Swine influenza A viruses (SwIV) cause significant economic losses in animal husbandry as well as instances of human disease and occasionally give rise to human pandemics, including that caused by ...the H1N1/2009 virus. The lack of systematic and longitudinal influenza surveillance in pigs has hampered attempts to reconstruct the origins of this pandemic. Most existing swine data were derived from opportunistic samples collected from diseased pigs in disparate geographical regions, not from prospective studies in defined locations, hence the evolutionary and transmission dynamics of SwIV are poorly understood. Here we quantify the epidemiological, genetic and antigenic dynamics of SwIV in Hong Kong using a data set of more than 650 SwIV isolates and more than 800 swine sera from 12 years of systematic surveillance in this region, supplemented with data stretching back 34 years. Intercontinental virus movement has led to reassortment and lineage replacement, creating an antigenically and genetically diverse virus population whose dynamics are quantitatively different from those previously observed for human influenza viruses. Our findings indicate that increased antigenic drift is associated with reassortment events and offer insights into the emergence of influenza viruses with epidemic potential in swine and humans.
The origin of the H5N1 influenza viruses that killed six of eighteen infected humans in 1997 and were highly pathogenic in chickens has not been resolved. These H5N1 viruses transmitted directly to ...humans from infected poultry. In the poultry markets in Hong Kong, both H5N1 and H9N2 influenza viruses were cocirulating, raising the possibility of genetic reassortment. Here we analyze the antigenic and genetic features of H9N2 influenza viruses with different epidemiological backgrounds. The results suggest that the H9N2 influenza viruses of domestic ducks have become established in the domestic poultry of Asia. Phylogenetic and antigenic analyses of the H9N2 viruses isolated from Hong Kong markets suggest three distinct sublineages. Among the chicken H9N2 viruses, six of the gene segments were apparently derived from an earlier chicken H9N2 virus isolated in China, whereas the PB1 and PB2 genes are closely related to those of the H5N1 viruses and a quail H9N2 virus--A/quail/Hong Kong/G1/97 (Qa/HK/G1/97)--suggesting that many of the 1997 chicken H9 isolates in the markets were reassortants. The similarity of the internal genes of Qa/HK/G1/97 virus to those of the H5N1 influenza viruses suggests that the quail virus may have been the internal gene donor. Our findings indicate that the human and poultry H5N1 influenza viruses in Hong Kong in 1997 were reassortants that obtained internal gene segments from Qa/HK/G1/97. However, we cannot be certain whether the replicate complex of H5N1 originated from Qa/HK/G1/97 or whether the reverse transfer occurred; the available evidence supports the former proposal.
In May, 1997, a 3-year-old boy in Hong Kong was admitted to the hospital and subsequently died from influenza pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, Reye's syndrome, multiorgan failure, and ...disseminated intravascular coagulation. An influenza A H5N1 virus was isolated from a tracheal aspirate of the boy. Preceding this incident, avian influenza outbreaks of high mortality were reported from three chicken farms in Hong Kong, and the virus involved was also found to be of the H5 subtype.
We carried out an antigenic and molecular comparison of the influenza A H5N1 virus isolated from the boy with one of the viruses isolated from outbreaks of avian influenza by haemagglutination-inhibition and neuraminidase-inhibition assays and nucleotide sequence analysis.
Differences were observed in the antigenic reactivities of the viruses by the haemagglutination-inhibition assay. However, nucleotide sequence analysis of all gene segments revealed that the human virus A/Hong Kong/156/97 was genetically closely related to the avian A/chicken/Hong Kong/258/97.
Although direct contact between the sick child and affected chickens has not been established, our results suggest transmission of the virus from infected chickens to the child without another intermediate mammalian host acting as a “mixing vessel”. This event illustrates the importance of intensive global influenza surveillance.
The meeting on `Adult Vaccination in Asia' came soon after the influenza A H5N1 outbreak in Hong Kong. The problems of influenza vaccination in Asia are many, ranging from the selection of the right ...influenza virus variant for the vaccine, particularly in a region where new variants often first emerge, the longer yearly occurrence of the variant and limited knowledge of the disease burden through to the situation should a new pandemic virus arise here. While there have been no cases of H5N1 influenza since the slaughter of chicken in Hong Kong in late December 1997 to the time of writing, this abridged chronological report draws attention to issues faced by a small but nonetheless established laboratory in Hong Kong that deals with animal influenza. In its reaction to the need to determine the source of the H5N1 virus for humans, there may be lessons for other laboratories in dealing with the next pandemic, which inevitably must occur.
Pig serum samples collected in southeastern China were examined for antibodies to influenza A viruses. Since the hemagglutination inhibition (HI) test does not accurately detect antibodies to the ...hemagglutinins (HAs) of “avian” influenza viruses, we utilized the neutralization (NT) test to detect subtype-specific antibodies to the HA of avian viruses in pig sera. Neutralizing antibodies to H1, H3, H4, and H5 influenza viruses were detected in the serum samples collected in 1977–1982 and 1998, suggesting that pigs in China have been sporadically infected with avian H4 and H5 viruses in addition to swine and human H1 and H3 viruses. Antibodies to H9 virus, on the other hand, were found only in the sera collected in 1998, not in those collected in 1977–1982, correlating with the recent spread in poultry and subsequent isolation of H9N2 viruses from pigs and humans in 1998. The present results indicate that avian influenza viruses have been transmitted to pig populations in southeastern China.
The transmission of avian H5N1 influenza viruses to 18 humans in Hong Kong in 1997 with six deaths established that avian influenza viruses can transmit to and cause lethal infection in humans. This ...report characterizes the antigenic and biological properties of the H5N1 influenza viruses isolated from chickens, ducks, and geese from farms and poultry markets in Hong Kong during 1997 and compares them with those of virus isolated from the index human case. Each of the H5N1 viruses from Hong Kong poultry markets that were tested were lethal in chickens, possessed polybasic amino acids at the carboxy-terminus of HA1, and by definition were highly pathogenic in poultry. The available nonpathogenic H5 influenza viruses and the pathogenic H5N1 virus from Hong Kong were analyzed with monoclonal antibodies prepared to A/chicken/Pennsylvania/1370/83 (H5N2). The analysis revealed limited antigenic drift in 15 years and established that monoclonal antibodies are useful reagents for identification and antigenic analysis of avian strains that may transmit to humans in the future. One of the monoclonal antibodies permitted separation of the H5N1 influenza viruses from poultry into two groups that correlated with the presence or absence of a carbohydrate at residue 158 adjacent to the receptor binding site on HA. The H5N1 viruses examined replicated in geese, pigs, rats, and mice, but to only a very limited extent in ducks. It is noteworthy that all infected geese shed virus and that the H5N1 viruses caused disease signs and death in a portion (3 of 16) of the geese, with evidence of systemic spread to the brain. The tropism for geese is unusual and may provide insight into the origin of these viruses. In mice, the H5N1 virus caused lethal pneumonia and spread systemically to the brain. Mice would thus provide an ideal model system for studying immune responses and pathogenesis. Transmission experiments in chickens revealed that the H5N1 viruses are spread by fecal–oral transmission rather than by aerosol, and that the viruses are inactivated by drying of feces at ambient temperature. However, infectivity is maintained for at least 4 days in wet feces at 25°C. There were differences in the morphology of the H5N1 viruses isolated from birds and humans. The perpetuation of H5N1 influenza viruses in the poultry markets in Hong Kong and the transmission of these viruses to humans emphasize the importance of these markets in the epidemiology of influenza. The poultry markets are of critical importance in the perpetuation and transmission of influenza viruses to other avian species and to mammals, including humans.
Besides enormous economic losses to the poultry industry, recent H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) originating in eastern Asia have posed serious threats to public health. Up to ...April 17, 2008, 381 human cases had been confirmed with a mortality of more than 60 %. Here, we attempt to identify potential progenitor genes for H5N1 HPAIVs since their first recognition in 1996; most were detected in the Eurasian landmass before 1996. Combinations among these progenitor genes generated at least 21 reassortants (named H5N1 progenitor reassortant, H5N1-PR1-21). H5N1-PR1 includes A/Goose/Guangdong/1/1996(H5N1). Only reassortants H5N1-PR2 and H5N1-PR7 were associated with confirmed human cases: H5N1-PR2 in the Hong Kong H5N1 outbreak in 1997 and H5N1-PR7 in laboratory confirmed human cases since 2003. H5N1-PR7 also contains a majority of the H5N1 viruses causing avian influenza outbreaks in birds, including the first wave of genotype Z, Qinghai-like and Fujian-like virus lineages. Among the 21 reassortants identified, 13 are first reported here. This study illustrates evolutionary patterns of H5N1 HPAIVs, which may be useful toward pandemic preparedness as well as avian influenza prevention and control.