Sociability and education in Kant and Hessen Zagirnyak, Mikhail
Journal of philosophy of education,
December 2021, 2021-12-00, 20211201, Letnik:
55, Številka:
6
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Sociability is a concept that reflects not only the individual's ability to enter into social communication, but also the dependence of the structure of social interaction on the degree of the ...individual's freedom in society. Kant's ethics arguably represents a key stage in the development of this idea. However, it was not until a later era that a comprehensive notion was formed according to which the social actualisation of individual freedom is a significant factor in social development. The Russian neo‐Kantian, Sergey Hessen, develops a model of sociability where education forms free individuals who exercise their freedom through the development of culture. I reconstruct Hessen's model and establish that, proceeding from Rickert's axiology, he showed how education can improve the realisation of the ideals of freedom and equality in the framework of Kant's individualistic treatment of society. In his pedagogical philosophy, Hessen identifies stages in human development (anomie–heteronomy–autonomy), in the course of which the individual renounces arbitrariness. Hessen stresses the crucial significance of the secondary school in developing an awareness of freedom as duty and of society as the sphere of its actualisation. In his legal theory, Hessen strips the state of its law‐making function and distributes that to the whole society. This enables free individuals to accept the need for universal subjection to the law under conditions of equality. Hessen proposes a new social structure: individuals create collective entities, each of which forms its own legal order, while the state coordinates these legal orders to prevent conflict and contradictions among them.
People make judgments about the world around them and about themselves all the time but hardly realize that they intrinsically are connected with values. Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936), in the ...tradition of Immanuel Kant, put such value-judgments in the center of his theory of knowledge and developed an elaborate philosophy of values in which he tried to avoid both historical relativism and metaphysical absolutism. He also rejected the irrationalism which dominated the vitalist philosophies from Nietzsche to Bergson, and later the French and German currents of existentialism, without, however, falling prey to a one-sided rationalism and intellectualism. He found an elegant solution to the old issue of the demarcation of Natural Science and Cultural Science without favoring, as is still usually done, one of them.
Presented in V PARTS, containing 18 Chpts, & an Introduction is a theoretical study of the philosophical underpinnings of Max Weber's methodology & Heinrich Rickert's influence on it, asking where ...social science now stands in relation to Weber's work, & under what conditions subjective values can provide the basis for the conceptualization of social phenomena as objects of knowledge. PART I - WEBER AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES - in (1) Introduction; (2) The Irrationality of Reality; (3) The Sciences of Concrete Reality and the Constitution of Culture; (4) Value Relevance; & (5) The Problem of the Objectivity of the Cultural Sciences -- explores the premises in Weber's methodological writings that are responsible for generating the question of the influence of subjective values on social science conceptualizations. PART II - RICKERT AND THE THEORY OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE - in (1) The Problematic of the Southwest German School; (2) Windelband and the Idea of Idiographic Knowledge; (3) Lask's Analysis of Concept Formation and the Irrationality of Reality; (4) Rickert's Project; (5) The Problem of Concept Formation in History; & (6) The Doctrine of Value Relevance -- traces Rickert's more systematic analysis of the same questions posed in philosophical & methodological concerns with subjective values. PART III - RICKERT AND THE OBJECTIVITY OF VALUES - in (1) The Objectivity of Value Relevance and the Objectivity of Values; (2) The Analysis of Values; & (3) The Objectivity of Values -- provides an analysis of the elements of Rickert's value theory on which his solution to the problem of the objectivity of values depends. PART IV - CRITIQUE OF RICKERT - in (1) Introduction; (2) Critique of the Value/Valuation Dichotomy; (3) Critique of the Transcendental Solution; & (4) The Incommensurability of Values -- assesses Rickert's solution to the problem of objectivity. It is concluded that Rickert fails to solve the problem &, since the objectivity of concept formation rests on the objectivity of values, he fails to solve this problem as well; the problem of the objectivity of social science cannot be solved by employing the conceptual apparatus & the arguments of philosophy. PART V - CONCLUDING REMARKS - considers the implications for Weber's work of this critique of Rickert's failure, arguing that to the extent that Weber's methodology depends on these elements of Rickert's thought, the critique of Rickert also destroys the basis of Weber's methodology. It is opined that from the standpoint of Weber's own Rickertian premises, Weber's sociology of religion also presupposes a solution to the problem of value relevance that is not possible on the basis of an axiological decisionism; in the end, Weber's turn from a philosophy of values to a sociology of values has the same result as Rickert's turn from a normative theory of values to a purely formal taxonomy of values: the irresolvability of the problem of the objectivity of the cultural sciences. Chpt Notes include references. M. Crowdes
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