Michael Gehler bares the behind-the-scenes workings, suspicions, and phobias of all parties involved in solving the so-called German question and documents deliberations about using an Austrian model ...for Germany. The Soviets, in exchange for German neutrality, offered to agree to unification if Germany did not join NATO and remained unarmed. Germany rejected the idea. Because the Soviets championed Austrian neutrality, the Germans, suspicious of Soviet motives, viewed the Austria State Treaty as a mere dress rehearsal for a similar proposal for Germany. Gehler amply demonstrates that Soviet fears of a powerful Germany motivated their suggesting German neutrality. He also cites German fears that, if left unarmed and without the support of the West Allies (read: the United States), Germany and the center of Europe would have been defenseless in the eventuality of Soviet aggression. Gehler also provides insights into the tenuous relationship that still existed between the US government and the fledgling Federal Republic: while Konrad Adenauer cemented ties with the US, the State Department Office of Intelligence Research was discussing a neutralized-not neutral-Germany even after ratification of the Paris Treaty. It entertained a unification of the Western with the Soviet zones under the auspices of the Allies. Germany would also be prohibited "from joining either a western or an eastern alliance system, although it may form part of an overall European security system and will have limited defense forces" (913).
By allowing college students of German to write and perform their own plays, it added a tremendous boost to their interest in speaking a foreign language. This motivated them to do what they would ...ordinarily have done with great reluctance--memorize a text and engage in an intensive, goal-oriented activity in German, outside the language classroom. (SL)
