We present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We compare innovation activity under three regimes ...patents,no-patents,andpatentpoolsand find that none of them can reach the first best. We find that the first best can be reached through a decentralized tax-subsidy mechanism, by which innovators receive a subsidy when they innovate, and are taxed with subsequent innovations. This finding implies that optimal transfers work in the exact opposite way as traditional patents. Finally, we consider patents of finite duration and determine the optimal patent length.
We present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We compare innovation activity under three regimes -patents, ...no-patents, and patent pools- and find that none of them can reach the first best. We find that the first best can be reached through a decentralized tax-subsidy mechanism, by which innovators receive a subsidy when they innovate, and are taxed with subsequent innovations. This finding implies that optimal transfers work in the exact opposite way as traditional patents. Finally, we consider patents of finite duration and determine the optimal patent length.
We present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We study the equilibrium innovation activity under three regimes: ...patents, no-patents and patent pools. Patent pools increase the probability of innovation with respect to patents, but we also find that: (1) their outcome can be replicated by a licensing scheme in which innovators sell complete patent rights, and (2) they are dynamically unstable. We find that none of the above regimes can reach the first or second best. Finally, we consider patents of finite duration and determine the optimal patent length.
We present a model of sequential innovation in which an innovator uses several research inputs to invent a new good. These inputs, in turn, must be invented before they can be used by the final ...innovator. As a consequence, the degree of patent protection affects the revenues and cost of the innovator, but also determines the incentives to invent the research inputs in the first place. We study the effects of increases in the number of required inputs on innovation activity and optimal patent policy. We find that the probability of introducing the final innovation decreases (increases) as the number of inputs increases when inputs are complements (substitutes). We also find that the optimal strength of patents on research inputs is increasing in the degree of substitution between the inputs, but decreasing in the number of inputs for any degree of substitution.
We present a model of sequential innovation in which an innovator uses several research inputs to invent a new good. These inputs, in turn, must be invented before they can be used by the final ...innovator. As a consequence, the degree of patent protection affects the revenues and cost of the innovator, but also determines the incentives to invent the research inputs in the first place. We study the effects of increases in the number of required inputs on innovation activity and optimal patent policy. We find that the probability of introducing the final innovation decreases (increases) as the number of inputs increases when inputs are complements (substitutes). We also find that the optimal strength of patents on research inputs is increasing in the degree of substitution between the inputs, but decreasing in the number of inputs for any degree of substitution.
When innovation is sequential, the development of new products depends on the access to previous discoveries. As a consequence the patent system affects both the revenues and the cost of the ...innovator. We construct a model of sequential innovation in which an innovator uses n patented inputs in R&D to invent a new product. We ask three questions: (i) what is the net effect of patents on innovation as technologies become more complex (n increases)? (ii) are patent pools welfare enhancing? (iii) what is the optimal response of patent policy as technological complexity increases? We find that the answers to these questions depend on the degree of complementarity and substitutability between the inputs used in research.
Mixed Source Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon; Llanes, Gastón
2009/09
9
Paper
We study competitive interaction between profit-maximizing firms that sell software and complementary goods or services. In addition to tactical price competition, we allow firms to compete through ...business model reconfigurations. We consider three business models: the proprietary model (where all software modules offered by the firm are proprietary), the open source model (where all modules are open source), and the mixed source model (where a few modules are open). When a firm opens one of its modules, users can access and improve the source code. At the same time, however, opening a module sets up an open source (free) competitor. This hampers the firm's ability to capture value. We analyze three competitive situations: monopoly, commercial firm vs. non-profit open source project, and duopoly. We show that: (i) firms may become "more closed" in response to competition from an outside open source project; (ii) firms are more likely to open substitute, rather than complementary, modules to existing open source projects; (iii) when the products of two competing firms are similar in quality, firms differentiate through choosing different business models; and (iv) low-quality firms are generally more prone to opening some of their technologies than firms with high-quality products.
We present a model of industry equilibrium to study the coexistence of Open Source (OS) and Proprietary (P) firms. Two novel aspects of the model are: (1) participation in OS arises as the optimal ...decision of profit-maximizing firms, and (2) OS and P firms may (or may not) coexist in equilibrium. Firms decide their type and investment in R&D, and sell packages composed of a primary good (like software) and a complementary private good. The only difference between both kinds of firms is that OS share their technological advances on the primary good, while P keep their innovations private. The main contribution of the paper is to determine conditions under which OS and P coexist in equilibrium. Interestingly, this equilibrium is characterized by an asymmetric market structure, with a few large P firms and many small OS firms.
We present a model of industry equilibrium to study the coexistence of Open Source (OS) and Proprietary (P) firms. Two novel aspects of the model are: (1) participation in OS arises as the optimal ...decision of profit-maximizing firms, and (2) OS and P firms may (or may not) coexist in equilibrium. Firms decide their type and investment in R&D, and sell packages composed of a primary good (like software) and a complementary private good. The only difference between both kinds of firms is that OS share their technological advances on the primary good, while P keep their innovations private. The main contribution of the paper is to determine conditions under which OS and P coexist in equilibrium. Interestingly, this equilibrium is characterized by an asymmetric market structure, with a few large P firms and many small OS firms.
When innovation is sequential, the development of new products depends on the access to previous discoveries. As a consequence the patent system affects both the revenues and the cost of the ...innovator. We construct a model of sequential innovation in which an innovator uses n patented inputs in R&D to invent a new product. We ask three questions: (i) what is the net effect of patents on innovation as technologies become more complex (n increases)? (ii) are patent pools welfare enhancing? (iii) what is the optimal response of patent policy as technological complexity increases? We find that the answers to these questions depend on the degree of complementarity and substitutability between the inputs used in research.
