be addressed through concerted actions that include policy makers' health communications and the food industry's product development.
The subject of the article is the non-plasticity of intuition, understood as the low susceptibility of intuition to modification even when the subject of the intuition gets acquainted with other ...evidence that is not consistent with intuition. The purpose of the article is to indicate possible interpretations of the non-plasticity of intuition – in what aspect intuition can be modified, and the importance of non-plasticity of intuition for distinguishing intuition from belief.
Decades of
research has shown that people are poor at detecting lies. Two explanations for
this finding have been proposed. First, it has been suggested that lie detection
is inaccurate because ...people rely on invalid cues when judging deception.
Second, it has been suggested that lack of valid cues to deception limits
accuracy. A series of 4 meta-analyses tested these hypotheses with the framework
of
Brunswik's
(1952)
lens model. Meta-Analysis 1 investigated
perceived cues to deception by correlating 66 behavioral cues in 153 samples
with deception judgments. People strongly associate deception with impressions
of incompetence (
r
= .59) and ambivalence (
r
=
.49). Contrary to self-reports, eye contact is only weakly correlated with
deception judgments (
r
= −.15). Cues to perceived
deception were then compared with cues to actual deception. The results show a
substantial covariation between the 2 sets of cues (
r
= .59 in
Meta-Analysis 2,
r
= .72 in Meta-Analysis 3). Finally, in
Meta-Analysis 4, a lens model analysis revealed a very strong matching between
behaviorally based predictions of deception and behaviorally based predictions
of perceived deception. In conclusion, contrary to previous assumptions, people
rarely rely on the wrong cues. Instead, limitations in lie detection accuracy
are mainly attributable to weaknesses in behavioral cues to deception. The
results suggest that intuitive notions about deception are more accurate than
explicit knowledge and that lie detection is more readily improved by increasing
behavioral differences between liars and truth tellers than by informing
lie-catchers of valid cues to deception.
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Experiments on theories of reference have mostly tested referential intuitions. We think that experiments should rather be testing linguistic usage. Substantive Aim (I): to test classical description ...theories of proper names against usage by “elicited production.” Our results count decisively against those theories. Methodological Aim (I): Machery, Olivola, and de Blanc () claim that truth‐value judgment experiments test usage. Martí () disagrees. We argue that Machery et al. are right and offer some results that are consistent with that conclusion. Substantive Aim (II): Machery et al. provide evidence that the usage of a name varies, being sometimes descriptive, sometimes not. In seven out of eight tests of usage, we did not replicate this variation. Methodological Aim (II): to test the reliability of referential intuitions by comparing them with linguistic usage. Earlier studies led us to predict that we would find those intuitions unreliable, but we did not. Our results add to evidence that tests of referential intuition are susceptible to unpredictable wording effects.
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