Higher-order theories of consciousness argue that conscious awareness crucially depends on higher-order mental representations that represent oneself as being in particular mental states. These ...theories have featured prominently in recent debates on conscious awareness. We provide new leverage on these debates by reviewing the empirical evidence in support of the higher-order view. We focus on evidence that distinguishes the higher-order view from its alternatives, such as the first-order, global workspace and recurrent visual processing theories. We defend the higher-order view against several major criticisms, such as prefrontal activity reflects attention but not awareness, and prefrontal lesion does not abolish awareness. Although the higher-order approach originated in philosophical discussions, we show that it is testable and has received substantial empirical support.
How to measure metacognition Fleming, Stephen M; Lau, Hakwan C
Frontiers in human neuroscience,
07/2014, Letnik:
8
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
The ability to recognize one's own successful cognitive processing, in e.g., perceptual or memory tasks, is often referred to as metacognition. How should we quantitatively measure such ability? Here ...we focus on a class of measures that assess the correspondence between trial-by-trial accuracy and one's own confidence. In general, for healthy subjects endowed with metacognitive sensitivity, when one is confident, one is more likely to be correct. Thus, the degree of association between accuracy and confidence can be taken as a quantitative measure of metacognition. However, many studies use a statistical correlation coefficient (e.g., Pearson's r) or its variant to assess this degree of association, and such measures are susceptible to undesirable influences from factors such as response biases. Here we review other measures based on signal detection theory and receiver operating characteristics (ROC) analysis that are "bias free," and relate these quantities to the calibration and discrimination measures developed in the probability estimation literature. We go on to distinguish between the related concepts of metacognitive bias (a difference in subjective confidence despite basic task performance remaining constant), metacognitive sensitivity (how good one is at distinguishing between one's own correct and incorrect judgments) and metacognitive efficiency (a subject's level of metacognitive sensitivity given a certain level of task performance). Finally, we discuss how these three concepts pose interesting questions for the study of metacognition and conscious awareness.
How should we measure metacognitive ("type 2") sensitivity, i.e. the efficacy with which observers' confidence ratings discriminate between their own correct and incorrect stimulus classifications? ...We argue that currently available methods are inadequate because they are influenced by factors such as response bias and type 1 sensitivity (i.e. ability to distinguish stimuli). Extending the signal detection theory (SDT) approach of Galvin, Podd, Drga, and Whitmore (2003), we propose a method of measuring type 2 sensitivity that is free from these confounds. We call our measure meta-d', which reflects how much information, in signal-to-noise units, is available for metacognition. Applying this novel method in a 2-interval forced choice visual task, we found that subjects' metacognitive sensitivity was close to, but significantly below, optimality. We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings, as well as related computational issues of the method. We also provide free Matlab code for implementing the analysis.
In studies of anxiety and other affective disorders, objectively measured physiological responses have commonly been used as a proxy for measuring subjective experiences associated with pathology. ...However, this commonly adopted "biosignal" approach has recently been called into question on the grounds that subjective experiences and objective physiological responses may dissociate. We performed machine-learning-based analyses on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data to assess this issue in the case of fear. Although subjective fear and objective physiological responses were correlated in general, the respective whole-brain multivoxel decoders for the two measures were different. Some key brain regions such as the amygdala and insula appear to be primarily involved in the prediction of physiological reactivity, whereas some regions previously associated with metacognition and conscious perception, including some areas in the prefrontal cortex, appear to be primarily predictive of the subjective experience of fear. The present findings are in support of the recent call for caution in assuming a one-to-one mapping between subjective sufferings and their putative biosignals, despite the clear advantages in the latter's being objectively and continuously measurable in physiological terms.
Is activity in prefrontal cortex (PFC) critical for conscious perception? Major theories of consciousness make distinct predictions about the role of PFC, providing an opportunity to arbitrate ...between these views empirically. Here we address three common misconceptions: (1) PFC lesions do not affect subjective perception; (2) PFC activity does not reflect specific perceptual content; and (3) PFC involvement in studies of perceptual awareness is solely driven by the need to make reports required by the experimental tasks rather than subjective experience per se. These claims are incompatible with empirical findings, unless one focuses only on studies using methods with limited sensitivity. The literature highlights PFC's essential role in enabling the subjective experience in perception, contra the objective capacity to perform visual tasks; conflating the two can also be a source of confusion.
Are the Neural Correlates of Consciousness in the Front or in the Back of the Cerebral Cortex? Clinical and Neuroimaging Evidence, by Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini, Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Bradley R. Postle, Christof Koch, and Giulio Tononi.
Can humans be trained to make strategic use of latent representations in their own brains? We investigate how human subjects can derive reward-maximizing choices from intrinsic high-dimensional ...information represented stochastically in neural activity. Reward contingencies are defined in real-time by fMRI multivoxel patterns; optimal action policies thereby depend on multidimensional brain activity taking place below the threshold of consciousness, by design. We find that subjects can solve the task within two hundred trials and errors, as their reinforcement learning processes interact with metacognitive functions (quantified as the meaningfulness of their decision confidence). Computational modelling and multivariate analyses identify a frontostriatal neural mechanism by which the brain may untangle the 'curse of dimensionality': synchronization of confidence representations in prefrontal cortex with reward prediction errors in basal ganglia support exploration of latent task representations. These results may provide an alternative starting point for future investigations into unconscious learning and functions of metacognition.
In Consciousness We Trust is a synthesis of Hakwan Lau's 20-year research programme exploring the neuroscience of consciousness. Discussing studies from his own laboratory Lau uses various ...neuroscience techniques to address challenging philosophical questions about the nature of our subjective experience.
Mental health problems often involve clusters of symptoms that include subjective (conscious) experiences as well as behavioral and/or physiological responses. Because the bodily responses are ...readily measured objectively, these have come to be emphasized when developing treatments and assessing their effectiveness. On the other hand, the subjective experience of the patient reported during a clinical interview is often viewed as a weak correlate of psychopathology. To the extent that subjective symptoms are related to the underlying problem, it is often assumed that they will be taken care of if the more objective behavioral and physiological symptoms are properly treated. Decades of research on anxiety disorders, however, show that behavioral and physiological symptoms do not correlate as strongly with subjective experiences as is typically assumed. Further, the treatments developed using more objective symptoms as a marker of psychopathology have mostly been disappointing in effectiveness. Given that "mental" disorders are named for, and defined by, their subjective mental qualities, it is perhaps not surprising, in retrospect, that treatments that have sidelined mental qualities have not been especially effective. These negative attitudes about subjective experience took root in psychiatry and allied fields decades ago when there were few avenues for scientifically studying subjective experience. Today, however, cognitive neuroscience research on consciousness is thriving, and offers a viable and novel scientific approach that could help achieve a deeper understanding of mental disorders and their treatment.
Sensory signals are highly structured in both space and time. These regularities allow expectations about future stimulation to be formed, thereby facilitating decisions about upcoming visual ...features and objects. One such regularity is that the world is generally stable over short time scales. This feature of the world is exploited by the brain, leading to a bias in perception called serial dependence: previously seen stimuli bias the perception of subsequent stimuli, making them appear more similar to previous input than they really are. What are the neural processes that may underlie this bias in perceptual choice? Does serial dependence arise only in higher-level areas involved in perceptual decision-making, or does such a bias occur at the earliest levels of sensory processing? In this study, human subjects made decisions about the orientation of grating stimuli presented in the left or right visual field while activity patterns in their visual cortex were recorded using fMRI. In line with previous behavioral reports, reported orientation on the current trial was consistently biased toward the previously reported orientation. We found that the orientation signal in V1 was similarly biased toward the orientation presented on the previous trial. Both the perceptual decision and neural effects were spatially specific, such that the perceptual decision and neural representations on the current trial were only influenced by previous stimuli at the same location. These results suggest that biases in perceptual decisions induced by previous stimuli may result from neural biases in sensory cortex induced by recent perceptual history.
We perceive a stable visual scene, although our visual input is constantly changing. This experience may in part be driven by a bias in visual perception that causes images to be perceived as similar to those previously seen. Here, we provide evidence for a sensory bias that may underlie this perceptual effect. We find that neural representations in early visual cortex are biased toward previous perceptual decisions. Our results suggest a direct neural correlate of serial dependencies in visual perception. These findings elucidate how our perceptual decisions are shaped by our perceptual history.
A central controversy in metacognition studies concerns whether subjective confidence directly reflects the reliability of perceptual or cognitive processes, as suggested by normative models based on ...the assumption that neural computations are generally optimal. This view enjoys popularity in the computational and animal literatures, but it has also been suggested that confidence may depend on a late-stage estimation dissociable from perceptual processes. Yet, at least in humans, experimental tools have lacked the power to resolve these issues convincingly. Here, we overcome this difficulty by using the recently developed method of decoded neurofeedback (DecNef) to systematically manipulate multivoxel correlates of confidence in a frontoparietal network. Here we report that bi-directional changes in confidence do not affect perceptual accuracy. Further psychophysical analyses rule out accounts based on simple shifts in reporting strategy. Our results provide clear neuroscientific evidence for the systematic dissociation between confidence and perceptual performance, and thereby challenge current theoretical thinking.
PDF
