Moralna relevantnost namjera Sušnik, Matej
Nova prisutnost,
03/2022, Letnik:
XX, Številka:
1
Journal Article, Paper
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Rasprava o moralnoj relevantnosti namjera danas se značajnim dijelom svodi na pitanje o tome jesu li namjere relevantne za moralnu dopustivost. Oni koji na to pitanje odgovaraju afirmativno, svoje ...stajalište opravdavaju povlačenjem distinkcije između namjernog činjenja štete i štete koja nastaje kao nenamjeravani, ali predvidljivi popratni učinak nekog djelovanja. Cilj ovog članka jest kritički preispitati navedeno stajalište – također poznato kao načelo dvostrukog učinka – te pružiti alternativno shvaćanje moralne relevantnosti namjera. Prema tom shvaćanju, temelj za moralnu pohvalu i osudu nije u izvršenoj radnji, već u namjeri s kojom je ta radnja izvršena.
The debate about the moral relevance of intentions today boils down to the question of whether intentions are relevant to moral permissibility. Those who answer this question affirmatively justify their position by drawing the distinction between intentional harm and harm that occurs as an unintended, but forseeable side-effect of an action. In this article, I critically examine this view—also known as the principle of double effect—and propose an alternative understanding of the moral relevance of intentions. According to this understanding, the basis of moral praise and blame does not lie in the performed act, but rather in the intention with which an action is performed.
David Benatar believes that (1) all human lives are very bad; that (2) some human lives are worth continuing; and that (3) some human lives are not worth continuing. This article claims that ...Benatar's arguments do not support all three statements at once. After giving a brief outline of his position, it is shown that insofar as his arguments support (1) and (2), they do not support (3), and that insofar as they support (1) and (3), they do not support (2). It is then shown that insofar as they support (2) and (3), they do not support (1).
Contemporary defenses of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) are mainly focused on avoiding the absurdity charge raised by Judith Thomson (1991). There are two strategies proposed in the literature ...for refuting Thomson's argument. In this paper I argue that answering Thomson's challenge comes at a heavy price: while both versions of the DDE that are developed within these two strategies successfully avoid the absurdity charge, they also remain incomplete. Thomson's argument reveals that the proponents of the DDE can at best provide a partial defense of the claim that intentions can be relevant to permissibility.
This paper examines a well-known non-identity case of a mother who chooses to conceive a blind child instead of a sighted one. While some people accept the non-identity argument and claim that we ...should reject the intuition that the mother’s act is morally wrong, others hold onto that intuition and try to find a fault in the non-identity argument. This paper proposes a somewhat middle approach. It is argued that the conclusion of the non-identity argument is not necessarily in conflict with our intuitive response to this case.
Moralne granice u okolnostima samoobrane određene su, između ostalog, moralnim statusom osoba koje se u tim okolnostima nalaze. Netko tko posjeduje moralni imunitet zadržava pravo ne biti napadnut i ...samim time zaštićen je od potencijalne obrambene štete. U radu razmatram ulogu moralnog imuniteta u kontekstu problema takozvanih “nevinih napadača”. Dok neki smatraju da nevine napadače – uslijed nedostatka njihove odgovornosti za prijetnju – nije moralno dopustivo usmrtiti u samoobrani, pokazujem da argumenti koji se pritom navode ne uspijevaju uspostaviti spomenuti zaključak. Na koncu se također priklanjam onim autorima koji tvrde da nevinost napadača u ovim slučajevima nije prepreka opravdanju za njihovo usmrćivanje.
This paper examines a well-known non-identity case of a mother who chooses to conceive a blind child instead of a sighted one. While some people accept the non-identity argument and claim that we ...should reject the intuition that the mother’s act is morally wrong, others hold onto that intuition and try to find a fault in the non-identity argument. This paper proposes a somewhat middle approach. It is argued that the conclusion of the non-identity argument is not necessarily in conflict with our intuitive response to this case.
Markovićeva metaetika Sušnik, Matej
Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine,
12/2023, Letnik:
49, Številka:
1 (97)
Journal Article, Paper
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Članak se bavi metaetičkim aspektima knjige
Etika
Franje Markovića. Markovićeva opažanja o prirodi morala nastojim interpretirati u kontekstu suvremenih metaetičkih pozicija, a pritom je naglasak ...stavljen na njegovu raspravu o izvorima etičkih načela, u kojoj se on jasno smješta u tradiciju onih autora koji etiku pokušavaju utemeljiti u sentimentu. Ukazujući na relevantne dijelove njegove rasprave, u tekstu sugeriram da Marković zagovara senzibilističku verziju moralnog sentimentalizma i da je potporu takvoj interpretaciji moguće pronaći u Markovićevu razumijevanju odnosa između etike, psihologije i estetike.
The article deals with the metaethical aspects of Franjo Marković’s book
Ethics
. I try to interpret Marković’s observations about the nature of morality in the context of contemporary meta-ethical positions, while emphasizing his discussion of the sources of ethical principles, in which he clearly places himself in the tradition of those authors who try to ground ethics in sentiment. Pointing to the relevant parts of his discussion, I suggest that Marković advocates a version of moral sentimentalism – namely, a sensibility theory – and that support for such an interpretation can be found in Marković’s understanding of the relationship between ethics, psychology and aesthetics.
In his book Moralna spoznaja Baccarini argues that, with respect to the individual reasoning about morality, the method of reflective equilibrium is the appropriate method of moral reasoning. The ...starting point of my argument is Baccarini’s refutation of Hare’s view. As I see it, one of Baccarini’s central arguments against Hare consists in claiming that Hare’s approach to the amoralist objection weakens the deductive model of moral reasoning. I argue that the amoralist objection also posses a threat to the method of reflective equilibrium. At the end of the paper, I consider another view of moral reasoning which, in my view, is better suited to deal with the amoralist objection.
Internalists about reasons argue that the presence of a motive is a precondition for the existence
of a reason. According to the Humean interpretation of this view, reasons for action are always
...relative since their existence depends on the arbitrary elements which form one’s subjective
motivational set. One of the greatest challenges to Humean internalism is the Kantian interpretation of the internalist position. The main intention of Kantian approach is to prove the
possibility of rational motivation and thus deny Humean internalism. In this article I critically
examine this discussion and attempt to defend Humean internalism against one contemporary
Kantian proposal.
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