We examine gender differences among the six PhD student cohorts 2004-2009 at the California Institute of Technology using a new dataset that includes information on trainees and their advisors and ...enables us to construct detailed measures of teams at the advisor level. We focus on the relationship between graduate student publications and: (1) their gender; (2) the gender of the advisor, (3) the gender pairing between the advisor and the student and (4) the gender composition of the team. We find that female graduate students co-author on average 8.5% fewer papers than men; that students writing with female advisors publish 7.7% more. Of particular note is that gender pairing matters: male students working with female advisors publish 10.0% more than male students working with male advisors; women students working with male advisors publish 8.5% less. There is no difference between the publishing patterns of male students working with male advisors and female students working with female advisors. The results persist and are magnified when we focus on the quality of the published articles, as measured by average Impact Factor, instead of number of articles. We find no evidence that the number of publications relates to the gender composition of the team. Although the gender effects are reasonably modest, past research on processes of positive feedback and cumulative advantage suggest that the difference will grow, not shrink, over the careers of these recent cohorts.
Consistent with two models of imperfect competition in the labor market—the efficient bargaining model and the monopsony model—we provide two extensions of a microeconomic version of Hall's framework ...for estimating price-cost margins. We show that both product and labor market imperfections generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue, which can be characterized by a 'joint market imperfections parameter'. Using an unbalanced panel of 10,646 French firms in 38 manufacturing industries over the period 1978—2001, we can classify these industries into six different regimes depending on the type of competition in the product and the labor market. By far the most predominant regime is one of imperfect competition in the product market and efficient bargaining in the labor market (IC-EB), followed by a regime of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market (IC-PR), and by a regime of perfect competition in the product market and monopsony in the labor market (PC-MO). For each of these three predominant regimes, we assess within-regime firm differences in the estimated average price-cost mark-up and rent sharing or labor supply elasticity parameters, following the Swamy methodology to determine the degree of true firm dispersion. To assess the plausibility of our findings in the case of the dominant regime (IC-EB), we also relate our industry and firm-level estimates of price-cost mark-up and extent of rent sharing to industry characteristics and firm-specific variables respectively.
We identify the impact of intermediate goods markets imperfections on productivity downstream. Our empirical specification is based on a model of multifactor productivity (MFP) growth in which the ...effects of upstream competition can vary with distance to frontier. This model is estimated on a panel of fifteen OECD countries and twenty industries over 1985 to 2007. Competitive pressures are proxied with industry product market regulation data. We find evidence that anticompetitive upstream regulations have significantly curbed MFP growth over the past fifteen years, and more strongly so for observations that are close to the productivity frontier.
Our study investigates the importance of two main channels through which upstream anti‐competitive sector regulations impact productivity growth: investments in R&D and in ICT, as opposed to ...alternative channels we cannot explicitly consider for lack of appropriate data such as improvements in skills, management and organization. We specify a three equations model: an extended production function relating total factor productivity to both R&D and ICT capital, and to upstream regulations, and two factor demand functions relating R&D and ICT capital to upstream regulations. We estimate these relations on an unbalanced panel of 15 OECD countries and 13 industries over the period 1987–2007. We find that the total impact of upstream regulations on total factor productivity is sizeable, a large part of which is transmitted through investments in R&D and ICT, mainly the former.
This analysis proposes new measures of rent creation and rent sharing and assesses their impact on productivity on cross‐country‐industry panel data. We find first that: (1) anticompetitive product ...market regulations positively affect rent creation and (2) employment protection legislation boosts hourly wages, particularly for low‐skill workers. However, we find no significant impact of this employment legislation on rent sharing, as the hourly wage increases are offset by a negative impact on hours worked. Second, using regulation indicators as instruments, we find that rent creation and rent sharing both have a substantial negative impact on total factor productivity. (JEL E22, E24, O30, L50, O43, O47, C23)
We construct company panel data sets for manufacturing firms in Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, covering the period 1978-1989. These data sets are used to estimate empirical ...investment equations, and to investigate the role played by financial factors in each country. A robust finding is that cash flow and profits terms appear to be both statistically and quantitatively more significant in the United Kingdom than in the three continental European countries. This is consistent with the suggestion that financial constraints on investment may be relatively severe in the more market-oriented U.K. financial system.
•We estimate product and labor market imperfections in France, Japan and the Netherlands.•We consider two product and three labor market settings, thus distinguishing 6 regimes.•We classify 30 ...comparable manufacturing industries in these regimes.•We find important regime differences across the three countries.•We also observe differences in the levels of product market imperfections within regimes.
Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficient bargaining and monopsony), this paper relies on two extensions of Hall’s econometric framework for estimating simultaneously price–cost margins and scale economies. Using an unbalanced panel of 17653 firms over the period 1986–2001 in France, 8728 firms over the period 1994–2006 in Japan and 7828 firms over the period 1993–2008 in the Netherlands, we first apply two procedures to classify 30 comparable manufacturing industries in 6 distinct regimes that differ in terms of the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets. For each of the predominant regimes in each country, we then investigate industry differences in the estimated product and labor market imperfections and scale economies. Consistent with differences in institutions and in the industrial relations system in the three countries, we find important regime differences across the three countries and also observe differences in the levels of product market imperfections and scale economies within regimes.
This paper proposes an accounting framework for innovation and it is illustrated by an application based on the data from the first European Community Innovation Survey, for the year 1992 and the ...RND-intensive manufacturing industries in seven European countries. In this application, innovation intensity is measured by the share of innovative sales, but the framework can also be applied to other sources of data and other measures of innovation. Trying to make the best use of the qualitative and quantitative information available in the survey, a certain number of explanatory variables are selected for the propensity to innovate.
Abstract
This article presents empirical evidence on the impacts of product innovation, export, and other important factors on employment growth in Chinese manufacturing industries over the period ...2000–2006. The results of our analysis show that the overall demand effect of firms’ output growth on their average yearly employment growth amounts to 7.0%, of which 3.5%, 1.2%, 1.6%, and 0.7% correspond to the output growth of, respectively, domestic-old, export-old, domestic-new and export-new products. The displacement effect from process and organizational innovations, as measured by firms’ productivity efforts to catch up with industry regional productivity frontiers, accounts for a 5.4% average reduction of yearly employment growth. We also observe a trade-off between growth of productivity and growth of employment, which could have been on average higher by 2% for productivity (16.8% instead of 14.8%) and lower by 2% for employment (1.4% instead of 3.4%).
•We compare rent-sharing panel data estimates from two econometric reduced-form models.•Industry distributions of these estimates slightly overlap but differ on average.•The average rent-sharing ...estimate is roughly 0.30 for the productivity model.•This average value is 0.17 for the wage determination model using firm-level data only.•It reduces to 0.10 for the wage determination model accounting for non-random sorting.
The extent to which employers share rents with their employees is typically assessed by estimating the responsiveness of workers’ wages on firms’ ability to pay. This paper compares rent-sharing estimates using such a wage determination regression with estimates based on a productivity regression that relies on standard firm-level input and output data. Using a large matched firm-worker panel data sample for French manufacturing, we find that the respective industry distributions of the rent-sharing estimates are correlated and slightly overlap, but are significantly different on average. Precisely, if we only rely on the firm-level information, we obtain an average rent-sharing estimate of roughly 0.30 for the productivity regression and 0.17 for the wage determination regression. When we also take advantage of the worker-level information to control for unobserved worker ability in the model of wage determination, we find as expected a lower average value of 0.10.
PDF
