Mi contribución se inscribe en el mejor de los ánimos posibles de incentivar el debate académico serio y nutrido. Pero sobre todo para esclarecer errores de comprensión y turbias interpretaciones que ...aparecen en el artículo de Miguel Hernando Guamanga Anaconas, “Husserl ¿Fenomenología de la matemática?” Eidos: Revista de Filosofía, Nº. 36, 2021, págs. 171-193.
This is the first complete critical commentary of Husserl's seminal work Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. Leading international scholars offer a close reading, ...examining arguments and phenomenological descriptions, connecting them to Husserl's earlier and later works, and engaging important secondary sources. The book will be invaluable reading for scholars and students of phenomenology and 20th century philosophy.
This paper reconstructs Sellars' theory of “sensation” or “sense impression,” positioning it in relation to his theoretical distinction between the Manifest and Scientific Image. Though Sellars' ...account of “sensation” has been a widely neglected part of his thought, it is central not only to his theory of perception but also to understanding his confrontation with traditional accounts of sensing (from Descartes to C.I. Lewis and Husserl). In this article, I first show that Sellars' argument for introducing the notion of “sensation” into his theoretical system should be understood as distinctly explanatory, rather than transcendental or phenomenological. After outlining this argument and analyzing its significance, I explore Sellars' adverbialist construal of “sensation” and its implications in relation to contemporaneous and current forms of adverbialism. Finally, in the last part of the paper, I illuminate how Sellars situates his conceptual framework for “sensations” (correctly understood) in the Manifest Image theory of perception. Highlighting Sellars' understanding of the process by which the Manifest Image substitutes sensation in the Scientific Image, I clarify Sellars' obscure notion of “sensa,” then conclude with a comprehensive account of his stereoscopic view of the phenomenon of sensing.
In this contribution we first sketch an outline of the concept of lifeworld (
Lebenswelt
), to introduce the readers to the guest-edited collection of essays
Varieties of the Lifeworld: Phenomenology ...and Aesthetic Experience
, special issue of the “Continental Philosophy Review.” We trace back the origin of the concept of lifeworld to Husserl’s late phenomenology, although also explaining (on the basis of the careful historical-conceptual reconstructions offered by some distinguished scholars of Husserl and the phenomenological movement) that the development of Husserl’s phenomenology of the
Lebenswelt
was gradual and was connected, among other things, to the question of the natural world of experience. Then, quickly referring to Gadamer, Landgrebe, Fink and other authors belonging to the phenomenological tradition, we explain that different interpretations of the topic “Lifeworld” in Husserl’s thinking have been provided: In our view, this contributes to the fact that still nowadays this topic is a fascinating and philosophically stimulating one. Finally, making reference to more recent works by such authors as Figal, Gallagher, Zahavi and Shusterman (a pragmatist philosopher, whose somaesthetics is nonetheless very rich in insights that can be connected to phenomenological views of the body and its place in the world), we emphasize how the question concerning the lifeworld is still capable today to open a great variety of perspectives and plurality of paths for thinking, as testified by the essays collected in this guest-edited special issue of the “Continental Philosophy Review.”
Perceptual confidence: A Husserlian take Laasik, Kristjan
European journal of philosophy,
June 2021, 2021-06-00, 20210601, Letnik:
29, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
In this paper, I propose a Husserlian account of perceptual confidence, and argue for perceptual confidence by appeal to the self‐justification of perceptual experiences. Perceptual confidence is the ...intriguing view, recently developed by John Morrison, that there are not just doxastic confidences but also perceptual confidences, that is, confidences as aspect of perceptual experience, enabling us to account, for example, for the increasing confidence with which we experience an approaching human figure, while telling ourselves, as the viewing distance diminishes, “It looks like this just could be Isaac,” “It looks like this is probably Isaac,” “It looks like this is almost certainly Isaac.” I first present my Husserlian account with a focus on the notion of fulfillment, and the idea that the contents of perceptual experience are fulfillment conditions. I then show that this account can be complemented by PC. Finally, I develop a focus on the idea of perceptual self‐justification, diverting the perceptual confidence debate from its pre‐eminent concern with the relations between perceptual and doxastic confidences, and present an argument to the effect that there are perceptual confidences.
The phenomenological method (or rather, methods) has been fruitfully used to study the experience of illness in recent years. However, the role of illness is not merely that of a passive object for ...phenomenological scrutiny. I propose that illness, and pathology more generally, can be developed into a phenomenological method in their own right. I claim that studying cases of pathology, breakdown, and illness offer illumination not only of these experiences, but also of normal function and the tacit background that underpins it. In particular, I claim that the study of embodiment can be greatly enhanced, and indeed would be incomplete, without attending to bodily breakdown and what I term bodily doubt. I offer an analogy between illness and Husserl’s
epoché
, suggesting that both are a source of distancing, and therefore motivate a reflective stance.
This contribution highlights the importance of the work of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, a student of Husserl and early phenomenological thinker, in the context of a review of James Hart’s 1972 dissertation ...on her work, now published under the title
Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Ontological Phenomenology
. It provides some context for Conrad-Martius’ thought, gives a brief chapter-by-chapter account of Hart’s treatment, and raises some further questions about his discussion of her work.