Psychopathic individuals display a chronic and flagrant disregard for the welfare of others through their callous and manipulative behavior. Historically, this behavior is thought to result from ...deficits in social-affective processing. However, we show that at least some psychopathic behaviors may be rooted in a cognitive deficit, specifically an inability to automatically take another person’s perspective. Unlike prior studies that rely solely on controlled theory of mind (ToM) tasks, we employ a task that taps into automatic ToM processing. Controlled ToM processes are engaged when an individual intentionally considers the perspective of another person, whereas automatic ToM processes are engaged when an individual unintentionally represents the perspective of another person. In a sample of incarcerated offenders, we find that psychopathic individuals are equally likely to show response interference under conditions of controlled ToM, but lack a common signature of automatic ToM known as altercentric interference. We also demonstrate that the magnitude of this dysfunction in altercentric interference is correlated with real-world callous behaviors (i.e., number of assault charges). These findings suggest that psychopathic individuals have a diminished propensity to automatically think from another’s perspective, which may be the cognitive root of their deficits in social functioning and moral behavior.
•People with Parkinson’s disease show comparable difficulties in understanding others’ mental states and emotional experiences.•Deficits in cognitive empathy/affective theory of mind only evident for ...performance based tasks.•Preliminary support for preserved affective empathy in people with Parkinson’s disease.
In contrast to well-documented deficits in the core social cognitive domains of social perception and theory of mind (ToM), how Parkinson’s disease (PD) affects one’s empathic capacity remains poorly understood. The current study provides the first meta-analytic review of both ToM and empathy as broad constructs, and also breaks these constructs down to clearly differentiate their overlapping (affective ToM and cognitive empathy) and distinct (affective empathy and cognitive ToM) components. A total of 38 studies contributed to these analyses, with results revealing that, relative to controls, PD is associated with significant and substantial deficits in the domain of cognitive ToM (g = –0.78), as well as the overlapping domains of affective ToM/cognitive empathy (g = –0.69). However, no group differences were identified for affective empathy (g = –0.08). These data speak to there being a potential preservation of affective empathic processing in PD, but because of the relatively limited research base on this topic, recommendations for future research are highlighted.
Successful social interactions depend on people’s ability to predict others’ future actions and emotions. People possess many mechanisms for perceiving others’ current emotional states, but how might ...they use this information to predict others’ future states? We hypothesized that people might capitalize on an overlooked aspect of affective experience: current emotions predict future emotions. By attending to regularities in emotion transitions, perceivers might develop accurate mental models of others’ emotional dynamics. People could then use these mental models of emotion transitions to predict others’ future emotions from currently observable emotions. To test this hypothesis, studies 1–3 used data from three extant experience-sampling datasets to establish the actual rates of emotional transitions. We then collected three parallel datasets in which participants rated the transition likelihoods between the same set of emotions. Participants’ ratings of emotion transitions predicted others’ experienced transitional likelihoods with high accuracy. Study 4 demonstrated that four conceptual dimensions of mental state representation—valence, social impact, rationality, and human mind—inform participants’ mental models. Study 5 used 2 million emotion reports on the Experience Project to replicate both of these findings: again people reported accurate models of emotion transitions, and these models were informed by the same four conceptual dimensions. Importantly, neither these conceptual dimensions nor holistic similarity could fully explain participants’ accuracy, suggesting that their mental models contain accurate information about emotion dynamics above and beyond what might be predicted by static emotion knowledge alone.
Planning with Theory of Mind Ho, Mark K.; Saxe, Rebecca; Cushman, Fiery
Trends in cognitive sciences,
November 2022, 2022-11-00, 20221101, Volume:
26, Issue:
11
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
Understanding Theory of Mind should begin with an analysis of the problems it solves. The traditional answer is that Theory of Mind is used for predicting others’ thoughts and actions. However, the ...same Theory of Mind is also used for planning to change others’ thoughts and actions. Planning requires that Theory of Mind consists of abstract structured causal representations and supports efficient search and selection from innumerable possible actions. Theory of Mind contrasts with less cognitively demanding alternatives: statistical predictive models of other people’s actions, or model-free reinforcement of actions by their effects on other people. Theory of Mind is likely used to plan novel interventions and predict their effects, for example, in pedagogy, emotion regulation, and impression management.
Theory of Mind research has traditionally emphasized its predictive function (e.g., predicting someone will be angry after being stuck in traffic). Prediction tasks have dominated decades of experimental and computational research.Theory of Mind is also used to plan interventions on other minds (e.g., choosing how to cheer someone up who has been stuck in traffic) and representations used for planning will have different requirements from those only used for prediction.Research on planning emphasizes the importance of abstract and structured causal models, like Theory of Mind.Focusing on Theory of Mind for planning can illuminate a range of socio-cognitive phenomena, such as interpersonal affect regulation, impression management, pragmatic speech, and pedagogy.
Along with the increased interest in and volume of social cognition research, there has been higher awareness of a lack of agreement on the concepts and taxonomy used to study social processes. Two ...central concepts in the field, empathy and Theory of Mind (ToM), have been identified as overlapping umbrella terms for different processes of limited convergence. Here, we review and integrate evidence of brain activation, brain organization, and behavior into a coherent model of social-cognitive processes. We start with a meta-analytic clustering of neuroimaging data across different social-cognitive tasks. Results show that understanding others' mental states can be described by a multilevel model of hierarchical structure, similar to models in intelligence and personality research. A higher level describes more broad and abstract classes of functioning, whereas a lower one explains how functions are applied to concrete contexts given by particular stimulus and task formats. Specifically, the higher level of our model suggests 3 groups of neurocognitive processes: (a) predominantly cognitive processes, which are engaged when mentalizing requires self-generated cognition decoupled from the physical world; (b) more affective processes, which are engaged when we witness emotions in others based on shared emotional, motor, and somatosensory representations; (c) combined processes, which engage cognitive and affective functions in parallel. We discuss how these processes are explained by an underlying principal gradient of structural brain organization. Finally, we validate the model by a review of empathy and ToM task interrelations found in behavioral studies.
Public Significance Statement
Empathy and Theory of Mind are important human capacities for understanding others. Here, we present a meta-analysis of neuroimaging data from 4,207 participants, which shows that these abilities can be deconstructed into specific and partially shared neurocognitive subprocesses. Our findings provide systematic, large-scale support for the hypothesis that understanding others' mental states can be described by a multilevel model of hierarchical structure, similar to models in intelligence and personality research.
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Substantial research indicates that individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) have difficulties with Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities, but rarely have studies used a comprehensive battery to ...measure both the cognitive and affective aspects of ToM. The present study tested this ability in 24 Greek-speaking children with ASD (ages 7–14), and their performance was compared to 24 age-, gender- and language-matched typically developing controls. Results showed that ASD children’s performance was selectively impaired in both ToM aspects, supporting the distinction between ToM components. This is the first study of ToM abilities among Greek-speaking children with ASD, and the findings confirm that children with ASD are experiencing difficulties with socio-emotional understanding across languages and cultures.
► Affective and cognitive mental states are subserved by dissociable networks. ► Ventral and dorsal attentional systems mediate self–other mental-state attribution. ► Dopamine and serotonin are ...critical for theory of mind functioning. ► Mentalizing is dependent on cortical and subcortical regions.
This paper presents a novel neurobiological model of theory of mind (ToM) that incorporates both neuroanatomical and neurochemical levels of specificity. Within this model, cortical and subcortical regions are functionally organized into networks that subserve the ability to represent cognitive and affective mental states to both self and other. The model maintains that (1) cognitive and affective aspects of ToM are subserved by dissociable, yet interacting, prefrontal networks. The cognitive ToM network primarily engages the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the dorsal striatum; and the affective ToM network primarily engages the ventromedial and orbitofrontal cortices, the ventral anterior cingulate cortex, the amygdala and the ventral striatum; (2) self and other mental-state representation is processed by distinct brain regions within the mentalizing network, and that the ability to distinguish between self and other mental states is modulated by a functionally interactive dorsal and ventral attention/selection systems at the temporoparietal junction and the anterior cingulate cortex; and (3) ToM functioning is dependent on the integrity of the dopaminergic and serotonergic systems which are primarily engaged in the maintenance and application processes of represented mental states. In addition to discussing the mechanisms involved in mentalizing in terms of its component processes, we discuss the model's implications to pathologies that variably impact one's ability to represent, attribute and apply mental states.
We meta-analyzed imaging studies on theory of mind and formed individual task groups based on stimuli and instructions. Overlap in brain activation between all task groups was found in the mPFC and ...in the bilateral posterior TPJ. This supports the idea of a core network for theory of mind that is activated whenever we are reasoning about mental states, irrespective of the task- and stimulus-formats (Mar, 2011). In addition, we found a number of task-related activation differences surrounding this core-network. ROI based analyses show that areas in the TPJ, the mPFC, the precuneus, the temporal lobes and the inferior frontal gyri have distinct profiles of task-related activation. Functional accounts of these areas are reviewed and discussed with respect to our findings.
Background
The association between impaired social cognition and bipolar disorder (BD) is well established. However, to our knowledge, there has not been a recent systematic review that characterizes ...disparate dimensions of social cognition in BD. Herein, this systematic review and meta‐analysis aimed to synthesize the literature on core aspects of social cognition (i.e., Theory of Mind, emotion recognition, and social judgment) to identify potential areas of impairment.
Methods
Online databases (i.e., PubMed, Cochrane Libraries, PsycINFO) and Google Scholar were searched from inception to May 2021. Studies with populations ages ≥16 with DSM‐IV or DSM‐5 defined BD (I or II) either in a euthymic or symptomatic state were included. The risk of bias was measured using the ROBINS‐1 tool, and the quality of the sources was evaluated using GRADE criteria. The results of the studies were quantitatively measured by synthesizing Hedge's g effect sizes through a random effects meta‐analytic approach.
Results
A total of 29 studies were included in the final review (i.e., 12 studies on the Theory of Mind, 11 on emotion recognition, and 6 on social judgment). Overall, results demonstrated social cognition to be moderately impaired in individuals with BD (d = 0.59). The individual domains ranged in effect size (0.38 < d < 0.70), providing evidence for variation in impairment within social cognition.
Discussion
Individuals with BD exhibit clinically significant deficits in social cognition during euthymic and symptomatic states. Social cognition impairments in individuals with BD are an important therapeutic target for treatment discovery and development.
A Duet for one Friston, Karl; Frith, Christopher
Consciousness and cognition,
November 2015, 2015-Nov, 2015-11-00, 20151101, Volume:
36
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
•This paper casts theory of mind as inferring the causes of sensory signals.•In demonstrates the emergence of neuronal synchronisation during active inference.•It shows how attention to and ...attenuation of sensations enables communication.•This provides a (mathematical) image of communication as generalised synchrony.
This paper considers communication in terms of inference about the behaviour of others (and our own behaviour). It is based on the premise that our sensations are largely generated by other agents like ourselves. This means, we are trying to infer how our sensations are caused by others, while they are trying to infer our behaviour: for example, in the dialogue between two speakers. We suggest that the infinite regress induced by modelling another agent – who is modelling you – can be finessed if you both possess the same model. In other words, the sensations caused by others and oneself are generated by the same process. This leads to a view of communication based upon a narrative that is shared by agents who are exchanging sensory signals. Crucially, this narrative transcends agency – and simply involves intermittently attending to and attenuating sensory input. Attending to sensations enables the shared narrative to predict the sensations generated by another (i.e. to listen), while attenuating sensory input enables one to articulate the narrative (i.e. to speak). This produces a reciprocal exchange of sensory signals that, formally, induces a generalised synchrony between internal (neuronal) brain states generating predictions in both agents. We develop the arguments behind this perspective, using an active (Bayesian) inference framework and offer some simulations (of birdsong) as proof of principle.
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