This study aims to describe tax avoidance or tax aggressiveness committed by a public company in Indonesia. To maintain company sustainability, taxation strategy must always be supported by a ...non-financial system. In Indonesia, sustainability report disclosure is voluntary, but the Indonesian government handles the issue by requiring the inclusion of social and environmental activities in the report as taxable operational costs. The research sample of this study comprises public companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, which have submitted sustainability reports separately. A total of 68 companies were involved, from which 132 datasets were obtained for further analysis via regression test. This research introduces a new way to measure tax aggressiveness (fiscal effective tax rate) to supplement the results generated by the existing measure (GAAP effective tax rate). The development of research shows that sustainability reporting has a significant effect on tax aggressiveness committed by public companies in Indonesia.
Purpose
Central to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was a requirement that every company have an audit of its internal control over financial reporting. However, there were concerns that this requirement was ...overly burdensome, from a financial perspective, for small businesses. This concern promoted several delays in enforcing the law for small companies and ultimately caused congress to permanently exempt small businesses. Yet, there are some small companies that voluntarily elect to comply with the law. The purpose of this paper is to explore why these companies elect to incur these costly audits.
Design/methodology/approach
Using a sample of 5,834 non-accelerator US firms, this paper uses a robust logistic regression model to examine why some firms comply voluntary with SOX Section 404(b).
Findings
This study shows that small companies getting audits of internal controls may be doing so to restore investor confidence after reporting failures, to appear credible prior to raising funds, as a response to organizational changes, or in anticipation of being required to comply.
Practical implications
This study provides regulators with an improved understanding of when it is necessary to implement mandatory rather than voluntary guidance.
Originality/value
This study is the first to document why a client would voluntarily comply with SOX Section 404 (b).
In December 1999, the SEC instituted a new listing standard for NYSE and NASDAQ firms. Listed firms were now required to maintain fully independent audit committees with at least three members. In ...July 2002, the U.S. Congress legislated these standards through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Our research question is whether all investors benefited from the 1999 new rule. Using both an event study and a difference-in-differences methodology, we find no evidence of higher market value or better financial reporting quality resulting from this rule.
We study the determinants and consequences of cross-listings on the New York and London stock exchanges from 1990 to 2005. This investigation enables us to evaluate the relative benefits of New York ...and London exchange listings and to assess whether these relative benefits have changed over time, perhaps as a result of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. We find that cross-listings have been falling on US exchanges as well as on the Main Market in London. This decline in cross-listings is explained by changes in firm characteristics instead of by changes in the benefits of cross-listing. We show that after controlling for firm characteristics there is no deficit in cross-listing counts on US exchanges related to SOX. Investigating the valuation differential between listed and non-listed firms (the cross-listing premium) from 1990 to 2005, we find that there is a significant premium for US exchange listings every year, that the premium has not fallen significantly in recent years, and that it persists when allowing for time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics. In contrast, no premium exists for listings on London's Main Market in any year. Firms increase their capital-raising activities at home and abroad following a cross-listing on a major US exchange but not following a cross-listing in London. Our evidence is consistent with the theory that an exchange listing in New York has unique governance benefits for foreign firms.
Section 104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB conducts inspections of registered public accounting firms that provide audits for ...publicly traded companies. The results of the inspection process are summarized in publicly available reports at the PCAOB website. Using these reports, we categorize the inspection reports into three levels of increasing severity: clean, GAAS-deficient, and GAAP-deficient. We examine the potential use of GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection reports as perceived audit quality signals for the clients of GAAP-deficient auditors that are inspected on a triennial basis by the PCAOB. Our investigation is predicated on the notion that audit quality is generally not directly observable. Thus, the clients of these auditors may seek to signal their desire for audit quality by dismissing their GAAP-deficient auditors. Our results suggest that the clients of GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditors are more likely to dismiss these auditors in favor of triennially inspected auditors that are not GAAP-deficient. In addition, we find that greater agency conflicts, the presence of an independent and expert audit committee, and outside blockholdings magnify this effect. Interestingly, we find no evidence that the clients use GAAP-deficient reports to procure a subsequent-year audit fee discount or more favorable going-concern auditor reporting treatment. Our evidence indicates that PCAOB inspection reports created heterogeneity in auditor brand name among a group of non-Big N/non-national auditors that did not previously exist and are universally treated by prior research as “other auditors.”
IFRS 17 requires a significant change to insurer accounting, and we look at some of the frictions resulting from its implementation. We make three points. First, since IFRS 17 is a principles-based ...standard, it will be costly to implement. Audit committees must become sophisticated users of the underlying models generating the reports. Second, we examine the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on U.S. public insurers and a similar law for private insurers to assess the costs of complying with new rules. We find evidence that these costs vary in their incidence across the industry. Third, we conduct an event study of specific announcements regarding IFRS 17 promulgation and implementation. We find a negative sentiment for announcements concerning the implementation. However, we cannot identify a single specific rationale for the negative sentiment as it could be related to several factors. In sum, we find that there are many reasons to keep insurance accounting as part of IFRS and some reasons that may lead to delays in implementation, but any concern this accounting standard is 'too difficult' is likely not due to the standard itself but to other things that may reflect the ultimate net benefits of the standard to investors.
This paper investigates the economic consequences of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) by examining market reactions to related legislative events. Using concurrent stock returns of non-U.S.-traded ...foreign firms to estimate normal U.S. returns, I find that U.S. firms experienced a statistically significant negative cumulative abnormal return around key SOX events. I then examine the cross-sectional variation of U.S. firms’ returns around these events. Regression results are consistent with the non-audit services and governance provisions imposing net costs. Additional tests show that deferring the compliance of Section 404, which mandates an internal control test, resulted in significant cost savings for non-accelerated filers.
We examine a comprehensive sample of going-dark deregistrations where companies cease SEC reporting, but continue to trade publicly. We document a spike in going dark that is largely attributable to ...the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Firms experience large negative abnormal returns when going dark. We find that many firms go dark due to poor future prospects, distress and increased compliance costs after SOX. But we also find evidence suggesting that controlling insiders take their firms dark to protect private control benefits and decrease outside scrutiny, particularly when governance and investor protection are weak. Finally, we show that going dark and going private are distinct economic events.
We examine various penalties that could serve as enforcement mechanisms for Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 404. We focus on firms with restatements, some of which had previously reported their control ...weaknesses as required and some of which acknowledged them only after announcing their restatement. We find no evidence that penalties are more likely for firms, managers, or auditors that fail to report existing control weaknesses. Instead, class action lawsuits, management turnover, and auditor turnover are all more likely in the wake of a restatement when control weaknesses had previously been reported. We find similar, although weaker, evidence for Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sanctions. These results are consistent with disclosure of control weaknesses making it difficult for management to plausibly claim later that they were unaware of the underlying conditions that led to restatements. The results also suggest that the public and private enforcement mechanisms surrounding SOX 404 are unlikely to provide strong incentives for compliance and offer a potential explanation for why most restatements are issued by firms that previously claimed to have effective internal controls.
We investigate going-private decisions in response to the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). We study firms that go private from 1998 to May 2005 and find: (1) the quarterly frequency ...of going-private transactions has increased after the passage of SOX, and (2) abnormal returns surrounding both the passage of SOX and the going-private announcement are significantly related to proxies for the costs and benefits of SOX and the net benefits of being a public firm. Our empirical evidence is broadly consistent with the notion that SOX has affected firms’ going-private decisions.
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