In Japan's Nuclear Disaster and the
Politics of Safety Governance , Florentine
Koppenborg argues that the regulatory reforms taken up in the wake
of the Fukushima disaster on March 11, 2011, directly ...and
indirectly raised the costs of nuclear power in Japan. The
Nuclear Regulation Authority resisted capture by the nuclear
industry and fundamentally altered the environment for nuclear
policy implementation. Independent safety regulation changed
state-business relations in the nuclear power domain from
regulatory capture to top-down safety regulation, which raised
technical safety costs for electric utilities. Furthermore, the
safety agency's extended emergency preparedness regulations
expanded the allegorical backyard of NIMBY demonstrations.
Antinuclear protests, mainly lawsuits challenging restarts,
incurred additional social acceptance costs. Increasing costs
undermined pronuclear actors' ability to implement nuclear power
policy and caused a rift inside the "nuclear village." Small
nuclear safety administration reforms were, in fact, game changers
for nuclear power politics in Japan.
Koppenborg's findings contribute to the vibrant conversations
about the rise of independent regulatory agencies, crisis as a
mechanism for change, and the role of nuclear power amid global
interest in decarbonizing our energy supply.
This article situates Japan in the international climate security debate by analysing competing climate change discourses. In 2020, for the first time, the Japanese Ministry of the Environment ...included the term “climate crisis” (kikō kiki) in its annual white paper, and the Japanese parliament adopted a “climate emergency declaration” (kikō hijō jitai sengen). Does this mean that Japan’s climate discourse is turning toward the securitisation of climate change? Drawing on securitisation theory, this article investigates whether we are seeing the emergence of a climate change securitisation discourse that treats climate change as a security issue rather than a conventional political issue. The analysis focuses on different stakeholders in Japan’s climate policy: the Japanese Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the parliament, the Cabinet, and sub- and non-state actors. Through a discourse analysis of ministry white papers and publications by other stakeholders, the article identifies a burgeoning securitisation discourse that challenges, albeit moderately, the status quo of incrementalism and inaction in Japan’s climate policy. This article further highlights Japan’s position in the rapidly evolving global debate on the urgency of climate action and provides explanations for apparent changes and continuities in Japan’s climate change discourse.
In Japan's Nuclear Disaster and the Politics of Safety Governance , Florentine Koppenborg argues that the regulatory reforms taken up in the wake of the Fukushima disaster on March 11, 2011, directly ...and indirectly raised the costs of nuclear power in Japan. The Nuclear Regulation Authority resisted capture by the nuclear industry and fundamentally altered the environment for nuclear policy implementation. Independent safety regulation changed state-business relations in the nuclear power domain from regulatory capture to top-down safety regulation, which raised technical safety costs for electric utilities. Furthermore, the safety agency's extended emergency preparedness regulations expanded the allegorical backyard of NIMBY demonstrations. Antinuclear protests, mainly lawsuits challenging restarts, incurred additional social acceptance costs. Increasing costs undermined pronuclear actors' ability to implement nuclear power policy and caused a rift inside the nuclear village. Small nuclear safety administration reforms were, in fact, game changers for nuclear power politics in Japan. Koppenborg's findings contribute to the vibrant conversations about the rise of independent regulatory agencies, crisis as a mechanism for change, and the role of nuclear power amid global interest in decarbonizing our energy supply.
•First Multiple Linear Regression analysis of waste management systems in EU capitals.•Door-to-door bio-waste collection linked to higher overall dry recyclables capture.•On average, dry recyclables ...sorting doubled in capitals with door-to-door bio-waste collection.•Linkage between door-to-door bio-waste collection and boosted sorting needs further research.•Convenience, communication campaigns and system maturity likely causal factors.•Severe lack of available data hampers evidence-based EU policymaking.
The European Union Waste Framework Directive revised in 2018 sets an ambitious target of recycling 55 percent of municipal solid waste by 2025. Separate waste collection is an important prerequisite for achieving this target, but progress is uneven among Member States and has slowed down in recent years. This makes it paramount to identify effective waste management systems to enable higher recycling rates. Waste management systems vary greatly within Member States and are established by municipalities or district authorities, making the city-level the ideal level of analysis. Based on quantitative analysis of data from 28 European Union capitals (pre-Brexit), this paper speaks to debates about the effectiveness of waste management systems more broadly and the role of door-to-door bio-waste collection in particular.
Drawing on encouraging findings in literature, we investigate whether door-to-door bio-waste collection contributes to boosting the collection of dry recyclables such as glass, metal, paper and plastic. Employing Multiple Linear Regression, we sequentially test for 13 control variables including six related to different waste management system and seven controls related to urban, economic and political aspects. We find evidence that door-to-door bio-waste collection is associated with greater amounts of separately collected dry recyclables. Cities with door-to-door bio-waste collection, on average, sort 60 kg per capita per year more of dry recyclables. Although the causal mechanisms behind such a relationship need further investigation, this finding indicates that European Union waste management could benefit from a stronger promotion of door-to-door bio-waste collection.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS Koppenborg, Florentine
Japan's Nuclear Disaster and the Politics of Safety Governance,
06/2023
Book Chapter
The starting point for this book was the puzzling existence of an independent nuclear safety regulator in Japan, the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), which was able to withstand pressure to return ...to pre-3.11 business as usual. The analysis of Japan’s regulatory reforms has shown that the addition of an independent nuclear safety regulator has fundamentally altered nuclear safety governance in Japan and, by extension, nuclear power politics.
Regulation, including safety, has become ubiquitous in modern societies. It applies to everything from everyday items, such as kitchen appliances, to more complex technologies that come with many promises and potential pitfalls, such
THE FISSURED “NUCLEAR VILLAGE” Koppenborg, Florentine
Japan's Nuclear Disaster and the Politics of Safety Governance,
06/2023
Book Chapter
Every crisis offers an opportunity for change. After 3.11, many scholars asked whether Japan would phase out nuclear power altogether. The nuclear phaseout debate (discussed in chapter 2) took place ...amid large antinuclear demonstrations but resulted in no more than a vague DJP government decision to reduce Japan’s dependence on nuclear power. One reason was severe nuclear industry opposition to a zero nuclear power policy. Soon after, the pronuclear LDP won the 2012 general elections in a landslide victory, public demonstrations subsided, and pro-nuclear actors reasserted the necessity of nuclear power in the public discourse, all of which were taken
POST-3.11 NUCLEAR SAFETY STANDARDS Koppenborg, Florentine
Japan's Nuclear Disaster and the Politics of Safety Governance,
06/2023
Book Chapter
Safety standards refer to a set of goals, requirements, and principles the design of a nuclear power plant needs to meet, also called the design basis. The design basis plays an important role as a ...risk acceptance mechanism, especially for high-risk technologies and facilities. The expectation is that a nuclear power plant that conforms to the design basis poses “an acceptable risk to all stakeholders, including society as a whole” (Wyss 2016, 34).
Prior to 3.11, Japan’s safety requirements regulated many technical components of reactor units but allowed electric utilities to largely determine residual risks for society via partly voluntary
Such reads the mission statement of the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), created in 2012 as an independent organization, affiliated with the Ministry of Environment, and endowed with sole ...authority over nuclear safety in Japan. The NRA Establishment Act (NRA Act, Genshiryoku-kisei-i’inkai-secchi-hô), passed in June 2011, integrated all nuclear safety-related functions into the NRA. Until 3.11, nuclear safety functions were shared between three bodies: NISA, the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC), and the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES). The main one, NISA, was integrated into the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE), the energy policymaking agency within METI. A recurring
THE “NUCLEAR VILLAGE” Koppenborg, Florentine
Japan's Nuclear Disaster and the Politics of Safety Governance,
06/2023
Book Chapter
The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in March 2011 (simply referred to as “3.11” in Japan) naturally drew attention to Japan’s nuclear power program. Japan’s history of promoting ...the civilian use of nuclear power to generate electricity dates to the post-World War II period as part of the effort of resurrecting the country from the ruins of war. By 2011, Japan had fifty-four commercial nuclear reactors, making it the country with the third largest number of nuclear reactors, following the United States and France. The expectation inside and outside the country had been that nuclear power was
3.11 AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE Koppenborg, Florentine
Japan's Nuclear Disaster and the Politics of Safety Governance,
06/2023
Book Chapter
The earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident that assailed Fukushima, Japan, on March 11, 2011, cast a harsh spotlight on nuclear safety. Almost immediately, there were initiatives to strengthen ...safety measures at nuclear power plants abroad. In late March, the EU began its stress test, a review of nuclear power plant safety in EU member states. In April, representatives from different countries gathered at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to discuss possible nuclear safety improvements. The consultation process resulted in the IAEA adopting the “Action Plan on Nuclear Safety” in September 2011 in order to improve nuclear safety and emergency
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