Bandwagoning by stealth refers to a situation when a government of a small state tries to accommodate a great power turned to aggressor amid a strong public opposition. We explain it with the example ...of Georgia's foreign policy towards Russia in the period of 2012-2022. It is argued that Georgia's attempt for rapprochement to Russia since 2012 can be explained by two unit-level variables: (1) a belief of the country's leadership in the need to accommodate Russia and (2) a societal and public opposition to the Russia-accommodating policy. A conflictual dynamic between the Russia-accommodating government and Russia-sceptic public resulted in bandwagoning by stealth - a defacto and partial bandwagoning with Russia without formally changing Georgia's declared pro-Western foreign policy.
This article assesses the European Union's (EU) performance in promoting societal resilience in the Eastern Partnership countries (EaP) on examples of Georgia and Ukraine. We examine two approaches ...to external resilience-building employed by the EU: support for the sources of societal resilience (social trust, legitimacy of governance actors, design of governance institutions) and prevention of domestic and external risks. Our research shows that while Ukraine and Georgia possess a moderate degree of societal resilience both countries also suffer from a high exposure to domestic and external risks, making them dependent on external resilience-building support from the EU. Analysis of the EU's resilience-building agenda in Georgia and Ukraine shows a mixed record for the EU. While the EU managed to strengthen sources of resilience and alleviate domestic risks in both countries, it failed to mitigate geopolitical risks: leaving the window open for new conflicts and endangering the sustainability of its resilience agenda.
This article explores Ukraine's and Georgia's attempts to reshape the dynamics of their relations with the EU by moving from Europe's peripheral status towards becoming part of Europe. The drive of ...the two post-Soviet countries towards European core is explained by both consequentialist (seeking defence from Russia) and ideational (Europe as civilization choice) incentives. The Europeanization school of the neoinstitutionalist paradigm is used to back the main argument. Finally, as the article concludes, next to Russia as a veto player, the socio-political underdevelopment and lack of good governance make both countries less attractive and complicates their quest to escape the European margins and becoming part of the European core.
Abbreviations: AA - Association Agreements: CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States: DCFTA - Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area: EaP - Eastern Partnership: ENP - European Neighbourhood Policy: EU - European Union: NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization: RCI - Rational Choice Institutionalism: SI - Sociological Institutionalism
This paper analyses the extent to which Georgia's pro-Western foreign policy orientation stems from ideas and identity rather than from materialist and systemic factors alone. Finding such narrow ...approaches insufficient for explaining small state behavior, and drawing on liberal and constructivist approaches to international relations theory, the article argues that Georgia's foreign policy orientation has a strong basis in the widespread ideological perception amongst the local political elite that Georgia “belongs” in the West. Based on this theoretical framework, this paper provides a historical overview of Georgia's foreign policy, tracing the evolution of Georgia's identity from seeing itself as “Christian” in contrast to its Islamic neighbors, to identifying as European in contrast to a modern, Russian “other”. As Georgia attempts to construct a collective international identity, the devotion to the idea of Euro-Atlantic integration as a “sacred destiny” amongst the country's elite has significant foreign policy implications. This article overviews the current challenges and dilemmas of self-identification and investigates the roles that national identity and the prevailing “European” identity play in Georgia's quest for “desovietization”.
Since its independence, Georgia has been one of the most vocally independentminded countries among the Soviet Unions successor states. As Georgia's ambitions to draw closer to Europe and the ...transatlantic community have grown, its relations with Russia have deteriorated. After the Russian aggression and under the global financial crisis Georgia faces security dilemma exacerbated by ambivalent prospect of its Euro-Atlantic integration. The article explores current political challenges in Georgia and “new tone” of Russia's diplomacy aimed to win ideological battle inside the Georgia. It also deals with Georgias National security issues aftermath of “five day war” and prospects of Russo-Georgian relations. Bağımsızlığından bugüne Gürcistan Sovyet sonrası ülkeler arasında en bağımsızlık düşünceli ülkelerden biridir. Gürcistan'ın Avrupa ve transatlantik topluma yakın olma isteği arttıkça Rusya ile ilişkileri kötüleşmiştir. Rus saldırısı sonrasından ve global ekonomik kriz döneminde, Gürcistan Avro-Atlantik bölgesi ile entegrasyonunu belirsiz geleceğini şiddetlendiren güvenlik ikilemi ile karşı karşıya kalmaktadır. Bu makale Gürcistan'daki siyasal tehditleri ve Gürcistan'da ideolojik mücadeleyi kazanmayı amaçlayan Rusya diplomasisinin “yeni tonunu” incelemektedir. Aynı zamanda Gürcü-Rus savaşından sonra Gürcistan ulusal strateji meseleleri ve Gürcü-Rus ilişkilerinin geleceğini tartışmaktadır.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea and South Caucasus has become the focus of considerable international attention, primary because it is one of the oldest and potentially ...richest oil and gas producing areas in the world. The August 2008 Russian invasion of the Georgia and the unilateral recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia fundamentally changed the situation in the region. The war has created a new strategic situation.
And the question is now how to handle this delicate situation in a strategically and geopolitically important region. So by controlling Georgia (in case Russia reaches abovementioned aims), Russia actually will be able to cut off Central Asia and Caspian resources. It means Russia would be able to isolate and cut off Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries and it will significantly strengthen its energy monopoly over Europe with all results coming out from that fact. So it’s about major shift in the energy policy and major shift in geopolitics based on this energy policy and Russian energy monopoly. The August war in Georgia demonstrated some risks associated with the functioning of the transit energy corridor in the southern Caucasus. It also demonstrated the need for broader security guarantees for a region that is vital to European and global energy security. Paper deals with economic damage inflicted by the Russo-Georgian war in South Caucasus and its implications for regional security.
This paper explores the impact of two important informal leaders--former president Mikheil Saakashvili and former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili--on recent parliamentary elections in Georgia. It ...is argued that informal governance has predominated in Georgia's political system for a long time and that the interference of informal leaders in the 2016 parliamentary elections was the latest manifestation of this tendency. It is further contended that the electorate's perceptions of the consequences of interference by informal leaders determined the outcome of the elections. Whereas the role of Bidzina Ivanishvili--the informal leader of the governing GD party--was perceived as undesirable yet necessary to stabilize political processes in the country, the active role played by Mikheil Saakashvili --the former president and exiled leader of the main opposition party--was assessed rather critically and contributed to handing the ruling GD party a somewhat unexpected easy win.
The 2012 parliamentary elections witnessed Georgia's first peaceful post-independence transfer of power. Under Bidzina Ivanishvili, the government formed by the Georgian Dream Coalition significantly ...softened the harsh anti-Russia rhetoric of Saakashvili's 'National Movement', launching a policy aimed at normalising relations with Russia. Such a shift of a steady, almost decade-long counter-Russian foreign policy resists explanation by structural theories on small states located in relatively stable external environments. Mapping discursive changes and employing a constructivist framework, we argue that distinct foreign policy visions are reflections of the differences between the identities of the two leadership camps.
Reform has been relatively successful in Georgia because, after the Rose Revolution, the new government used its dominance of the state to fire a huge number of officers, purge the old leadership, ...and instigate a crackdown on police corruption and links with organised crime. This took place in the background of a strong public demand for reform and a state-building process which dramatically reduced public sector corruption and altered state-society relations. In Kyrgyzstan and Russia, neither top-down nor bottom-up pressure has manifested itself into political pressure for reform. In the former, the state has been highly contested and powerful factions have competed to use it to extract resources for their own benefit and/or those of their constituents. In Russia, the state is more stable, but the leadership lacks the know-how or the willingness to implement meaningful reform. Instead of reform being imposed upon each country’s Ministry of Interior, reforms have been co-opted by elements within the ministries, with the result that they have been ineffective.
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