Archeologists are actively working to quantitatively measure income and wealth inequality in ancient history based on available data, some of them being quite sophisticated. Timothy A. Kohler and ...Michael E. Smith’s Ten Thousand Years of Inequality: The Archaeology of Wealth Differences presents existing measurement efforts and insightful discussions of the challenges faced, on all continents except Oceania. These first exercises should help us over time understand better the evolution of inequality in ancient history and its determinants. Understanding better the effects of differences in institutions in the ancient past should be a crucial next step.
The long-run impact of bombing Vietnam Miguel, Edward; Roland, Gérard
Journal of development economics,
09/2011, Letnik:
96, Številka:
1
Journal Article
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We investigate the impact of U.S. bombing on later economic development in Vietnam. The Vietnam War featured the most intense bombing campaign in military history and had massive humanitarian costs. ...We use a unique U.S. military dataset containing bombing intensity at the district level (N
=
584) to assess whether the war damage led to persistent local poverty traps. We compare the heavily bombed districts to other districts controlling for district demographic and geographic characteristics, and use an instrumental variable approach exploiting distance to the 17th parallel demilitarized zone. U.S. bombing does not have negative impacts on local poverty rates, consumption levels, infrastructure, literacy or population density through 2002. This finding indicates that even the most intense bombing in human history did not generate local poverty traps in Vietnam.
Abstract
We model how corruption erodes state power, that is, the state’s ability to keep its apparatus under control in crises. Under a general assumption about fat-tailed risk of crisis, we show ...that given strong fiscal capacity, the head of the state will control local corruption at such a level that its power is secured; given weaker capacity, the state will over-tolerate corruption to retain officials, risking control in crises; moreover, a state may be trapped with too weak fiscal capacity, rampant corruption, and the state losing control in any real crisis, while having little incentive to invest in fiscal capacity. By developing historical narratives, we show that these theoretical results are consistent with experience from the Roman Empire, New Kingdom of Egypt, Ming China and many other powerful states in history.
Abstract
To better understand institutional differences across space and time, we propose a two-dimensional framework of the power structure among three players in society: the degree of absolute ...power of the Ruler over the Elites and the People, and the degree of asymmetry between the latter two in terms of their everyday rights and power. Within this framework, we show that a more absolutist Ruler prefers a more balanced Elite–People relationship. This theory helps in particular to reconcile views on the comparison between imperial China and premodern Europe that would seem contradictory in one-dimensional or two-estate frameworks: the Ruler’s absolute power was weaker in Europe, whereas the Elite–People relationship was more balanced in China. Our approach also helps more generally to interpret specific institutions and other variations in power structures.
We build a model that puts together crony capitalism, the hierarchy of the Chinese communist party-state, and the decision-making process inside the Party Center. We show that inefficient economic ...institutions create local corruption that raises realized productivity, while generating rents that flow along the party-state hierarchy up to the provincial level, threatening the Center’s control in potential crises. Although both stronger crisis control and higher economic performance help the Center’s goal to stay in power, we show that given a general fat-tailed risk of crisis, the Center will maximize crisis control at the expense of the economy when choosing its tolerance of local corruption. Power structure and corruption within the Center and reciprocal accountability between central and provincial leaders are also analyzed. Our analysis suggests conditions under which China’s communist regime will or will not deal with the existential threat presented by corruption.
•A theoretical framework is built to put together crony capitalism, the hierarchy of the Chinese communist party-state, and the decision-making process inside the Party Center.•Given a general fat-tailed risk of crisis, the Center will set the tolerance of local corruption at the level that prioritizes its ability to control crises that would challenge its power over the performance of the economy.•Power structure and corruption within the Party Center and reciprocal accountability between central and provincial leaders are also modeled and analyzed.•Analysis of the model suggests conditions under which China’s communist regime will or will not deal with the existential threat presented by corruption.
The overriding importance of political constraints in the transition process has led to developments of the theory of the political economy of reform. What are the main insights from that theory? How ...does it reflect the transition reality? What have we learned, and what do we still need to learn?
The present article will attempt to answer those questions.
This article proposes a classification of "slow-moving" and "fast-moving" institutions, and discusses the potential results of their interaction. A prime example of a slow-moving institution is ...culture, including values, beliefs, and social norms, which tend to change gradually. Political institutions are typically fast-moving institutions; exemplifying the nature of this category, political institutions do not necessarily change often but can change very quickly - sometimes nearly overnight. The interaction between slow-moving and fast-moving institutions can shed light on institutional change (why, how, and when it occurs), and evinces both the difficulty of transplanting institutions into different cultural contexts and the advantages of diverse institutional "blueprints" for efficient growth and development. PUBLICATION ABSTRACT
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