The Cultural Politics of Analytic Philosophy examines three generations of analytic philosophers, who between them founded the modern discipline of analytic philosophy in Britain. The book explores ...how philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, A.J. Ayer, Gilbert Ryle and Isaiah Berlin believed in a link between German aggression in the twentieth century and the nineteenth-century philosophy of Hegel and Nietzsche. Thomas L. Akehurst thus identifies in this political critique of continental philosophy the origins of the hugely significant faultline between analytic and continental thought, an aspect of twentieth-century philosophy that is still poorly understood. The book also uncovers a tripartite alliance in British analytic philosophy, between nation, political virtue and philosophical method. In revealing this structure behind the assumptions of certain analytical thinkers, Akehurst challenges the conventional wisdom that sees analytic philosophy as a semi-detached narrowly academic pursuit. On the contrary, this important book suggests that the analytic philosophers were espousing a national philosophy, one they believed operated in harmony with British thinking and the British values of liberty and tolerance.
L’art comme jeu est la transcription d’un cours que François Zourabichvili a professé en 2005-2006 à l’université Paul-Valéry de Montpellier. Ce cours ne se présente pas comme un cours d’histoire de ...la philosophie, mais comme l’expérience d’un faire de la philosophie : envisager sérieusement la relation de l’art et du jeu revient dès lors à construire cette relation – de sorte que les notions d’art et de jeu puissent s’inventer simultanément, l’une par l’autre.Ainsi, L’art comme jeu laisse apercevoir l’ensemble des rouages d’une pensée philosophique en cours d’élaboration : parfois fulgurante, d’autres fois tâtonnante, l’esthétique du jeu de François Zourabichvili, bien qu’inachevée, reste aujourd’hui porteuse de l’espoir d’un renouveau de l’esthétique.
An exemplary collection of work from one of the world's leading scholars of intellectual history László F. Földényi is a writer who is learned in reference, taste, and judgment, and entertaining in ...style. Taking a place in the long tradition of public intellectual and cultural criticism, his work resonates with that of Montaigne, Rilke, and Mann in its deep insight into aspects of culture that have been suppressed, yet still remain in the depth of our conscious. In this new collection of essays, Földényi considers the fallout from the end of religion and how the traditions of the Enlightenment have failed to replace neither the metaphysical completeness nor the comforting purpose of the previously held mythologies. Combining beautiful writing with empathy, imagination, fascination, and a fierce sense of justice, Földényi covers a wide range of topics that include a meditation on the metaphysical unity of a sculpture group and an analysis of fear as a window into our relationship with time.
In 1858/59, Karl Rosenkranz published his philosophical masterpiece, his Logic. Nowadays he is well known as a philosopher with Hegelian roots, but he was also a prolific student of Kantian ...philosophy as well, since he held Kant’s chair in Konigsberg since 1833. Influenced by Kant, he reorganized Hegel’s account of logic by separating the treatment of metaphysics again from the treat-ment of logic. Therefore he was then criticized by two other prominent Hegelians: Karl Ludwig Michelet and Ferdinand Lassalle. Lassalle coined the terminus of Neo-Kantianism in the ongoing dispute around 1860. He did this in analogy to the Neo-Platonist school, arguing that they are using Aristotelian doctrines while remaining obviously Platonists. The same comparison holds for Rosenkranz. He is a Neo-Kantian who was also impacted by Hegelian thought. Rosenkranz and Michelet took up the very wording phrase ‘Neo-Kantianism’ in their own contri-butions to the dispute
Abstract
In what follows, I attempt to reconstruct Fichte’s and Hegel’s reasons for developing at almost the same time two very different conceptions of a rational economic order. Whereas Hegel, on ...the basis of his objective notion of reason, would recommend that a rational state, founded on the notion of right, should include a strictly confined, socially embedded market economy, Fichte, on the basis of his subjective notion of reason, thought instead that the very same state must adopt an economic order that might well be described as a ‘planned economy’. Throughout the article I discuss whether it is the stark differences in their methodological premisses or their very different ideas about the individual freedom to be institutionalized in the economic sphere that helps us understand their respective notions of a rational economy.
This paper aims at focusing on Cassirer's relationship with Hegel during the crucial period when Cassirer is outlining and completing the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms in the early 1920s. The main ...thesis is that Cassirer has never abandoned his original Neo‐Kantian approach, despite the fact that it has been enriched within the perspective of a philosophy of culture indebted to some extent also to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. However, Cassirer maintains that Kant's critical idealism must be contrasted with Hegel's absolute idealism, keeping thereby open the process of the spirit that cannot close itself in a definitive logical structure. This critical stance is shared by some contemporaries of Cassirer such as Dilthey, Windelband, und above all Natorp. We have thus to read Cassirer's project against the historical backdrop of the ‘Hegel‐Renaissance’ in Germany, a circumstance that, according to the author, can contribute to a more adequate understanding of Cassirer's opus magnum.
This article offers a constructive reading of the ‘Teleology’ chapter in Hegel's Science of Logic. I argue that it contains an apparently conclusive case for the abstract concepts of means and end ...(in the sense of ‘purpose’), which has remained unrecognized in the literature. I then show some implications of the fact that the argument is entirely abstract in Hegel's system.
This article is an investigation into Hegel's claim that teleology is the truth of mechanism, which Hegel puts forward in the objectivity section in the Science of Logic. Contrary to most accounts of ...this section of the Logic, I make a case for a reading of Hegel's conception of external purposiveness according to which the latter makes a positive contribution to the structural development of the concepts of the Logic. I argue that external purposiveness plays a major role in understanding the Hegelian claim of teleology as the truth of mechanism. More specifically, I argue that structures of external purposiveness provide the conditions for the individuation of mechanical objects.
In this paper, I raise a question concerning the place of ‘Teleology’ in Hegel's system of logic and ask whether ‘Teleology’ as a logical category can and should come immediately before ‘Life’. I ...offer two main reasons to think that the category of ‘Teleology’ might be misplaced. The first and the indirect reason is inspired by a difference between the logical system and the Philosophy of Nature concerning the immediate precursors and the emergence of life as a logical category and real determinacy. In Hegel's Logic, ‘Teleology’ is interposed between ‘Chemism’ and ‘Life’, while in his Philosophy of Nature, ‘Organics’ immediately follows ‘The Chemical Process’. Although the systematic order of the natural determinacies laid out in the Philosophy of Nature has no authority over the sequence of logical determinacies, and although there does not have to be a one-to-one correspondence between the logical categories and natural determinacies of Hegel's system, I argue that the smooth transition from the chemical process to the self-sustaining totality of the geological organism in the Philosophy of Nature, is an incentive to consider a parallel transition in the logical exposition, which I show to be workable. The second and the direct reason is that Hegel's category of ‘Teleology’ cannot but make a crucial reference to the initial determinacy of the category of ‘Life,’ without which it is inconceivable. By explaining why this reference is untenable and how, by contrast, the initial determinacy of life is conceivable independently of the process in which some subjective end is realized in objectivity through external means, I conclude that the logic of ‘Life’ and internal teleology should precede the logic of external teleology, allowing for a direct passage from ‘Chemism’ to ‘Life’.
