The Samyé debate (792–794) between the Chinese Chan monk Moheyan and his Indo-Tibetan opponents has long been one of the key issues in the study of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. This article attempts to ...approach this debate from a different angle, by focussing on the common ground that enabled the debate in the first place, instead of the doctrinal opposition between the two parties. This article argues that there are several areas where Kamalaśīla’s doctrinal positions are comparable to or even compatible with the doctrinal positions found in Northern Chan texts. First, the article points to the centrality of the
and how it signifies their commitment to a form of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis. Second, the controversy revolving around the “Single Vehicle” (Ekayāna) is discussed. Third, the article discusses how to understand the “interface” between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka in Kamalaśīla’s texts and Northern Chan texts. Lastly, the article compares yogic perception discussed by Kamalaśīla and the extrasensory apprehension alluded to in Northern Chan texts.
This is the story of fifth century CE India, when the Yogacarin Buddhists tested the awareness of unawareness, and became aware of human unawareness to an extraordinary degree. They not only ...explicitly differentiated this dimension of mental processes from conscious cognitive processes, but also offered reasoned arguments on behalf of this dimension of mind. This is the concept of the 'Buddhist unconscious', which arose just as philosophical discourse in other circles was fiercely debating the limits of conscious awareness, and these ideas in turn had developed as a systematisation of teachings from the Buddha himself. For us in the twenty-first century, these teachings connect in fascinating ways to the Western conceptions of the 'cognitive unconscious' which have been elaborated in the work of Jung and Freud. This important study reveals how the Buddhist unconscious illuminates and draws out aspects of current western thinking on the unconscious mind. One of the most intriguing connections is the idea that there is in fact no substantial 'self' underlying all mental activity; 'the thoughts themselves are the thinker'. William S. Waldron considers the implications of this radical notion, which, despite only recently gaining plausibility, was in fact first posited 2,500 years ago.
Part I - The Background and Context of the Ãlaya-vijñãna Part II - The Abhidharma Context 15. The Abhidharma Project and its Problematic Part III - The Alaya-vijñana in the Yogacara Tradition, The Alaya-vijñana in the Early Tradition Part IV - The Alaya-Vijñana in the Mahayana-samgraha I : Bringing It All Back Home Part V - The Alaya-Vijñana in the Mahayana-samgraha II: Looking Beyond
William S. Waldron received his PhD in Buddhist Studies from the University of Wisconsin after studying extensively in India, Nepal and Japan. He currently teaches South Asian religions and Buddhist philosophy at Middlebury College, Vermont. His research areas include the Yogacara school of Indian Buddhism, and comparative psychologies and philosophies of mind.
In the majority of Abhidharmic Buddhist schools, smṛti serves the crucial function of ensuring the recollection of past events and is thus conceptualized as memory in scholarly discourse nowadays. ...Nevertheless, upon closer examination of various doctrinal perspectives, the interpretation of smṛti diverges significantly among different schools. Notably, it is deemed to be omnipresent in every moment of perception within the Sarvāstivādin tradition, while in Yogācāra, it is regarded as a specific response to an experienced object. This paper seeks to delve into the concept of smṛti within the latter tradition, with a specific focus on the Cheng Weishi Lun (成唯識論, henceforth: CWSL). Drawing upon the foundational principles of Yogācāra doctrine, which posit the ālayavijñāna as an underlying substratum responsible for retaining past information, I contend that smṛti embodies a cognitive faculty that intensifies the apprehension of learned objects when they are present. Furthermore, I argue that smṛti serves as the inception point for a series of cognitive processes acquiring knowledge that helps decision-making. Additionally, I will demonstrate that the function of smṛti in the CWSL diverges from both traditional Buddhist conceptions of memory and contemporary understandings thereof.
Vimalamitra’s (ca. the 8th–9th cent.) *Āryaprajñāpāramitāhṛdayaṭīkā (hereafter the PHT) sparks interest not only because of its detailed verbal commentary on the Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya or the Heart ...Sūtra but also because it developed various philosophical arguments. However, these arguments have not always been clear due to the difficulty surrounding Tibetan translation and the complexity of the discussion. For instance, in 2021, Mathes, who examined some passages of the PHT, suggested that Vimalamitra endorsed the Yogācāra idea that the perfect nature exists ultimately as the dharmakāya—an idea that can be traced back to 1996, Lopez. However, a close reading of the relevant passages of the PHT through consultation with the commentary on the Saptaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā by Vimalamitra himself, a sub-commentary on the PHT by rNgog blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109), and a reading of the Tibetan translation (the only translation preserved) conjecturing the underlying original Sanskrit reveals that the opposite is true: there is a fierce and complex debate between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra on the passage, with Vimalamitra sharply criticizing the latter’s views as a Mādhyamika. Thus, this paper will reveal for the first time the previously unknown details of the dispute between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka in the PHT. This will offer new evidence for the confrontation between the two around the eighth and ninth centuries.
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