This study investigates the unique implementation of a social choice function in iterative dominance in the ex-post term. We assume partial ex-post verifiability; that is, after determining an ...allocation, the central planner can observe partial information about the state as verifiable. We demonstrate a condition of the state space, termed “full detection,” and show that with full detection, any social choice function is uniquely implementable even if the information that can be verified ex-post is very limited. To prove this, we construct a dynamic mechanism according to which each player announces his (or her) private signal, before the other players observe this signal, at an earlier stage, and each player also announces the state at a later stage. In this construction, we can impose several severe restrictions such as boundedness, permission of only tiny transfers off the equilibrium path, and no permission of transfers on the equilibrium path. This study does not assume either expected utility or quasi-linearity.
This study investigates implementation of a social choice function with complete information, where we impose various restrictions such as boundedness, permission of only small transfers, and ...uniqueness of iterative dominance in strict terms. We assume that the state is ex-post verifiable after the determination of allocation. We show that with three or more players, any social choice function is uniquely and exactly implementable in iterative dominance. Importantly, this study does not assume either expected utility or quasi-linearity, even if we utilize the stochastic method of mechanism design explored by Abreu and Matsushima (Econometrica 60:993-1008, 1992a; Econometrica 60:1439-1442, 1992b; J Econ Theory 64(1):1-19, 1994). We further show that even with incomplete information, and even with two players, any ex-post incentive compatible social choice function is uniquely and exactly implementable in iterative dominance.
This study investigates infinitely repeated games of a prisoner’s dilemma with additive separability in which the monitoring technology is imperfect and private. Behavioral incentives indicate that a ...player is not only motivated by pure self-interest but also by social preference such as reciprocity, and that a player often becomes naïve and selects an action randomly due to her cognitive limitation and uncertain psychological mood as well as the strategic complexity caused by monitoring imperfection and private observation. By focusing on generous tit-for-tat strategies, we characterize a behavioral version of Nash equilibrium termed behavioral equilibrium in an accuracy-contingent manner. By eliminating the gap between theory and evidence, we show that not pure self-interest but reciprocity plays a substantial role in motivating a player to make decisions in a sophisticated manner.
We investigate combinatorial allocations with opt-out types and clarify the possibility of achieving efficiency under incomplete information. We introduce two distinct collective decision procedures. ...The first procedure assumes that the central planner designs a mechanism and players have the option to exit. The mechanism requires interim individual rationality. The second procedure assumes that players design a mechanism by committing themselves to participate. The mechanism requires marginal stability against blocking behavior by the largest proper coalitions. We show that the central planner can earn non-negative revenue in the first procedure, if and only if he cannot do so in the second.
This paper demonstrates the theoretical foundation that underlies the willingness of rational arbitrageurs to delay and reinforce the speculative attack. The key assumptions are that there is a small ...probability that arbitrageurs are behavioral and never time the market of their own accord and it is uncertain whether arbitrageurs are behavioral or rational. We model a stock market as a timing game, in which arbitrageurs compete to react quickest. We show that rational arbitrageurs are willing to ride the bubble for a long period. We also characterize symmetric Nash equilibria and show the sufficient condition for uniqueness.
Prediction and optimization of water-cooling performance of a pin fin heat sink with variable pin diameters along a flow direction is attempted. We have developed a simple analyze procedure for pin ...fin heat sink that enables to evaluate the row-by-row performance when diameters of fins are morphed along a flow direction. Validity of the procedure is confirmed for uniform and non-uniform pin diameter cases. The Taguchi method is applied to an optimization method. Optimal design among the considered cases, in which the thermal resistance is minimum, corresponds to the configuration where the pin diameter equals 3 mm constructed from copper. This holds for constant inlet velocity and constant pumping power cases. Optimum structure of heat sink considering simultaneous parameters (minimum thermal resistance, pressure drop and mass) occurs when the heat sink is built from aluminum with a pin diameter of 2 mm. These three parameters influence the design of the heat sink. For instance, when the thermal resistance and the pressure drop are significant, optimum structure is a “wing like shape” with larger pin diameter near the central rows and copper as material. However, when the thermal resistance and the heat sink mass are of interest, the optimum structure associated with the larger pin diameter constructed from aluminum. Also, when we consider the pressure drop and heat sink mass, the optimum design is the one where the pin diameter is 1 mm built from aluminum.
This article reports a theory for superior configurations of a heat spreader between a high performance disk shaped heat sink and a high density heating device. We considered three cases: (a) ...perimeter weighted distribution of cooling resources, (b) uniform distribution of cooling resources, and (c) center weighted distribution of cooling resources. Then, the most preferable distribution of cooling resources with same amount of cooling resource is studied. The center weighted distribution shows the highest performance for this case. The cooling performance of the heat spreader per total thermal conductance decreases with the increase in the heat spreader radius. On the other hand, the cooling performance of the heat spreader increases with the increase in the heat spreader radius. The cooling performance under the same degree of cooling in the center area increases with the increase in the heat spreader radius for perimeter weighted distribution. Furthermore, the perimeter weighted distribution is most effective due to the significant cooling resource in perimeter region. This advantage diminishes rapidly with the increase in the temperature parameter m (which is a function of the product of Biot number and Svelteness number of the heat spreader).
We incorporate behavioral economics into implementation theory, where each agent dislikes telling a white lie. By using a single detail-free mechanism, any alternative can be uniquely implemented as ...long as the agents regard this alternative as being socially desirable.
We investigate the implementation of social choice functions (SCFs) from an epistemological perspective. We consider the possibility that in higher-order beliefs there exists an honest agent who is ...motivated by intrinsic preference for honesty as well as material interest. We assume weak honesty, in that, although any honest agent has a cost of lying that is positive but close to zero, she (or he) is mostly motivated by material interests and even tells white lies. This study assumes that all agents are fully informed of the physical state, but “all agents are selfish” never happens to be common knowledge in epistemology. We show the following positive results for the implementability: with three or more agents, any SCF is uniquely implementable in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE). An SCF, whether material or nonmaterial (ethical), can be implemented even if all agents are selfish and “all agents are selfish” is mutual knowledge.
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