What are the consequences of a culture of victory in countries undergoing new state formation and democratic transition? In this article, we examine ‘foundational legitimacy,’ or a hegemonic ...narrative about the way in which a new state was created, and the role particular groups played in its creation. We argue that the way in which victory is institutionalized can pose a grave threat to the democratic project. If reconciliation and democratization depend of integrating losers into the new order and recognizing plural narratives of state formation, then exclusivist narratives based on foundational legitimacy pose a direct challenge to both. We focus on two Yugoslav successor states, Kosovo and Croatia. For both cases, we trace how appeals to ‘foundational legitimacy’ by groups that claim a leading role in the struggle for independence fostered a politics of exclusion, which ran counter to both the spirit of democracy. In Croatia, foundational legitimacy was partly challenged after 2000 by reformist political forces, though more recently it has re-appeared in political life. In Kosovo, foundational legitimacy was never successfully challenged and continues to shape political dynamics to the present day.
In recent years and decades, authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies have passed and enforced punitive memory laws, intending to ban certain interpretations of past events or sheltering ...official versions of history against challenges. This comes as no surprise in countries whose governments undermine pluralism and assume the existence of a historical truth that is stable over time, invariable, and self-explanatory. But why do liberal democracies, committed to political pluralism and open debate, pass laws that penalize challenges to certain interpretations of the past and restrict freedom of speech? This article argues that liberal democracies may do so yielding to bottom–up pressure by courts and to regulate civil law disputes for which existing legislation and jurisprudence may not suffice. Based on case studies from Germany, France, Switzerland, Poland, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, we also found punitive memory laws in liberal democracies narrower and more precise than in nonliberal states.
The tumultuous history of the Balkans has been subject to a plethora of conflicting interpretations, both local and external. In an attempt to help overcome the stereotypes that still pervade Balkan ...history, Battling over the Balkans concentrates on a set of five principal controversies from the precommunist period with which the region’s history and historiography must contend: (1) the pre-1914 Ottoman and Eastern Christian Orthodox legacies; (2) the post-1918 struggles for state-building; (3) the range of European economic and cultural influence across the interwar period, as opposed to diplomatic or political intervention; (4) the role of violence and paramilitary forces in challenging the interwar political regimes in the region; and (5) the fate of ethnic minorities into and after World War II, particularly Jews, Muslims and Roma. In an attempt to give a voice to eminent local authors, the chapters provide samples of new regional scholarship exploring these contested issues—most of them translated into English for the first time—and are prefaced with historiographical overviews addressing the state of the debate on these specific controversies. These translations help bridge the language barriers that often separate scholarly traditions within Southeast Europe, as well as scholars in Southeast Europe and English-speaking academia. It is hoped that the volume will enable readers to identify common patterns and influences that characterize the writing of history in the region, and will stimulate new transnational and comparative approaches to the history of the Balkans.
Yugoslav scholarship about the Spanish Civil War, specifically the Yugoslav volunteers who fought in the International Brigades, was almost exclusively tied to the partisan struggle during the Second ...World War and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Many countries in the Soviet bloc published books about their heroes who fought fascism before Western Europe reacted and raised monuments to Spanish Civil War veterans. However, many lost their lives during Stalinist purges of the late 1940s and early 1950s since they were potentially compromised cadres who returned to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other countries only after the Red Army's occupation. Yugoslav volunteers, however, generally had a more prominent status in the country (and historiography) since the Yugoslav resistance movement liberated the country with only minimal support from the Soviet Union.
In 2005, Croatia's prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration depended entirely on one man. Surprisingly, it was neither the country's prime minister, nor the president, nor any other government ...official, but rather a former French Foreign Legionnaire and retired Croatian Army general who determined the progress of Croatia's bid for membership of NATO and the European Union. The arrest of General Ante Gotovina, who had been in hiding since his indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was made public in the summer of 2001, was the litmus test for Croatia's cooperation with the Tribunal in The Hague, and correspondingly the country's readiness for further European integration. The fugitive general and hero of Croatia's war for independence (Domovinski rat, or Homeland War, 1991-1995) had transformed from being merely one name on a long list of individuals suspected of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and had become the cause of Croatia's foremost political dilemma. The four and a half year drama of Gotovina's flight from justice epitomised the unresolved legacies of devastating interethnic conflict, Croatia's relations with the ICTY and the EU, and internal political struggles in the wake of the post-communist transition. By 2005, Gotovina's transfiguration into a political symbol reached a high point, both domestically, where radical nationalist opposition groups used him to challenge the pro-EU policies of the government, and internationally, where he was cited as evidence of Croatia's alleged non-cooperation with the ICTY.
This article examines how rebel Serbs in Croatia reinterpreted narratives of World War Two to justify their uprising against the democratically elected Croatian government in 1990 and gain domestic ...and international legitimacy for the Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK) parastate. While scholars have written about the strategies nationalist elites used regarding controversial symbols and the rehabilitation of World War Two collaborators in Croatia and other Yugoslav successor states, the RSK's “culture of memory” has received little attention. Based on documents captured after the RSK's defeat in 1995, this article shows that it was not only the government of Franjo Tudjman that rejected the Partisan narratives of “Brotherhood and Unity,” but a parallel process took place among the leadership in the Krajina. Ultimately the decision to base the historical foundations of the Croatian Serbs’ political goals on a chauvinist and extremist interpretation of the past resulted in a criminalized entity that ended tragically for both Serbs and Croats living on the territory of the RSK.
The Jasenovac Concentration Camp prevails as one of the most potent symbols that continues to fuel ideological and ethno-national divisions in Croatia and neighboring Yugoslav successor states. We ...argue that mnemonic actors who distort the history, memory, and representations of Jasenovac through commemorative speeches, exhibitions, and political discourse are by no means new. The misuses of the Jasenovac tragedy, vividly present during socialist Yugoslavia, continue to the present day. Drawing upon the history of mediating Jasenovac as well as recent examples of commemorative speeches and problematic exhibitions, this article highlights some of the present-day struggles surrounding this former campscape.
This article provides an overview on some of the key issues related to the Bleiburg commemoration and more broadly the cultural memory of Partisan crimes at the end of the Second World War. Drawing ...upon four years of fieldwork, media analysis, and recent historiographical debates, the authors take a transnational approach in examining why Bleiburg remains one of the most controversial commemorations not just in Croatia but in the region. The article focuses on historical narratives in the commemorative speeches, the role of space in shaping memory politics, symbols and monuments present at Bleiburg Field, and the broader context of how Austrian politics affects the commemoration and its public perception.
In summer 1936 Vladko Maček's priorities lay with rebuilding the Croatian Peasant Party after its six years of illegality under King Aleksandar's dictatorship in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Yet the ...Spanish Civil War (1936–39) was to have a polarising and radicalising effect on Croatian society. Both communists and supporters of the fascist Ustaša movement looked to Spain as a model for resolving the ‘Croat question’ at a time when Croats were becoming increasingly frustrated with Maček's passivity. As a propaganda war raged in the press of the radical left and right, the Croatian Peasant Party tried to ignore the conflict. Maček's failure to realise the impact of the war in Spain on the political situation in Croatia is indicative of some of his weaknesses as a leader in difficult times. The Croatian Peasant Party missed the opportunity to take a strong moral stance against fascism during the Spanish conflict, and Maček's fence-sitting from the 1930s onwards permitted the more extreme ideological movements in Croatia to take advantage of the rapidly changing conditions of a Europe engulfed in war. Durant l'été 1936, la priorité de Vladko Maček était de reconstruire le Parti paysan croate après six ans où il avait été frappé d'illégalité sous la dictature du roi Alexander dans le royaume de Yougoslavie. Pourtant, la guerre civile espagnole (1936–9) allait avoir des effets de polarisation et de radicalisation sur la société croate. Les communistes, comme les adhérents au mouvement fasciste Ustasa, regardaient l'Espagne comme un modèle pour résoudre la ‘question croate’, au moment où les Croates étaient très frustrés par la passivité de Maček. Alors qu'une guerre de propagande faisait rage dans la presse des radicaux de droite comme de gauche, le Parti paysan croate tenta d'ignorer le conflit. L'incapacité de Maček à mesurer l'impact de la guerre d'Espagne sur la situation politique croate souligne ses faiblesses de leader dans des moments difficiles. Le Parti paysan croate rata l'occasion de tenir une position morale forte contre le fascisme durant le conflit espagnol, et la barrière posée par Maček à partir des années trente a permis aux mouvements idéologiques extrêmes en Croatie de tirer avantage des conditions nouvelles d'une Europe engloutie dans la guerre. Im Sommer 1936 lagen Vladko Mačeks Prioritäten im Wiederaufbau der Kroatischen Bauernpartei, die unter der Diktatur König Alexanders im Königreich Jugoslawien sechs Jahre lang illegal gewesen war. Doch der Spanische Buergerkrieg sollte einen polarisierenden und radikalisierenden Effekt auf die kroatische Gesellschaft haben. Beide, Kommunisten und Unterstützer der faschistischen Ustaša Bewegung, sahen Spanien als ein Modell für die Lösung der ‘Kroatischen Frage’ und dies zu einer Zeit, als die Kroaten immer unzufriedener mit Mačeks Passivität wurden. Während der Propagandakrieg in der Presse der radikalen Linken und Rechten tobte, versuchte die kroatische Bauernpartei, den Konflikt zu ignorieren. Mačeks Unvermögen, die Auswirkungen des Krieges in Spanien auf die politische Situation in Kroatien zu realisieren, weist auf seine Schwächen als Führer in schwierigen Zeiten hin. Die Kroatische Bauernpartei versäumte die Gelegenheit, während des spanischen Konfliktes eine entschiedene moralische Haltung gegenüber dem Faschismus einzunehmen. Mačeks abwartende Haltung in den 1930ern erlaubte es den extremeren ideologischen Bewegungen in Kroatien, Vorteile aus den sich rasant verändernden Bedingungen eines im Krieg befindlichen Europas zu ziehen.
Although in recent years a new generation of scholars have analyzed the transformation of memory politics, the use of controversial symbols from the Second World War, and the rehabilitation of ...collaborationists in Croatia since 1990, these processes in the Republic of Srpska Krajina (RSK) have received little attention. The rebel Croatian Serb leaders of this parastate, carved out of Croatian territory during the breakup of Yugoslavia, justified their rejection of the democratically elected government in Zagreb by claiming that Franjo Tuđman’s administration had abandoned the antifascist legacy of the Partisans, which they alleged was the beginning of a new genocide against Serbs. However, this article, based on captured RSK documents, fieldwork, materials collected by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and interviews with individuals who had lived in the RSK, shows that the rebel Croatian Serb leadership had also abandoned the Partisan narrative during its short-lived existence. The RSK’s new politics of memory resulted in the destruction of monuments that reflected Serb-Croat cooperation, the transformation of public space, and the introduction of symbols that likewise rejected the antifascist legacy. The decision by the Krajina Serb leaders to base their political goals on a chauvinist and extremist interpretation of the past, which excluded the possibility of co-existing with other national groups, ended tragically for both Serbs and Croats living on the territory of the RSK.
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