The legislative powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are vested in the National Assembly, which comprises the Senate and the House of Representatives. There were no universal indicators for ...assessing the effectiveness or power of the legislature until the publication of the Legislative Powers Survey (LPS), developed by Fish and Kroenig. This article evaluates the usefulness of the LPS to the study of the Nigerian central legislature, the National Assembly, and finds that the results based on them are not satisfactory because of the wrongfulness of some of the indicators contained in it. This article contends, therefore, that in assessing the effectiveness of the legislature of a particular country, a country specific indicator that takes into cognisance formal allocation of power in the Constitution and other statutes, the adequacy of the powers granted together with empirical evidence of how those powers have been used, is of greater utility than universal indicators that incorporate too many indices of little local relevance. Reprinted by permission of African Society of International and Comparative Law
In this paper, I examine a simple procedure in the United States House of Representatives, approving the Journal, and its implications for legislative business. In this paper, I examine the ...hypothesis that such votes are more than simply pro forma motions or dilatory tactics by the minority party. Considering the 102nd-107th Congresses, I show that votes on the Journal's approval are just as frequently requested by the majority party as by members of the minority party. Furthermore, I find that votes recorded on days on which a vote was also recorded on the House Journal were more likely to be close and more likely to be party-line votes than those recorded on other days.
This study analyses the legislative impact of the European Parliament (EP) under the revised co-decision procedure. I develop a model with adoption by Council and Commission as dependent variables ...and relative amendment importance, time of adoption, the amendment’s position in the legislation and internal parliamentary unity as independent variables. The results of my logistic regression question the common expectation that Co-decision II has increased the EP’s power. On the contrary, the rate of amendment adoption remains unchanged. The Commission’s influence during the second reading has, however, diminished. Furthermore, the study shows that the chance of an amendment made in the first reading being reintroduced increases in line with its adoption by the Commission and its non-adoption by the Council.
This article develops a formal model of the politics of delegation in the European
Union (EU) incorporating key institutional features: the legislative-executive role
of the Commission, the ...legislative-executive role of the members of the Council of
Ministers, the possible implementation of European policies by different national
administrations and the variety of EU decision rules. The model generates
propositions on how decision rules, policy conflict and the status quo affect the
delegation of powers to the Commission and to national authorities. It demonstrates
how qualified majority voting and, in some cases, codecision work as a commitment
technology by facilitating the adoption of legislation that restrains national
authorities, shifts powers from national administrations to the Commission and
increases its discretion. More generally, it shows that, first, the negative
relation between conflict and discretion may not hold in the case of many
administrators and a high threshold for decision-making; and, second, a less
demanding bargaining environment in the legislature may work in favor of an
administrator with agenda-setting power.
This article examines the determinants of the European Commission's executive discretion and the impact of comitology when policy authority is delegated by member states and the Parliament (i.e. ...principals) and all actors are uninformed about future contingencies. In such context, the Commission always prefers complete discretion while principals have to trade off the risk of agency losses against the need to give enough latitude to the Commission to deal with unexpected events. The analysis reveals a general trade-off in the institutional design of the European Union. On the one hand, the Commission can enjoy high and stable discretion, differing across legislative procedures, degree of uncertainty and of preference convergence, because of its monopoly proposal power. On the other hand, comitology procedures impose burdensome constraints on the Commission's autonomy and can be explained as a price for legislative intervention paid by the Commission. Finally, comitology procedures also increase the conflict across principals over the degree of discretion to grant to the Commission because the trade-off between ex ante discretion and ex post control can disappear with multiple principals.
Triple majority for changing the status quo in Treaty of Nice (2001): qualified majority of weighted votes, majority of countries, qualified majority of the population. Convention proposal (2003): ...requirements from three to two by dropping the qualified majority of weighted votes and reducing the qualified majority threshold of the population from 62% to 60%. Important consequences for the political institutions of the Union: 1) facilitates political decision-making; 2) reduces relative weight of governments participating in the Council and increases the importance of the European Parliament; 3) reduces the role of the judiciary and bureaucracies in the Union in favor of the political process. Consequences of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe signed in Rome 29 October 2004. Exactly in the middle between Nice and the European Convention.
This article analyses the role of the Commission in the European Union (EU). We present a game-theoretical model of two EU processes - Commission appointment and the adoption of legislation - and ...apply this model to the appointment of recent Commissions and their legislative programmes. Institutional reforms of the EU have led to more involvement of the European Parliament and majority voting in the Council in both processes. We find that the introduction of majority voting in the legislative process in the mid-1980s let the Commission move policy further from the status quo. Yet unanimity for appointing the Commission still allowed the member states to commit to a legislative programme that was preferred by all of them. More recently, the move to majority voting for appointing the Commission, combined with the ability of the European Parliament to amend Commission proposals, has moved the EU towards a more majoritarian political system. However, the potential policy consequences of these changes have been limited thus far because of the particular configuration of policy preferences of the governments and the European Parliament.
This article analyses the role of the Commission in the European Union (EU). We present a game-theoretical model of two EU processes — Commission appointment and the adoption of legislation — and ...apply this model to the appointment of recent Commissions and their legislative programmes. Institutional reforms of the EU have led to more involvement of the European Parliament and majority voting in the Council in both processes. We find that the introduction of majority voting in the legislative process in the mid-1980s let the Commission move policy further from the status quo. Yet unanimity for appointing the Commission still allowed the member states to commit to a legislative programme that was preferred by all of them. More recently, the move to majority voting for appointing the Commission, combined with the ability of the European Parliament to amend Commission proposals, has moved the EU towards a more majoritarian political system. However, the potential policy consequences of these changes have been limited thus far because of the particular configuration of policy preferences of the governments and the European Parliament.
The process of the constitutionalisation of Europe calls for both theoretical and practical comments. In view of the designated European Constitution, the article explores some paths of thought in ...regard to legislative procedures and institutions of the European Union.
