This study investigates Churchill's attitude towards the Kurdish question and explains how and why the idea of a Kurdish buffer state initially formed as part of Churchill's Middle Eastern strategy before ultimately being abandoned. It primarily focuses on the role of behind-the-scene officials in influencing and directing the policy decisions towards the future of Kurdistan. It argues that the contention between the Colonial Office and Baghdad did not reflect as much disagreement between Churchill and the High Commissioner of Baghdad Percy Cox, as previous works have suggested, as between their advisers, particularly Hubert Young, Assistant Secretary in the Middle East Department, and Gertrude Bell, Oriental Secretary at Baghdad. This study argues that behind the scenes, Young and Bell exerted great influence over the views of Churchill and Cox, respectively. Young's standpoint in favour of Kurdish independence influenced Churchill's initial advocacy of a Kurdish buffer state to protect British colonial interests in the Middle East. However, Bell was ultimately fundamental in determining the future of Kurdistan, contributing significantly to the absence of Kurdistan from the political map. She was at the core of British imperial policymaking for the Iraqi state through her significant influence over Cox regarding the political situation in Iraq. Facilitated by Churchill's indecision, Bell was successful in obstructing the implementation of the ethnographic approach advocated by the Cairo Conference, and finally, in preventing the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, instigating the perpetual complexity of the Kurdish question.