Fatal human respiratory disease associated with influenza A subtype H5N1 has been documented in Hong Kong, and more recently in Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia. We previously demonstrated that ...patients with H5N1 disease had unusually high serum levels of IP-10 (interferon-gamma-inducible protein-10). Furthermore, when compared with human influenza virus subtype H1N1, the H5N1 viruses in 1997 (A/Hong Kong/483/97) (H5N1/97) were more potent inducers of pro-inflammatory cytokines (e.g. tumor necrosis factor-a) and chemokines (e.g. IP-10) from primary human macrophages in vitro, which suggests that cytokines dysregulation may play a role in pathogenesis of H5N1 disease. Since respiratory epithelial cells are the primary target cell for replication of influenza viruses, it is pertinent to investigate the cytokine induction profile of H5N1 viruses in these cells.
We used quantitative RT-PCR and ELISA to compare the profile of cytokine and chemokine gene expression induced by H5N1 viruses A/HK/483/97 (H5N1/97), A/Vietnam/1194/04 and A/Vietnam/3046/04 (both H5N1/04) with that of human H1N1 virus in human primary alveolar and bronchial epithelial cells in vitro.
We demonstrated that in comparison to human H1N1 viruses, H5N1/97 and H5N1/04 viruses were more potent inducers of IP-10, interferon beta, RANTES (regulated on activation, normal T cell expressed and secreted) and interleukin 6 (IL-6) in primary human alveolar and bronchial epithelial cells in vitro. Recent H5N1 viruses from Vietnam (H5N1/04) appeared to be even more potent at inducing IP-10 than H5N1/97 virus.
The H5N1/97 and H5N1/04 subtype influenza A viruses are more potent inducers of proinflammatory cytokines and chemokines in primary human respiratory epithelial cells than subtype H1N1 virus. We suggest that this hyper-induction of cytokines may be relevant to the pathogenesis of human H5N1 disease.
We did a case-control study in five Hong Kong hospitals, with 241 non-infected and 13 infected staff with documented exposures to 11 index patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) ...during patient care. All participants were surveyed about use of mask, gloves, gowns, and hand-washing, as recommended under droplets and contact precautions when caring for index patients with SARS. 69 staff who reported use of all four measures were not infected, whereas all infected staff had omitted at least one measure (p=0·0224). Fewer staff who wore masks (p=0·0001), gowns (p=0·006), and washed their hands (p=0·047) became infected compared with those who didn't, but stepwise logistic regression was significant only for masks (p=0·011). Practice of droplets precaution and contact precaution is adequate in significantly reducing the risk of infection after exposures to patients with SARS. The protective role of the mask suggests that in hospitals, infection is transmitted by droplets.
An epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has been associated with an outbreak of atypical pneumonia originating in Guangdong Province, People's Republic of China. We aimed to identify ...the causative agent in the Guangdong outbreak and describe the emergence and spread of the disease within the province.
We analysed epidemiological information and collected serum and nasopharyngeal aspirates from patients with SARS in Guangdong in mid-February, 2003. We did virus isolation, serological tests, and molecular assays to identify the causative agent.
SARS had been circulating in other cities of Guangdong Province for about 2 months before causing a major outbreak in Guangzhou, the province's capital. A novel coronavirus, SARS coronavirus (CoV), was isolated from specimens from three patients with SARS. Viral antigens were also directly detected in nasopharyngeal aspirates from these patients. 48 of 55 (87%) patients had antibodies to SARS CoV in their convalescent sera. Genetic analysis showed that the SARS CoV isolates from Guangzhou shared the same origin with those in other countries, and had a phylogenetic pathway that matched the spread of SARS to the other parts of the world.
SARS CoV is the infectious agent responsible for the epidemic outbreak of SARS in Guangdong. The virus isolated from patients in Guangdong is the prototype of the SARS CoV in other regions and countries.
We investigated the temporal progression of the clinical, radiological, and virological changes in a community outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
We followed up 75 patients for 3 ...weeks managed with a standard treatment protocol of ribavirin and corticosteroids, and assessed the pattern of clinical disease, viral load, risk factors for poor clinical outcome, and the usefulness of virological diagnostic methods.
Fever and pneumonia initially improved but 64 (85%) patients developed recurrent fever after a mean of 8.9 (SD 3.1) days, 55 (73%) had watery diarrhoea after 7.5 (2.3) days, 60 (80%) had radiological worsening after 7.4 (2.2) days, and respiratory symptoms worsened in 34 (45%) after 8.6 (3.0) days. In 34 (45%) patients, improvement of initial pulmonary lesions was associated with appearance of new radiological lesions at other sites. Nine (12%) patients developed spontaneous pneumomediastinum and 15 (20%) developed acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) in week 3. Quantitative reverse-transcriptase (RT) PCR of nasopharyngeal aspirates in 14 patients (four with ARDS) showed peak viral load at day 10, and at day 15 a load lower than at admission. Age and chronic hepatitis B virus infection treated with lamivudine were independent significant risk factors for progression to ARDS (p=0.001). SARS-associated coronavirus in faeces was seen on RT-PCR in 65 (97%) of 67 patients at day 14. The mean time to seroconversion was 20 days.
The consistent clinical progression, shifting radiological infiltrates, and an inverted V viral-load profile suggest that worsening in week 2 is unrelated to uncontrolled viral replication but may be related to immunopathological damage.
Published online May 9, 2003 http://image.thelancet.com/extras/03art4432web.pdf
In 1997, the first documented instance of human respiratory disease and death associated with a purely avian H5N1 influenza virus resulted in an overall case-fatality rate of 33%. The biological ...basis for the severity of human H5N1 disease has remained unclear. We tested the hypothesis that virus-induced cytokine dysregulation has a role.
We used cDNA arrays and quantitative RT-PCR to compare the profile of cytokine gene expression induced by viruses A/HK/486/97 and A/HK/483/97 (both H5N1/97) with that of human H3N2 and H1N1 viruses in human primary monocyte-derived macrophages in vitro. Secretion of tumour necrosis factor α (TNF α) from macrophages infected with the viruses was compared by ELISA. By use of naturally occurring viral reassortants and recombinant viruses generated by reverse genetic techniques, we investigated the viral genes associated with the TNF-α response.
The H5N1/97 viruses induced much higher gene transcription of proinflammatory cytokines than did H3N2 or H1N1 viruses, particularly TNF α and interferon beta. The concentration of TNF-α protein in culture supernatants of macrophages infected with these viruses was similar to that induced by stimulation with
Escherichia coli lipopolysaccharide. The non-structural (
NS) gene-segment of H5N1/97 viruses contributed to the increase in TNF α induced by the virus.
The H5N1/97 viruses are potent inducers of proinflammatory cytokines in macrophages, the most notable being TNF α. This characteristic may contribute to the unusual severity of human H5N1 disease.
No country is fully prepared for a 1918-like pandemic influenza. Averting a pandemic of H5N1 influenza virus depends on the successful control of its endemicity, outbreaks in poultry and occasional ...spillage into human which carries a case-fatality rate of over 50%. The use of perimetric depopulation and vaccination has failed to halt the spread of the epidemic. Blanket vaccination for all poultry over a large geographical area is difficult. A combination of moratorium, segregation of water fowls from chickens and vaccination have been proved to be effective in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) since 2002 despite endemicity and outbreaks in neighbouring regions. Systematic surveillance in southern China showed that ducks and geese are the primary reservoirs which transmit the virus to chickens, minor poultry and even migratory birds.
We hypothesize that this combination of moratorium, poultry segregation and targeted vaccination if successfully adapted to an affected district or province in any geographical region with high endemicity would set an example for the control in other regions.
A planned one-off moratorium of 3 weeks at the hottest month of the year should decrease the environmental burden as a source of re-infection. Backyard farms will then be re-populated by hatchlings from virus-free chickens and minor poultry only. Targeted immunization of the ducks and geese present only in the industrial farms and also the chickens would be strictly implemented as blanket immunization of all backyard poultry is almost impossible. Freely grazing ducks and geese would not be allowed until neutralizing antibodies of H5 subtype virus is achieved. As a proof of concept, a simple mathematical model with susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) structure of coupled epidemics between aquatic birds (mainly ducks and geese) and chickens was used to estimate transmissibility within and between these two poultry populations. In the field the hypothesis is tested by prospective surveillance of poultry and immunocompetent patients hospitalized for severe pneumonia for the virus before and after the institution of these measures.
A combination of targeted immunization with the correct vaccine, segregation of poultry species and moratorium of poultry in addition to the present surveillance, biosecurity and hygienic measures at the farm, market and personal levels could be important in the successful control of the H5N1 virus in poultry and human for an extensive geographical region with continuing outbreaks. Alternatively a lesser scale of intervention at the district level can be considered if there is virus detection without evidence of excess poultry deaths since asymptomatic shedding is common in waterfowls.
Severe acute respiratory syndrome Peiris, J S M; Guan, Y; Yuen, K Y
Nature medicine,
12/2004, Letnik:
10, Številka:
12 Suppl
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was caused by a previously unrecognized animal coronavirus that exploited opportunities provided by 'wet markets' in southern China to adapt to become a virus ...readily transmissible between humans. Hospitals and international travel proved to be 'amplifiers' that permitted a local outbreak to achieve global dimensions. In this review we will discuss the substantial scientific progress that has been made towards understanding the virus-SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV)-and the disease. We will also highlight the progress that has been made towards developing vaccines and therapies The concerted and coordinated response that contained SARS is a triumph for global public health and provides a new paradigm for the detection and control of future emerging infectious disease threats.
The emergence of pandemic H1N1/2009 influenza demonstrated that pandemic viruses could be generated in swine. Subsequent reintroduction of H1N1/2009 to swine has occurred in multiple countries. ...Through systematic surveillance of influenza viruses in swine from a Hong Kong abattoir, we characterize a reassortant progeny of H1N1/2009 with swine viruses. Swine experimentally infected with this reassortant developed mild illness and transmitted infection to contact animals. Continued reassortment of H1N1/2009 with swine influenza viruses could produce variants with transmissibility and altered virulence for humans. Global systematic surveillance of influenza viruses in swine is warranted.
The emergence of the H7N9 influenza virus in humans in Eastern China has raised concerns that a new influenza pandemic could occur. Here, we used a ferret model to evaluate the infectivity and ...transmissibility of A/Shanghai/2/2013 (SH2), a human H7N9 virus isolate. This virus replicated in the upper and lower respiratory tracts of the ferrets and was shed at high titers for 6 to 7 days, with ferrets showing relatively mild clinical signs. SH2 was efficiently transmitted between ferrets via direct contact, but less efficiently by airborne exposure. Pigs were productively infected by SH2 and shed virus for 6 days but were unable to transmit the virus to naïve pigs or ferrets. Under appropriate conditions, human-to-human transmission of the H7N9 virus may be possible.