This book analyses whether the EU’s drift towards European strategic autonomy presents a challenge or a window of opportunity for its small member states to advance their security interests. The ...volume presents small states’ perceptions of European strategic autonomy, highlighting their expectations and concerns. The chapters focus on the depth and breadth of European strategic autonomy, national security considerations, assessment of the impact on transatlantic relations, the expected outputs, and its potential impact on the EU’s institutional structure. It also shows how systemic circumstances and the interests of powerful states, either belonging to the EU (France, Germany, and Poland) or having a significant say in European security architecture (the US), establish opportunities and constraints for the small states to shape European strategic autonomy. In particular, the study focuses on the diverging interests of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, and the Netherlands. It demonstrates that, in most cases, European strategic autonomy is perceived not as an alternative to NATO but as a supplementary element that could facilitate the development of national military capabilities, indigenous defence industries and resilience to non-military threats. Ultimately, the book suggests that national approaches towards European strategic autonomy mainly stem from pragmatic national security and foreign policy considerations, while largely ignoring grand strategic ideas. This book will be of much interest to students of European politics, security studies, and international relations. The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.
The collective political imagination establishes world orders that define how political communities interact. The relative power of the West allowed the introduction of the first global world order, ...known as the Westphalian. However, the increasing relative power of the People’s Republic of China allows it to promote an alternative world order vision, which is the result of its political imagination. Zhao Tingyang’s re-imagined hierarchic Tianxia order is seen as a challenger to the Westphalian order. This paper analyzes whether the Tianxia order can replace the Westphalian, considering the contemporary global political environment. The discussion is based on Jeffrey Legro’s theory of collective ideas and foreign policy change, applying it to world order replacement analysis. The findings suggest that the Tianxia has significant limitations in replacing the Westphalian world order. The Westphalian order orthodoxy remains strong. The order is also adaptable, capable of including hierarchical elements. Despite the increase of the PRC’s relative power and its greater capabilities to shape norms with domestic support, continuity usually prevails, so the habit of sovereignty prevails over hierarchical order. Finally, the article argues that the Tianxia order is not resilient to the anarchic-competitive element of human nature.
The article argues that states’ narratives about themselves and each other, shaped by the foreign policy decision-makers, create filters for the achievement of soft power goals. A state agent can ...shape narratives that can be rejected by the state’s target’s society because they would undermine dominating biographical and strategic narratives of the state target. The empirical analysis of the narratives of the president, minister of foreign affairs, and spokesperson of the MFA of Russia illustrates how Russia prevents itself from soft power expansion by “othering” Lithuania. At the same time, analysis of the narratives of presidents and the minister of the foreign affairs of Lithuania illustrates how they shield society from Russia’s narratives and, thus, soft power while searching for “sameness” with the Euro-Atlantic partners.
The article argues that technological innovations change war, and pushes to innovate, to rethink strategic, operational and tactical decisions which raise new issues of moral and legal impacts. Small ...states have to redefine their defence concerning major technological trends. Technological progress will only strengthen the polycentric system in military technology because war is waged in six domains; small states do not have access to all of them, and at the same time they lack financial and industrial capabilities. Artificial intelligence, the increasing role of cyber and informational elements, unmanned systems, 3D printing and changing battlefield force to adapt the defence of small states. Small states have to plan their defence in three periods – peace, attack until full occupation and resistance. Technological innovations for the defence of small states are important, but the most crucial element is preparation of military and society for total resistance with the focus on denying victory for the aggressor. Small states cannot compete with technologically advanced powers (in terms of arms quality and quantity), so they have to adapt by expanding their fighting force, adapt to defend in the areas which decrease technological advantage and increase uncertainty. Small states also have to approach defence more creatively by exploiting non-conventional instruments, focusing on capabilities to fight without clear command and control, investing in personal skills of officers and soldiers, as well as maintaining symbiotic relations with technologically superior allies.
Rusiją galima vadinti pagrindiniu Lietuvos tarptautinių santykių ekspertų tyrimų gravitacijos centru, kurio nuolat svarstomą problematiką pasitelkus tiriami Lietuvos santykiai su jos kaimynėmis, ...partnerėmis ir tarptautinėmis organizacijomis. Kadangi visiškas Rusijos pažinimas neįmanomas, referuojant į žymiąją Winstono Churchillio frazę, galima daryti prielaidą, kad Rusijos tyrimai ar sąsajos su ja ateities tyrimuose sudarys apčiuopiamiausią Lietuvos tarptautinių santykių tyrimų dalį. Jeigu Rusija amžinai liks už visiško pažinimo ribų, tai gal ją galima bent bandyti nuspėti, nubrėžti bent plačius veikimo parametrus, analizuojant jos veiksmus tarptautinėje erdvėje ir procesus vidaus politikoje, vyraujančias idėjas ir pasaulio suvokimą? Bent iš dalies. Identifikuojant minėtus didžiosios kaimynės elementus, kolektyvinėje monografijoje „Rusijos raidos scenarijai: implikacijos Lietuvos ir regiono saugumui“ bandoma ją pažinti, siekiant numatyti veiksmus ir jų poveikį Lietuvos saugumui.
Lithuania has been a target of Russia’s soft power efforts for the past two decades. The aim of this article is to analyse Russia’s soft power influence possibilities in Lithuania. First, it analyzes ...how soft power is interpreted in Russia compared to the Western conception. Then, Russia’s soft power instruments and their core goals are reviewed, not all of which fall under the category of “soft power instruments” according to the Western understanding. The article proceeds with demographic changes in Lithuania and trends of consumption of Russian culture and information in Lithuania. The main argument is that Russia is not aiming to apply soft power to the general Lithuanian society but to particular groups within the population (Russophone minorities and residents with sentiments for the Soviet Union). It can be assumed that demographic trends and Russia’s aggressive actions will increasingly limit its soft power capabilities. However, the greatest setback to Russia’s soft power in Lithuania is arguably caused by its continuing reliance on hard power when it comes to countries of the post-Soviet space.
The Activity Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania for 2017 declares that Lithuania’s foreign policy is effective and claims that public opinion is the most important ...criteria for measuring its effectiveness. The article analyses Lithuania’s foreign public policy cycle, with the focus on its formation and evaluation peculiarities. It argues that the cycle of Lithuanian foreign public policy is stagnating since its evaluation stage lacks efficiency and misses critical evaluations. The lack of strategic documents does not allow defining core foreign policy goals and in this matter to evaluate their achievement. The ambiguous goals in lower level documents prevent critical evaluation because of political interests. Lithuanian foreign policy is the outcome of close cooperation between President’s Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs which limits criticism between institutions. The Seimas provides greater criticism only when initiative is showed by the opposition. Foreign policy remains the sphere of responsibility of the political elite which has broad consensus and has differences in their views on a tactical level. Media and experts, for the most part, avoid critical evaluations of foreign policy as they want to remain in the dominating discourse and keep close contacts with state institutions. The current evaluation environment and tools are not sufficient to make changes at the agenda-setting stage of foreign policy.
The collective political imagination establishes world orders that define how po-litical communities interact. The relative power of the West allowed the introduction of the first global world order, ...known as the Westphalian. However, the increasing relative power of the People's Republic of China allows it to promote an alternative world order vision, which is the result of its political imagination. Zhao Tingyang's re-imagined hierarchic Tianxia order is seen as a challenger to the Westphalian order. This paper analyzes whether the Tianxia order can replace the Westphalian, considering the contemporary global politi-cal environment. The discussion is based on Jeffrey Legro's theory of collective ideas and foreign policy change, applying it to world order replacement analysis. The findings sug-gest that the Tianxia has significant limitations in replacing the Westphalian world order. The Westphalian order orthodoxy remains strong. The order is also adaptable, capable of including hierarchical elements. Despite the increase of the PRC's relative power and its greater capabilities to shape norms with domestic support, continuity usually prevails, so the habit of sovereignty prevails over hierarchical order. Finally, the article argues that the Tianxia order is not resilient to the anarchic-competitive element of human nature.
The article argues that despite the evident link between political environment and security of energy supply, political elements are not sufficiently represented in contemporary scientific ...literature, namely in indexes that are designed for the assessment of security of energy supply. In an attempt to fill this gap, the article presents an innovative methodology for quantitative assessment of the political vulnerabilities on security of energy supply and applies it to the analysis of the Baltic States.
The proposed index determines the plausibility of the occurrence of threats of a political nature on the security of energy supply and defines it as political vulnerability. The application of index methodology to an analysis of the Baltic States has revealed that the overall political vulnerability on security of energy supply is the highest in Lithuania, considerably lower in Latvia, and the lowest in Estonia. The analysis has shown that political vulnerability has increased in Lithuania due to the closure of Ignalina NPP and an increase in energy import quantities from politically unstable countries, such as Russia. On the contrary, political vulnerabilities on the security of the energy supply have decreased in Latvia and Estonia due to the increase of consumption of indigenous energy. However, preliminary calculations show that political vulnerabilities should decrease considerably in 2015 in Lithuania due to the diversification of the natural gas supply.
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