Uncertainty is inherent to science and science communication. However, the evidence appears mixed regarding whether portraying uncertainty in science communication has positive or negative effects. ...We review a diverse range of experimental literature (k = 48; from 40 searches and 8000 retrievals), summarize the extant findings, and observe how the effects vary across four different types of communicated uncertainty (deficient, technical, scientific, and consensus uncertainty). The results indicate that most findings of negative effects (such as reduced credibility and beliefs) are from experiments that operationalized uncertainty as disagreement or conflict in science (consensus uncertainty). In this review, consensus uncertainty was never found to have positive effects. In contrast, uncertainty in the form of quantified error ranges and probabilities (technical uncertainty) in these studies has had only positive or null effects, not negative effects. We also highlight frequent moderators of the effects of uncertainty, such as prior beliefs and worldviews.
Beliefs based on pernicious ideology are widespread, and they often have harmful consequences. Attempts to solve the problems these beliefs cause could benefit from epistemological work on them, so ...it is heartening to see more epistemologists turning to study ideological beliefs. In this paper, I discuss one recent approach, radical epistemology, which has two aims: (1) offering structural explanations of epistemic justification and (2) putting these explanations to work in opposing ideology. While I share radical epistemologists’ opposition to pernicious ideology, I argue that their position is untenable because it gives rise to a vicious circularity. Its core commitment maintains that theorists’ choice between competing epistemological theories should be guided by their moral and political commitments. These commitments themselves, however, are susceptible to reasonable disagreement and thus stand in need of defense. To defend them, radical epistemologists must employ the very theories those commitments are supposed to undergird. I call this
the problem of theory choice
and conclude that radical epistemologists cannot solve it. But we shouldn’t despair: the time-honored tools of
non
-radical epistemology offer all we need to successfully theorize about and combat bad ideology.
Philosophers of science and medicine now aspire to provide useful, socially relevant accounts of mechanism. Existing accounts have forged the path by attending to mechanisms in historical context, ...scientific practice, the special sciences, and policy. Yet, their primary focus has been on more proximate issues related to therapeutic effectiveness. To take the next step toward social relevance, we must investigate the challenges facing researchers, clinicians, and policy makers involving values and social context. Accordingly, we learn valuable lessons about the connections between mechanistic processes and more fundamental reasons for (or against) medical interventions, particularly moral, ethical, religious, and political concerns about health, agency, and power. This paper uses debates over the controversial morning-after pill (emergency contraception) to gain insight into the deeper reasons for the production and use of mechanistic knowledge throughout biomedical research, clinical practice, and governmental regulation. To practice socially relevant philosophy of science, I argue that we need to account for mechanistic knowledge beyond immediate effectiveness, such as how it can also provide moral guidance, aid ethical categorization in the clinic, and function as a political instrument. Such insights have implications for medical epistemology, including the value-laden dimensions of mechanistic reasoning and the “epistemic friction” of values. Furthermore, there are broader impacts for teaching research ethics and understanding the role of science advisors as political advocates.
The ubiquity of video games in today's society has led to significant interest in their impact on the brain and behavior and in the possibility of harnessing games for good. The present meta-analyses ...focus on one specific game genre that has been of particular interest to the scientific community-action video games, and cover the period 2000-2015. To assess the long-lasting impact of action video game play on various domains of cognition, we first consider cross-sectional studies that inform us about the cognitive profile of habitual action video game players, and document a positive average effect of about half a standard deviation (g = 0.55). We then turn to long-term intervention studies that inform us about the possibility of causally inducing changes in cognition via playing action video games, and show a smaller average effect of a third of a standard deviation (g = 0.34). Because only intervention studies using other commercially available video game genres as controls were included, this latter result highlights the fact that not all games equally impact cognition. Moderator analyses indicated that action video game play robustly enhances the domains of top-down attention and spatial cognition, with encouraging signs for perception. Publication bias remains, however, a threat with average effects in the published literature estimated to be 30% larger than in the full literature. As a result, we encourage the field to conduct larger cohort studies and more intervention studies, especially those with more than 30 hours of training.
Public Significance Statement
Understanding the effects of action video game play is essential given that (a) a large number of individuals regularly spend many hours on these types of games, and (b) proponents are offering suites of video games that are claimed to change behavior or enhance cognition. The 2 meta-analyses in this paper present the current status of this field, concluding that playing action video games has some positive effects on improving cognitive skills. This review also identifies some limitations of current research.
For many decades, Duhem has been considered a paradigmatic instrumentalist, and while some commentators have argued against classifying him in this way, it still seems prevalent as an interpretation ...of his philosophy of science. Yet such a construal bears scant resemblance to the views presented in his own works—so little, indeed, that it might be said to constitute no more than a mere phantom with respect to his actual thought. In this article, we aim to deconstruct this phantom, tracing the sources of the misconceptions surrounding his ideas and pinpointing the sources and/or causes of its proliferation. We subsequently point out and discuss those elements of his philosophy that, taken together, support the view of him as a scientific realist of a sophisticated kind. Finally, we defend our own interpretation of his thought against suggestions to the effect that it is oriented towards neither instrumentalism nor scientific realism.
According to the predictive coding theory of cognition (PCT), brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, ...externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in the sense that it postulates that our cognitive contact with the world is mediated by internal representations. However, the exact sense in which PCT is representational remains unclear; neither is it clear that it deserves such status—that is, whether it really invokes structures that are truly and nontrivially representational in nature. In the present article, I argue that the representational pretensions of PCT are completely justified. This is because the theory postulates cognitive structures—namely action-guiding, detachable, structural models that afford representational error detection—that play genuinely representational functions within the cognitive system.
Over the past decade, a large and growing body of experimental research has analyzed dishonest behavior. Yet the findings as to when people engage in (dis)honest behavior are to some extent unclear ...and even contradictory. A systematic analysis of the factors associated with dishonest behavior thus seems desirable. This meta-analysis reviews four of the most widely used experimental paradigms: sender-receiver games, die-roll tasks, coin-flip tasks, and matrix tasks. We integrate data from 565 experiments (totaling N = 44,050 choices) to address many of the ongoing debates on who behaves dishonestly and under what circumstances. Our findings show that dishonest behavior depends on both situational factors, such as reward magnitude and externalities, and personal factors, such as the participant's gender and age. Further, laboratory studies are associated with more dishonesty than field studies, and the use of deception in experiments is associated with less dishonesty. To some extent, the different experimental paradigms come to different conclusions. For example, a comparable percentage of people lie in die-roll and matrix tasks, but in die-roll tasks liars lie to a considerably greater degree. We also find substantial evidence for publication bias in almost all measures of dishonest behavior. Future research on dishonesty would benefit from more representative participant pools and from clarifying why the different experimental paradigms yield different conclusions.
Public Significance Statement
Reports on corruption in industry and politics, fake news, and alternative facts highlight how crucial honesty is to the functioning of societies. But what aspects make people act dishonestly? We review 565 experiments that tempted 44,050 participants to behave dishonestly. We show that the degree and the magnitude of dishonesty depend on properties of the person (e.g., age, gender) and the context (e.g., the incentive to misreport, the experimental setup).
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