The swine-origin A(H1N1) influenza virus that has emerged in humans in early 2009 has raised concerns about pandemic developments. In a ferret pathogenesis and transmission model, the 2009 A(H1N1) ...influenza virus was found to be more pathogenic than a seasonal A(H1N1) virus, with more extensive virus replication occurring in the respiratory tract. Replication of seasonal A(H1N1) virus was confined to the nasal cavity of ferrets, but the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza virus also replicated in the trachea, bronchi, and bronchioles. Virus shedding was more abundant from the upper respiratory tract for 2009 A(H1N1) influenza virus as compared with seasonal virus, and transmission via aerosol or respiratory droplets was equally efficient. These data suggest that the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza virus has the ability to persist in the human population, potentially with more severe clinical consequences.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 virus can cause morbidity and mortality in humans but thus far has not acquired the ability to be transmitted by aerosol or respiratory droplet ("airbome ...transmission") between humans. To address the concern that the virus could acquire this ability under natural conditions, we genetically modified A/H5N1 virus by site-directed mutagenesis and subsequent serial passage in ferrets. The genetically modified A/H5N1 virus acquired mutations during passage in ferrets, ultimately becoming airborne transmissible in ferrets. None of the recipient ferrets died after airborne infection with the mutant A/H5N1 viruses. Four amino acid substitutions in the host receptor-binding protein hemagglutinin, and one in the polymerase complex protein basic polymerase 2, were consistently present in airborne-transmitted viruses. The transmissible viruses were sensitive to the antiviral drug oseltamivir and reacted well with antisera raised against H5 influenza vaccine strains. Thus, avian A/H5N1 influenza viruses can acquire the capacity for airborne transmission between mammals without recombination in an intermediate host and therefore constitute a risk for human pandemic influenza.
Recently, A/H5N1 influenza viruses were shown to acquire airborne transmissibility between ferrets upon targeted mutagenesis and virus passage. The critical genetic changes in airborne ...A/Indonesia/5/05 were not yet identified. Here, five substitutions proved to be sufficient to determine this airborne transmission phenotype. Substitutions in PB1 and PB2 collectively caused enhanced transcription and virus replication. One substitution increased HA thermostability and lowered the pH of membrane fusion. Two substitutions independently changed HA binding preference from α2,3-linked to α2,6-linked sialic acid receptors. The loss of a glycosylation site in HA enhanced overall binding to receptors. The acquired substitutions emerged early during ferret passage as minor variants and became dominant rapidly. Identification of substitutions that are essential for airborne transmission of avian influenza viruses between ferrets and their associated phenotypes advances our fundamental understanding of virus transmission and will increase the value of future surveillance programs and public health risk assessments.
Wild waterfowl form the main reservoir of influenza A viruses, from which transmission occurs directly or indirectly to various secondary hosts, including humans. Direct avian-to-human transmission ...has been observed for viruses of subtypes A(H5N1), A(H7N2), A(H7N3), A(H7N7), A(H9N2) and A(H10N7) upon human exposure to poultry, but a lack of sustained human-to-human transmission has prevented these viruses from causing new pandemics. Recently, avian A(H7N9) viruses were transmitted to humans, causing severe respiratory disease and deaths in China. Because transmission via respiratory droplets and aerosols (hereafter referred to as airborne transmission) is the main route for efficient transmission between humans, it is important to gain an insight into airborne transmission of the A(H7N9) virus. Here we show that although the A/Anhui/1/2013 A(H7N9) virus harbours determinants associated with human adaptation and transmissibility between mammals, its airborne transmissibility in ferrets is limited, and it is intermediate between that of typical human and avian influenza viruses. Multiple A(H7N9) virus genetic variants were transmitted. Upon ferret passage, variants with higher avian receptor binding, higher pH of fusion, and lower thermostability were selected, potentially resulting in reduced transmissibility. This A(H7N9) virus outbreak highlights the need for increased understanding of the determinants of efficient airborne transmission of avian influenza viruses between mammals.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses have devastated the poultry industry in many countries of the eastern hemisphere. Occasionally H5N1 viruses cross the species barrier and infect humans, ...sometimes with a severe clinical outcome. When this happens, there is a chance of reassortment between H5N1 and human influenza viruses. To assess the potential of H5N1 viruses to reassort with contemporary human influenza viruses (H1N1, H3N2 and pandemic H1N1), we used an in vitro selection method to generate reassortant viruses, that contained the H5 hemagglutinin gene, and that have a replication advantage in vitro. We found that the neuraminidase and matrix gene segments of human influenza viruses were preferentially selected by H5 viruses. However, these H5 reassortant viruses did not show a marked increase in replication in MDCK cells and human bronchial epithelial cells. In ferrets, inoculation with a mixture of H5N1-pandemic H1N1 reassortant viruses resulted in outgrowth of reassortant H5 viruses that had incorporated the neuraminidase and matrix gene segment of pandemic 2009 H1N1. This virus was not transmitted via aerosols or respiratory droplets to naïve recipient ferrets. Altogether, these data emphasize the potential of avian H5N1 viruses to reassort with contemporary human influenza viruses. The neuraminidase and matrix gene segments of human influenza viruses showed the highest genetic compatibility with HPAI H5N1 virus.
The objective of this study is to determine the prevalence of rectal carriage of plasmid- and chromosome-encoded AmpC β-lactamase-producing Escherichia coli and Klebsiella spp. in patients in a Dutch ...teaching hospital between 2013 and 2016.
Between 2013 and 2016, hospital-wide yearly prevalence surveys were performed to determine the prevalence of AmpC β-lactamase-producing E. coli and Klebsiella spp. rectal carriage. Rectal swabs were taken and cultured using an enrichment broth and selective agar plates. All E. coli and Klebsiella spp. isolates were screened for production of AmpC β-lactamase using phenotypic confirmation tests and for the presence of plasmid-encoded AmpC (pAmpC) genes. E. coli isolates were screened for chromosome-encoded AmpC (cAmpC) promoter/attenuator alterations.
Fifty (2.4%) of 2,126 evaluable patients were identified as rectal carrier of AmpC β-lactamase-producing E. coli. No carriage of AmpC β-lactamase producing Klebsiella spp. was found. Nineteen (0.9%) patients harboured isolates with pAmpC genes and 30 (1,4%) patients harboured isolates with cAmpC promoter/attenuator alterations associated with AmpC β-lactamase overproduction. For one isolate, no pAmpC genes or cAmpC promotor/attenuator alterations could be identified. During the study period, a statistically significant decline in the prevalence of rectal carriage with E. coli with cAmpC promotor/attenuator alterations was found (p = 0.012). The prevalence of pAmpC remained stable over the years.
The prevalence of rectal carriage of AmpC-producing E. coli and Klebsiella spp. in patients in Dutch hospitals is low and a declining trend was observed for E. coli with cAmpC promotor/attenuator alterations.
A wide range of influenza A viruses of pigs and birds have infected humans in the last decade, sometimes with severe clinical consequences. Each of these so-called zoonotic infections provides an ...opportunity for virus adaptation to the new host. Fortunately, most of these human infections do not yield viruses with the ability of sustained human-to-human transmission. However, animal influenza viruses have acquired the ability of sustained transmission between humans to cause pandemics on rare occasions in the past, and therefore, influenza virus zoonoses continue to represent threats to public health. Numerous recent studies have shed new light on the mechanisms of adaptation and transmission of avian and swine influenza A viruses in mammals. In particular, several studies provided insights into the genetic and phenotypic traits of influenza A viruses that may determine airborne transmission. Here, we summarize recent studies on molecular determinants of virulence and adaptation of animal influenza A virus and discuss the phenotypic traits associated with airborne transmission of newly emerging influenza A viruses. Increased understanding of the determinants and mechanisms of virulence and transmission may aid in assessing the risks posed by animal influenza viruses to human health, and preparedness for such risks.
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