As the chances wane of North Korea relinquishing its nuclear weapons, how will this capability affect its behavior and tolerance of risk? Increasingly, scholars are using the Cold War concept of a ...stability-instability paradox to describe the possibility of Pyongyang being more willing to tolerate risk and conduct increased numbers of lower-level provocations under the cover of nuclear weapons. North Korea has long been tolerant of accepting a great deal of risk prior to its acquisition of nuclear weapons, and it is not clear if nuclear weapons have increased that tolerance––or as some have argued, it may actually decrease North Korea’s risk tolerance, making it more cautious. While North Korea’s rhetorical barrages in recent years have exceeded past outbursts, and weapons testing has done a great deal to rattle nerves, much of this can be viewed as part of its deterrence-posturing and less of the more aggressive, status quo-altering actions predicted by the stability-instability paradox. KCI Citation Count: 14
This book examines the changes in politics, economics, society, and foreign policy in South Korea since 1980. Starting with a brief description of its history leading up to 1980, this book deals with ...South Korea's transition to democracy, the stunning economic development achieved since the 1960s, the 1997 financial crisis, and the economic reforms that followed and concludes with the North Korean nuclear crisis and foreign relations with regional powers. The theoretical framework of this book addresses how democratization affected all of these dimensions of South Korea. For instance, democratization allowed for the more frequent alternation of political elites from conservative to liberal and back to conservative. These elites initiated different policies for dealing with North Korea and held different views on South Korea's role in its alliance with the United States. Consequently, ideological divides in South Korean politics became more stark and the political process more combative.
As the international security environment grows increasingly complex, the need for multilateral solutions grows. Two such efforts are United Nations peacekeeping and counterpiracy ope ations off the ...coast of Somalia. Over the years many states have contributed police, observers, military personnel, ships, and oth assets to support these multinational efforts. Since 2009 Seoul has sent a destroyer and a team of Navy SEALS to the counter piracy operations near Somalia. In this study I contrast South Korea's contributions to UN peacekeeping and maritime securi with those of Australia, China, and Japan.
For many years, South Korea was largely a consumer of security, protected and supported by the United States and others to ensure peace and stability on the peninsula. South Korea's economic take-off ...and ascent as a rising middle power has changed these circumstances and as the years progressed, the Republic of Korea increased its contributions to international peace and security becoming more of a provider of global security than solely a consumer. Two areas where South Korea has made particularly important contributions have been in international development assistance and peace keeping operations. Though these contributions are significant, South Korea continues to lag behind other foreign assistance donors relative to the size of its economy. Yet, South Korea's increases to development assistance have been substantial and larger than most in the midst of the global economic turmoil, and it remains a staunch supporter of peacekeeping operations.
For close to sixty years, the United States has maintained alliances with Japan and South Korea that have included a nuclear umbrella, guaranteeing their security as part of a strategy of extended ...deterrence. Yet questions about the credibility of deterrence commitments have always been an issue, especially when nuclear weapons are concerned. Would the United States truly be willing to use these weapons to defend an ally?In this book, Terence Roehrig provides a detailed and comprehensive look at the nuclear umbrella in northeast Asia in the broader context of deterrence theory and U.S. strategy. He examines the role of the nuclear umbrella in Japanese and South Korean defense planning and security calculations, including the likelihood that either will develop its own nuclear weapons. Roehrig argues that the nuclear umbrella is most important as a political signal demonstrating commitment to the defense of allies and as a tool to prevent further nuclear proliferation in the region. While the role of the nuclear umbrella is often discussed in military terms, this book provides an important glimpse into the political dimensions of the nuclear security guarantee. As the security environment in East Asia changes with the growth of North Korea's capabilities and China's military modernization, as well as Donald Trump's early pronouncements that cast doubt on traditional commitments to allies, the credibility and resolve of U.S. alliances will take on renewed importance for the region and the world.
Despite the ties between politics and economics, little attention has been given to how economic development affects foreign policy. To fill the gap in the literature, Heo and Roehrig developed a ...theoretical framework, linking economic development and foreign relations. We refine the theory and name it development power theory, which is based on the logic that economic development influences a country's foreign policy in three broad directions: (i) it encourages a transition to democracy that leads to elite changes and foreign‐policy modification; (ii) it provides more resources and a larger set of tools to be used to pursue a broader set of national interests; and (iii) it enhances pride and ambition among state leaders and the public, resulting in a stronger military and a greater role in international affairs. Then, we apply the theory to the South Korean case.
For more than 60 years, the United States has maintained an extended deterrence commitment to protect South Korea as part of a system of alliances in East Asia. The guarantee included a mutual ...security treaty that formalized the U.S. pledge to defend its ally and placed troops along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) as a sign of the U.S. determination to defend South Korea. The U.S. commitment also entailed South Korea’s inclusion under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whereby Washington vowed to use nuclear weapons to deter and, if need be, defeat an attack on the South. The nuclear umbrella included the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula; however, these were removed in 1991. Despite the longevity of U.S. extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella in East Asia, there have always been some difficult and troubling aspects of this strategy. An important requirement for successful deterrence is credibility. Would the United States truly be willing to use nuclear weapons in the defense of an ally given the tremendous devastation of those weapons? What if the adversary possessed nuclear weapons that could strike the U.S. homeland or U.S. facilities in the region? Would the United States use nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack, whether conventional, biological, or chemical? Indeed, some even question whether there is a nuclear umbrella.
On 11 October 2008, the Bush administration removed North Korea from the State Department's list of states that sponsor terrorism. Pyongyang had been on the list since 1988 and was placed there after ...the November 1987 bombing of Korean Airlines flight 858 over the Andaman Sea. Though North Korea went on the list for terrorist actions, its removal became part of the Six‐Party process to convince Pyongyang to forgo its nuclear weapons ambitions. This article will explore these issues and examine the leverage the terrorism list had on North Korean behavior, how the USA chose to utilize that leverage, and North Korea's response to US efforts. This article argues that the intertwining of the terrorism list with denuclearization gave the USA leverage in the Six‐Party Talks but there were limits to what this leverage could gain. Moreover, the links to the denuclearization process also generated leverage for North Korea that it exercised, creating a more complex and crosscutting mix of costs and incentives that was more difficult for Washington to control.
