According to the skeptical argument from disagreement, we are mandated to suspend judgement about a question if we discover that others disagree with us. Critics, however, have proposed that this ...skeptical argument fails if there are not equally many people on either side of the debate: numbers matter. The present paper explicates this as the argument that a group can be more likely to arrive at the correct view by majority rule than the members are on their own. Defenders of the skeptical argument have resisted that numbers matter by observing that if group members depend on each other when forming their beliefs, then the group can be less competent than its members. However, neither side of the debate has accompanied their views with quantitative estimates of how detrimental dependence is for group competence. This paper tries to improve this situation by drawing on jury theorems from social choice theory. The paper cannot settle the debate, but it shows that even the lower limit on group competence will exceed the average individual competence when dependence among voters remains moderate. This should give confidence to those who propose that asymmetry between the disputing parties can counter the skeptical argument from disagreement since being in the majority can thus be higher-order evidence for the disputed proposition.
This book articulates and defends the position that terms for properties are rigid designators and that property designators' rigidity is put to good use in important philosophical arguments ...supporting and impugning various theoretical identity statements, including psychophysical identity statements. In the first chapter, rigidity in general is explained. Special problems raised by property designators specifically are discussed. In the next two chapters it is argued that designators for properties are subject to a genuine distinction and one that plays the same role that the rigid–nonrigid distinction plays for concrete-object designators: hence it is a rigid–nonrigid distinction. This distinction can be understood whether property designators are construed as singular terms (perhaps higher-order singular terms) or as merely predicative terms, as chapters 4 and 5 argue. In the final three chapters, the necessity of theoretical identities like ‘water = H2O’ is upheld, as is a skeptical argument impugning psychophysical identities like ‘pain = c-fiber firing’. Special attention is paid to the skeptical argument, which has been rejected by analytic functionalists (including Lewis), concept dualists (including Papineau), and scientific necessitarians (most of whom embrace scientific essentialism: including Shoemaker). Arguments aiming to establish scientific necessitarianism are rejected in favor of a broadly empiricist skepticism regarding psychophysical identities and many other statements that scientific necessitarians would regard as true and necessary. The book as a whole constitutes a broad defense of a tradition or set of traditions originating largely in seminal work from Kripke.
The purpose of this paper is to look at the problem of rule-following—notably discussed by Kripke (Wittgenstein on rules and private language, 1982) and Wittgenstein (Philosophical investigations, ...1953)—from the perspective of the study of generics. Generics are sentences that express generalizations that tolerate exceptions. I first suggest that meaning ascriptions be viewed as habitual sentences, which are a sub-set of generics. I then seek a proper semantic analysis for habitually construed meaning sentences. The quantificational approach is rejected, due to its persistent difficulties. Instead, a cognitive approach is adopted, where psychological considerations of meaning attributors play a crucial role. This account is then compared with the picture of meaning offered by Kripke and Wittgenstein, respectively. I show how this fresh way of conceiving of meaning sentences respects some of their insights while avoiding some of the drawbacks, and serves to improve the framework in which the current debate and inquiry about rule-following are conducted.
Hume’s Conceivability Arguments Reconsidered Chen, Bo; Liu, Jingxian
Axiomathes : quaderni del Centro studi per la filosofia mitteleuropea,
10/2019, Volume:
29, Issue:
5
Journal Article
This paper examines Hume’s formulations and uses of the conceivability principle (abbreviated as CP: Whatever is conceivable is possible) and the inconceivability principle (abbreviated as ICP: ...Whatever is inconceivable is impossible). In Hume’s works, we identify different versions of CP and ICP, including proper CP, proper ICP, the weak versions of CP and ICP, the epistemic versions of CP and ICP, and show that Hume not only expresses ICP, but also really maintains it. Assuming an axiomatic characterization of modalities, we argue that if there is a sharp distinction between levels of modalities, then Hume’s conceivability arguments do not hold. But, in a rather different way, we also argue that if Hume’s conceivability arguments hold, then there should be no distinction between levels of modalities. Finally, we argue that after Hume, there are lots of endeavors in logic and philosophy to distinguish different levels of modalities, and to accept new concepts of necessity other than logical necessity.
In religious epistemology there is a significant amount of focus on religious knowledge, but much less attention has been paid to religious understanding. This is unfortunate. It is unfortunate not ...just because religious understanding is an interesting topic but also because religious understanding is more epistemically valuable than religious knowledge. This chapter presents two reasons for thinking this is the case. The first is that the connection between understanding and action gives us reason to think this, and the second is that understanding plays a more important role in a religious context. Following this, the chapter argues that we ought to reconsider skeptical arguments against religious belief because although they may undermine knowledge, they may not undermine understanding—the chapter offers an example of a skeptical argument where focusing on understanding rather than knowledge provides us with a straightforward response.
Recently, scholars of ancient skepticism have raised what I call the Tranquility Charge: skeptical investigation aims at tranquility rather than at the discovery of truths; therefore it cannot count ...as genuine investigation. I argue that the Tranquility Charge, which was not raised in antiquity, rests on too simple a notion of investigation. Investigation need not aim at the discovery of truths. It must, however, be guided by epistemic norms that respond to the value of truth. On this premise, Pyrrhonian investigation can count as genuine investigation. First, it inherits a complex conception of investigation shaped by Socrates and Plato, whose philosophizing does not always immediately aim at the discovery of truths, though it certainly responds to the value of truth. Second, the motivation of investigation can be distinct from its aim. The Pyrrhonist’s motivation, namely that the mind is disturbed by discrepancy, reflects by itself concern with the truth. Third, it is a commonplace that the value of truth is associated with two aims rather than one: the acceptance of truths and the avoidance of falsehoods. The latter is prominent in skeptical investigation. The skeptics’ interlocutors share this preoccupation with the avoidance of the false, a preoccupation that, in its own way, reflects the value of truth.
Skepticism and Disagreement Lammenranta, Markus
Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy
Book Chapter
Though ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism is apparently based on disagreement, this aspect of skepticism has been widely neglected in contemporary discussion of skepticism. The paper provides a rational ...reconstruction of the skeptical argument from disagreement that can be found in the books of Sextus Empiricus. It is argued that this argument forms a genuine skeptical paradox that has no fully satisfactory resolution. All attempts to resolve it make knowledge or justified belief either intuitively too easy or impossible.
Bacon recognizes some important similarities between skepticism and his own philosophy, especially the skeptic’s emphasis on the weakness of our cognitive faculties and his suspension of judgment. ...But there is also a key difference: although both affirm the impossibility of knowledge, the skeptic claims that nothing can be known tout court, whereas Bacon contends that this is the case only as far as the traditional way of attaining knowledge is concerned. This essay examines the affinities and differences between Bacon’s philosophy and ancient skepticism, both Pyrrhonian and Academic, by focusing on a comparison between his doctrine of the idols and the arguments and themes found in the ancient and contemporary skeptical sources which he presumably read.
Hume on Skeptical Arguments Smith, Plínio Junqueira
Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy
Book Chapter
The paper is divided into two parts: the first deals with kinds of skeptical arguments, and the second with uses of skeptical arguments. In the first part, it shows that Hume distinguishes mainly two ...kinds of skeptical arguments: there are popular, weak skeptical arguments, and philosophical, strong skeptical arguments. The weaker skeptical arguments are mainly derived from ancient skepticism, both Academic and Pyrrhonian, whereas the stronger skeptical arguments are derived from modern philosophy, especially from Hume’s own empirical science of human nature. In the second part, it shows the difference, as Hume understands it, between Academic (or mitigated) skepticism and Pyrrhonism (or excessive) skepticism. This ancient distinction serves Hume’s own purposes. What is the difference between Academic scepticism and Pyrrhonism as they are construed by Hume? The difference lies in the use each form of skepticism makes of skeptical arguments. There can be two uses of the same skeptical arguments. One can use them to suspend judgment. This is the Pyrrhonian use. But one can also use the same arguments for other purposes, such as changing our attitude towards knowledge and affirming or restricting the scope of our inquiries. This is the Academic use of skeptical arguments. Two considerations are crucial for a skeptic to reach this Academic stance: the realization that these skeptical arguments admit no answer and the awareness that nature has implanted in us certain faculties and beliefs that resist the force of skepticism, which is devastating in relation to all other beliefs.
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