•Study derives carbon budget allocations when fairness concerns are considered.•Key concerns are basic needs, past emissions and benefits from historical emissions.•Fairness concerns identify ...critiques about current budget allocation principles.•A qualified equal-per-capita approach is a promising way to address such concerns.
Countries’ nationally determined contributions to mitigate global warming translate to claims of country specific shares of the remaining carbon budget. The remaining global budget is limited by the aim of staying well below 2 °C, however. Here we show how fairness concerns quantitatively condition the allocation of this global carbon budget across countries. Minimal fairness requirements include securing basic needs, attributing historical responsibility for past emissions, accounting for benefits from past emissions, and not exceeding countries’ societally feasible emission reduction rate. The argument in favor of taking into account these fairness concerns reflects a critique of both simple equality- and sovereignty-principled reduction approaches, the former modelled here as the equal-per-capita distribution from now on, the latter as prolonging the inequality of the status-quo levels of emissions into the transformation period (considered a form of “grandfathering”). We find the option most in line with fairness concerns to be a four-fold qualified version of the equal-per-capita approach that incorporates a limited form of grandfathering.
Abstract
In implementing the European Green Deal to align with the Paris Agreement, the EU has raised its climate ambition and in 2022 is negotiating the distribution of increased mitigation effort ...among Member States. Such partitioning of targets among subsidiary entities is becoming a major challenge for implementation of climate policies around the globe. We contrast the 2021 European Commission proposal - an allocation based on a singular country attribute - with transparent and reproducible methods based on three ethical principles. We go beyond traditional effort-sharing literature and explore allocations representing an aggregated least regret compromise between different EU country perspectives on a fair allocation. While the 2021 proposal represents a nuanced compromise for many countries, for others a further redistribution could be considered equitable. Whereas we apply our approach within the setting of the EU negotiations, the framework can easily be adapted to inform debates worldwide on sharing mitigation effort among subsidiary entities.
Is it fair to leave the next generation a public debt? Is it defensible to impose legal rules on them through constitutional constraints? From combating climate change to ensuring proper funding for ...future pensions, concerns about ethics between generations are everywhere. In this book sixteen philosophers explore intergenerational justice. Part One examines the ways in which various theories of justice look at the matter. These include libertarian, Rawlsian, sufficientarian, contractarian, communitarian, Marxian, and reciprocity-based approaches. In Part Two, the chapters look more specifically at issues relevant to each of these theories, such as motivation to act fairly towards future generations, the population dimension, the formation of preferences through education and how they impact on our intergenerational obligations, and whether it is fair to rely on constitutional devices.
Aplasia cutis congenita (ACC) of the scalp and terminal transverse limb defects (TTLD) are the characteristic findings of Adams–Oliver syndrome (AOS). The variable clinical spectrum further includes ...cardiac, neurologic, renal, and ophthalmological findings. Associated genes in AOS are in the Notch and the CDC42/Rac1 signaling pathways. Both autosomal‐dominant and autosomal‐recessive inheritances have been reported, the latter with pathogenic variants in DOCK6 or EOGT. The EOGT‐associated recessive type of AOS has been postulated to present a more favorable prognosis. We here report a 12‐year‐old girl from a refugee family of Iraq with consanguineous parents. She was born with a severe phenotype of AOS presenting a large ACC of the scalp with an underlying skull defect, which was often infected and inflamed. Afterward, additional ulceration developed. Furthermore, the girl showed microcephaly, TTLD on both hands and feet, and neurological findings: spastic paresis, epilepsy and suspicion of intellectual deficit. Molecular genetic analysis (next‐generation sequencing) revealed a novel frameshift mutation in the EOGT gene in Exon 13 in homozygous constellation: c.1013dupA p.(Asn338Lysfs*24). A biopsy within an ulceration at the scalp ACC showed a cutaneous squamous cell carcinoma (cSCC) with local invasive growth into the dura, the meninges, and the cortex. Treatment including surgical resection and focal irradiation was not curative and the girl deceased 6 months after initial diagnosis. This report on a patient with AOS and an autosomal‐recessive EOGT gene variant dying of a local aggressive cSCC at an ACC lesion shows that close monitoring of ACC is essential.
•Emissions must be understood as being contributed by both, consumers and producers.•Justice necessitates analysis of distributive consequences of a policy base change.•Industrialized ...consumption-based policy is not necessarily improving effectiveness.•Three conditions are derived that ensure higher cost-effectiveness and justice.•Clean technology transfer to developing countries is a crucial complement.
In recent years, climate policy under the United Nations system has been characterized by bottom-up, national approaches to climate mitigation. This raises concerns about the overall effectiveness of these mitigation policies, for example due to carbon leakage. In response to these concerns, authors have repeatedly suggested that policy makers consider a consumption-based climate policy approach. We analyze the potential merits of a switch to a consumption-based policy approach using the criteria of justice and economic efficiency. We argue that emissions must be understood as being contributed by both, consumers and producers, but that this fact does not by itself settle the question whether consumption or production ought to serve as the climate policy base. Rather, the perspective of justice necessitates an analysis of the distributive consequences of switching from a production- to a consumption-based policy.
We find that both (global) cost-effectiveness and justice can be improved if the unilateral climate policies of industrialized countries are based on emissions from consumption. There are preconditions, however, the switch in the policy base must be accompanied by clean technology transfer, and if implemented by border carbon adjustments, import tax revenues need to be channeled to developing and emerging economies. We further show that in such a setting, export rebates are of minor importance for efficiency and justice.
This article proposes that debates over historical injustice and Jeremy Waldron's supersession thesis are helpfully framed by distinguishing between (a) the abstract supersession thesis proper, (b) ...the temporal orientation of justice, (c) various conceptions of supersession, and (d) arguments against using supersession discourse. This introduction and contributors to this volume advance the debate by discussing Waldron's later, less examined writings on supersession of sovereignty, group identity, and treaties, as well as public dimensions of supersession and critiques drawn from settler colonial theory and Indigenous perspectives, among others. We discuss the contributions by Gordon Christie, Burke Hendrix, Julio Montero, Esme Murdock, Seunghyun Song, Jeff Spinner-Halev, and Santiago Truccone-Borgogno, and Jeremy Waldron's reply.
Climate justice and historical emissions Meyer, Lukas H.; Roser, Dominic
Critical review of international social and political philosophy,
03/2010, Letnik:
13, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Climate change can be interpreted as a unique case of historical injustice involving issues of both intergenerational and global justice. We split the issue into two separate questions. First, how ...should emission rights be distributed? Second, who should come up for the costs of coping with climate change? We regard the first question as being an issue of pure distributive justice and argue on prioritarian grounds that the developing world should receive higher per capita emission rights than the developed world. This is justified by the fact that the latter already owns a larger share of benefits associated with emission generating activities because of its past record of industrialisation. The second question appears to be an issue of compensatory justice. After defining what we mean by compensation, we show that different kinds of compensatory principles run into problems when used to justify payments by historical emitters of the North to people suffering from climate change in the South. As an alternative, we propose to view payments from wealthy countries for adaptation to climate change in vulnerable countries rather as a measure based on concerns of global distributive justice.
Ischemic stroke, a leading cause of disability and mortality worldwide, occurs due to the sudden interruption of blood supply to a specific region of the brain ...
Expectations play an important role in how people plan their lives and pursue their projects. People living in highly industrialized countries share a way of life that comes with high levels of ...emissions. Their expectations to be able to continue their projects imply their holding expectations to similarly high future levels of personal emissions. We argue that the frustration or undermining of these expectations would cause them significant harm. Further, the article investigates under what conditions people can be thought to hold legitimate expectations, in particular about permissible levels of future emissions. We distinguish differing theories of understanding these conditions, namely authority-based and justice-based theories, that each allows us to systematically distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate expectations. Furthermore, with respect to individuals’ future permissible emissions we give several reasons for holding that such theories cannot identify a particular expectation to a specific level of personal emissions as the only legitimate one. Finally, we argue that the set of legitimate expectations that people hold with respect to a just and effective solution to climate change has normative significance in at least two ways: the differing but equally legitimate expectations ought to be taken into account when justifying what could count as such a solution and when determining the just way of arriving at and implementing such a solution.