Is activity in prefrontal cortex (PFC) critical for conscious perception? Major theories of consciousness make distinct predictions about the role of PFC, providing an opportunity to arbitrate ...between these views empirically. Here we address three common misconceptions: (1) PFC lesions do not affect subjective perception; (2) PFC activity does not reflect specific perceptual content; and (3) PFC involvement in studies of perceptual awareness is solely driven by the need to make reports required by the experimental tasks rather than subjective experience per se. These claims are incompatible with empirical findings, unless one focuses only on studies using methods with limited sensitivity. The literature highlights PFC's essential role in enabling the subjective experience in perception, contra the objective capacity to perform visual tasks; conflating the two can also be a source of confusion.
Are the Neural Correlates of Consciousness in the Front or in the Back of the Cerebral Cortex? Clinical and Neuroimaging Evidence, by Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini, Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Bradley R. Postle, Christof Koch, and Giulio Tononi.
Localization of objects and events in the environment is critical for survival, as many perceptual and motor tasks rely on estimation of spatial location. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume ...that spatial localizations should generally be accurate. Curiously, some previous studies have reported biases in visual and auditory localizations, but these studies have used small sample sizes and the results have been mixed. Therefore, it is not clear (1) if the reported biases in localization responses are real (or due to outliers, sampling bias, or other factors), and (2) whether these putative biases reflect a bias in sensory representations of space or a priori expectations (which may be due to the experimental setup, instructions, or distribution of stimuli). Here, to address these questions, a dataset of unprecedented size (obtained from 384 observers) was analyzed to examine presence, direction, and magnitude of sensory biases, and quantitative computational modeling was used to probe the underlying mechanism(s) driving these effects. Data revealed that, on average, observers were biased towards the center when localizing visual stimuli, and biased towards the periphery when localizing auditory stimuli. Moreover, quantitative analysis using a Bayesian Causal Inference framework suggests that while pre-existing spatial biases for central locations exert some influence, biases in the sensory representations of both visual and auditory space are necessary to fully explain the behavioral data. How are these opposing visual and auditory biases reconciled in conditions in which both auditory and visual stimuli are produced by a single event? Potentially, the bias in one modality could dominate, or the biases could interact/cancel out. The data revealed that when integration occurred in these conditions, the visual bias dominated, but the magnitude of this bias was reduced compared to unisensory conditions. Therefore, multisensory integration not only improves the precision of perceptual estimates, but also the accuracy.
While people often think they veridically perceive much of the visual surround, recent findings indicate that when asked to detect targets such as gratings embedded in visual noise, observers make ...more false alarms in the unattended periphery. Do these results from psychophysics studies generalize to more ecologically valid settings? We used a modern game engine to create a simulated driving environment where participants (as drivers) had to make judgments about the colors of pedestrians’ clothing in the periphery. Confirming our hypothesis based on previous psychophysics studies, we found that subjects showed liberal biases for unattended locations when detecting specific colors of pedestrians’ clothing. A second experiment showed that this finding was not simply due to a confirmation bias in decision-making when subjects were uncertain. Together, these results support the idea that in everyday visual experience, there is subjective inflation of experienced detail in the periphery, which may happen at the decisional level.
•Selective attention does not seem to alter the probability of integrating.•Selective attention improves precision of visual spatial representations.•Auditory spatial representations are not impacted ...by selective attention.•Selective attention improves temporal numerosity precision in both modalities.
In our daily lives, our capacity to selectively attend to stimuli within or across sensory modalities enables enhanced perception of the surrounding world. While previous research on selective attention has studied this phenomenon extensively, two important questions still remain unanswered: (1) how selective attention to a single modality impacts sensory integration processes, and (2) the mechanism by which selective attention improves perception. We explored how selective attention impacts performance in both a spatial task and a temporal numerosity judgment task, and employed a Bayesian Causal Inference model to investigate the computational mechanism(s) impacted by selective attention. We report three findings: (1) in the spatial domain, selective attention improves precision of the visual sensory representations (which were relatively precise), but not the auditory sensory representations (which were fairly noisy); (2) in the temporal domain, selective attention improves the sensory precision in both modalities (both of which were fairly reliable to begin with); (3) in both tasks, selective attention did not exert a significant influence over the tendency to integrate sensory stimuli. Therefore, it may be postulated that a sensory modality must possess a certain inherent degree of encoding precision in order to benefit from selective attention. It also appears that in certain basic perceptual tasks, the tendency to integrate crossmodal signals does not depend significantly on selective attention. We conclude with a discussion of how these results relate to recent theoretical considerations of selective attention.
Do we perceive fine details in the visual periphery? Here, we propose that phenomenology in the visual periphery can be characterized by an inflated sense of perceptual capacity, as observers ...overestimate the quality of their perceptual inputs. Distinct from the well-known perceptual phenomenon of ‘filling-in’ where perceptual content is generated or completed endogenously, inflation can be characterized by incorrect introspection at the subjective level. The perceptual content itself may be absent or weak (i.e. not necessarily filled-in), and yet such content is mistakenly regarded by the system as rich. Behaviourally, this can be reflected by metacognitive deficits in the degree to which confidence judgements track task accuracy, and decisional biases for observers to think particular items are present, even when they are not. In two experiments using paradigms that exploit unique attributes of peripheral vision (crowding and summary statistics), we provide evidence that both types of deficits are present in peripheral vision, as observers' reports are marked by overconfidence in discrimination judgements and high numbers of false alarms in detection judgements. We discuss potential mechanisms that may be the cause of inflation and propose future experiments to further explore this unique sensory phenomenon.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access’.
Recent studies suggest that neurons in sensorimotor circuits involved in perceptual decision-making also play a role in decision confidence. In these studies, confidence is often considered to be an ...optimal readout of the probability that a decision is correct. However, the information leading to decision accuracy and the report of confidence often covaried, leaving open the possibility that there are actually two dissociable signal types in the brain: signals that correlate with decision accuracy (optimal confidence) and signals that correlate with subjects’ behavioral reports of confidence (subjective confidence). We recorded neuronal activity from a sensorimotor decision area, the superior colliculus (SC) of monkeys, while they performed two different tasks. In our first task, decision accuracy and confidence covaried, as in previous studies. In our second task, we implemented a motion discrimination task with stimuli that were matched for decision accuracy but produced different levels of confidence, as reflected by behavioral reports. We used a multivariate decoder to predict monkeys’ choices from neuronal population activity. As in previous studies on perceptual decision-making mechanisms, we found that neuronal decoding performance increased as decision accuracy increased. However, when decision accuracy was matched, performance of the decoder was similar between high and low subjective confidence conditions. These results show that the SC likely signals optimal decision confidence similar to previously reported cortical mechanisms, but is unlikely to play a critical role in subjective confidence. The results also motivate future investigations to determine where in the brain signals related to subjective confidence reside.
Is visual perception "rich" or "sparse?" One finding supporting the "rich" hypothesis shows that a specific visual summary representation, color diversity, is represented "cost-free" outside ...focally-attended regions in dual-task paradigms 1. Here, we investigated whether this "cost-free" phenomenon for color diversity perception extends to peripheral vision. After replicating previous findings and verifying that color diversity is represented "cost-free" in central vision, we performed two experiments: in our first experiment, we extended the paradigm to peripheral vision and found that in minimally-attended regions of space, color diversity perception was impaired. In a second and final experiment, we added confidence judgments to our task, and found that participants maintained high levels of metacognitive awareness of impaired performance in minimally-attended visual areas in the periphery. These findings provide evidence that color perception may be partially attention-dependent in peripheral vision, and challenge previous views on both sides of the rich vs. sparse debate.
Current dominant views hold that perceptual confidence reflects the probability that a decision is correct. Although these views have enjoyed some empirical support, recent behavioral results ...indicate that confidence and the probability of being correct can be dissociated. An alternative hypothesis suggests that confidence instead reflects the magnitude of evidence in favor of a decision while being relatively insensitive to the evidence opposing the decision. We considered how this alternative hypothesis might be biologically instantiated by developing a simple neural network model incorporating a known property of sensory neurons: tuned inhibition. The key idea of the model is that the level of inhibition that each accumulator unit receives from units with the opposite tuning preference, i.e. its inhibition 'tuning', dictates its contribution to perceptual decisions versus confidence judgments, such that units with higher tuned inhibition (computing relative evidence for different perceptual interpretations) determine perceptual discrimination decisions, and units with lower tuned inhibition (computing absolute evidence) determine confidence. We demonstrate that this biologically plausible model can account for several counterintuitive findings reported in the literature where confidence and decision accuracy dissociate. By comparing model fits, we further demonstrate that a full complement of behavioral data across several previously published experimental results-including accuracy, reaction time, mean confidence, and metacognitive sensitivity-is best accounted for when confidence is computed from units without, rather than units with, tuned inhibition. Finally, we discuss predictions of our results and model for future neurobiological studies. These findings suggest that the brain has developed and implements this alternative, heuristic theory of perceptual confidence computation by relying on the diversity of neural resources available.
Individuals vary in their tendency to bind signals from multiple senses. For the same set of sights and sounds, one individual may frequently integrate multisensory signals and experience a unified ...percept, whereas another individual may rarely bind them and often experience two distinct sensations. Thus, while this binding/integration tendency is specific to each individual, it is not clear how plastic this tendency is in adulthood, and how sensory experiences may cause it to change. Here, we conducted an exploratory investigation which provides evidence that (1) the brain's tendency to bind in spatial perception is plastic, (2) that it can change following brief exposure to simple audiovisual stimuli, and (3) that exposure to temporally synchronous, spatially discrepant stimuli provides the most effective method to modify it. These results can inform current theories about how the brain updates its internal model of the surrounding sensory world, as well as future investigations seeking to increase integration tendencies.
•Researchers disagree about whether visual phenomenology is rich or sparse.•Studies show that minimally attended phenomenology is subjectively overestimated based on what objective perceptual ...capacity would predict.•This subjective inflation effect points to a theoretical position that is somewhat intermediate between the Rich and Sparse views.•It suggests that the content of peripheral phenomenology is sparse, but its reliability is subjectively overestimated, making it feel rich.
How do we explain the seemingly rich nature of visual phenomenology while accounting for impoverished perception in the periphery? This apparent mismatch has led some to posit that rich phenomenological content overflows cognitive access, whereas others hold that phenomenology is in fact sparse and constrained by cognitive access. Here, we review the Rich versus Sparse debate as it relates to a phenomenon called subjective inflation, wherein minimally attended or peripheral visual perception tends to be subjectively evaluated as more reliable than attended or foveal perception when objective performance is matched. We argue that subjective inflation can account for rich phenomenology without invoking phenomenological overflow. On this view, visual phenomenology is constrained by cognitive access, but seemingly inflated above what would be predicted based on sparse sensory content.
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