Husserl’s 20th century phenomenological project requires little introduction, and remains the cornerstone of modern European philosophy. The significance of understanding the place of ethics in this ...project is thus of paramount importance to the ongoing legacy and study of Phenomenology itself, but also carries the weight to bear the potential to intervene in contemporary ethical debates and research. Ferrarello’s Husserl’s Ethics and Practical Intentionality constitutes one of the major new interventions in this burgeoning field of Husserl scholarship, and offers an unrivaled perspective on the question of ethics in Husserl’s philosophy through a focus on volumes that have as yet not been translated into English.
Abstract
This paper will discuss the notion of solastalgia or climatic anxiety (Albrecht et al., 2007; Galea et al., 2005) as a form of anxiety connected to traumatic environmental changes that ...generate an emotional blockage between individuals, their environment (Cloke et al., 2004) and their place (Nancy, 1993). I will use a phenomenological approach to explain the way in which emotions shape our constitution of reality (Husserl, 1970; Sartre, 1983, 1993, 1996; Seamon and Sowers, 2009; Shaw and Ward, 2009). The article’s overall goal is to describe the relationship between environment and “climatic” emotions to understand what we can do to improve our well-being. I believe that scientistic and reductionistic ways of looking at climatic anxiety do not consider this complex dynamic and fail to propose actual solutions for the well-being of both the environment and the individuals.
Affects and all its variants (affection, allure, affective force, etc.) represent our via
regia
to be alive and connected with our life-world. It is not the ego that constitutes the world we live in ...but the affections that allow us to become respectively objects of our life and subjects of our own choices. Affects are in fact main triggers of lower and higher feelings through which we become subjects and experience empathy with other people, intersubjectively connecting with them and making ethical choices that are hopefully considerate of ourselves and our community. Yet it might happen that our feelings are not capable of truly feeling what we are affected by. When this happens, what affects us remains with us but cannot be felt and accordingly processed. In this paper, I will first work on the term affect and its variants. I will then describe how this connects with feelings. To finally analyze what happens when we are not capable of feeling our affects as in the case of alexithymia; or when we feel our affects too much as in the case of BPD; or when we do not want to feel certain affects as in the case of NPD. The main conceptual reference of this analysis will be Husserl and his static and genetic phenomenology.
Phenomenological Bioethics Ferrarello, Susi
The Journal of medicine and philosophy,
04/2023, Letnik:
48, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Abstract
Eudaimonia, that is, the experience of flourishing and welfare at the center of Greek philosophical investigations, describes the qualitative experience of being able to feel well in our ...bodies. Reductionism in medicine as well as in philosophy would instead reduce well-being to a set of standards that the human body or its mind must meet in order to be recognized as functioning. This journal issue, dedicated to a phenomenological approach in bioethics, represents a way to overcome this dangerous constraint thanks to the methodological support of the phenomenological investigations. The authors invited to write in this journal issue will tackle the problem of reductionism in bioethics through a phenomenological approach.
In this article I will first show the continuity between Stoicism, phenomenology, and a mindful approach to life, before moving toward a more detailed confrontation between the theory of the lekton ...in Stoicism and the theory of noema in Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally, I will show how these theories apply to both phenomenological and Stoic ethics and what they can tell us about choosing to live a happy and flourishing life.
This special issue collects papers that explore the relationship between phenomenology and mindfulness with the goal of creating a fruitful dialogue between these two traditions, so as to bring into ...relief the overlaps and incongruities, exploring historical as well as systematic connections. Both phenomenology and mindfulness are inclusively construed: the former (phenomenology) is understood as an umbrella term that includes philosophers and approaches that follow directly from Brentano’s and Husserl’s phenomenological discoveries. For this reason, the issue will focus on phenomenology as a method as well as a philosophical approach with a major emphasis on Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, and Merleau-Ponty’s approach. The latter (mindfulness) includes a wide range of conceptions of mindfulness, from Buddhist-inspired strands of meditation practices and theories to Stoic-inspired. The journal issue takes into consideration the potential benefits that such a theme would have to clinical psychology by exploring the existing connection between mindfulness, well-being, and self-exploration. In particular, in this special issue we will point out how the phenomenological approach to mindfulness can help to further the understanding of such notions as “attention,” “authenticity,” “time,” “dignity,” and more.
This paper intends to provide a way for reflecting on the normative space of resilience with the goal of creating a fruitful cross-disciplinary dialogue on well-being and health. I will point to the ...epistemological and temporal bias of resilience as two necessary problems that need to be tackled when considering resilience as a dynamic life process. I believe that this is timely research given the several attempts currently being pursued to shape the notion of health and well-being as it pertains to resilience (Rockström et al., 2009).
Članak nastoji pružiti pravac za promišljanje normativnog prostora otpornosti s ciljem stvaranja plodnog međudisciplinarnog dijaloga o dobrobiti i zdravlju. Ukazat ću na epistemološku i vremensku pristranost otpornosti kao na dva neophodna problema s kojima se treba pozabaviti kada se otpornost razmatra kao dinamički životni proces. Vjerujem da je ovo pravovremeno istraživanje s obzirom na nekoliko pokušaja koji se trenutno provode kako bi se oblikovao pojam zdravlja i dobrobiti u odnosu na otpornost (Rockström i sur., 2009).
Existential Sexuality and Intimacy Ferrarello, Susi
Journal of constructivist psychology,
04/2019, Letnik:
32, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
This article will discuss sexuality from an existentialist and constructivist point of view. Constructivism will be used as a means to grasp a dynamic understanding of sexual existence and intimate ...life. In fact, the author believes there is genetic character of intimacy that informs the passive and active existential choices that constitute our sexual identity. The goal of the article is to show how the social constructions that define human sexual existence are remodeled continuously by the fluid nature of intimacy.
Pensar, actuar y ser Ferrarello, Susi
Revista filosofía UIS (En línea),
07/2011, Letnik:
10, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Pensar, actuar y ser son actividades cruciales de nuestra vida diaria. Estas actividades implican un trabajo práctico y epistemológico, base de la comprensión de las nuestras elecciones. En primer ...término se presentarán las generalidades sobre el pensamiento, los valores, y las normas morales como expresión de los valores personales. En segundo lugar, se explicarán los límites de la lógica, la ética y la psicología en la expresión de la identidad individual. En particular, me pregunto si hay una paradoja en la filosofía moral. En efecto, nosotros aprendemos la máxima délfica bien presente en el pensamiento de Sócrates –“γνῶθι σεαυτόν” (“Conócete a ti mismo”)– pero no podemos siempre toda nuestra identidad. Por tanto, el objetivo de este trabajo es investigar esta máxima y su significación lógica, psicológica y moral.
Thinking, acting and being are pivotal poles of our daily life, involving epistemological and practical faculties. To understand the balance between what we know and we do, we should figure out to what extent our being affects epistemological and practical choices. The questions I raise in this paper concern the boundaries of logic, ethics and psychology and the influence mutually exerted. My aim here is to display the part taken by logic and ethics in every identity and to figure out how fluid their presence is (if any). I wonder, particularly if there is a kind of paradox in moral philosophy. Indeed, we learn from the Delphic and Socratic saying the wise imperative –“γνῶθι σεαυτόν” (“know thyself”)– but it is quite apparent that we cannot get all that we know about ourselves out. Hence in this paper I am going to sift the meaning of this imperative in order to figure out if we have to take it as a sort of epistemological imperative or as an ethical one.