The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but ...neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
Choosing Justice Norman Frohlich; Joe A. Oppenheimer
07/2023
eBook
This book presents an entirely new answer to the question: "What is fair?" In their radical approach to ethics, Frohlich and Oppenheimer argue that much of the empirical methodology of the natural ...sciences should be applied to the ethical questions of fairness and justice.
CONSISTENT PROBABILISTIC SOCIAL CHOICE Brandl, Florian; Brandt, Felix; Seedig, Hans Georg
Econometrica,
September 2016, Letnik:
84, Številka:
5
Journal Article
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Two fundamental axioms in social choice theory are consistency with respect to a variable electorate and consistency with respect to components of similar alternatives. In the context of traditional ...non-probabilistic social choice, these axioms are incompatible with each other. We show that in the context of probabilistic social choice, these axioms uniquely characterize a function proposed by Fishburn (1984). Fishburn's function returns so-called maximal lotteries, that is, lotteries that correspond to optimal mixed strategies in the symmetric zero-sum game induced by the pairwise majority margins. Maximal lotteries are guaranteed to exist due to von Neumann's Minimax Theorem, are almost always unique, and can be efficiently computed using linear programming.
Let V be a society whose members express weak preferences about two alternatives. We show simple representation formulae that are valid for all, and only, the elements of various classes of ...non-manipulable social choice functions on V. We represent the entire class of the non-manipulable social choice functions, and various of its subclasses corresponding to further properties. We focus mainly on anonymity. Efficiency and neutrality up to one voter are also considered. As a consequence of the representation formulae, the cardinalities of some of these classes are also established. Notably, we show that the number of anonymous and non-manipulable social choice functions on V is 2n+1 if V contains n members.
A (deterministic) social choice correspondence F, mapping states into outcomes, is rationalizably implementable provided that there exists a mechanism such that the support of its set of ...rationalizable outcomes coincides with the set of outcomes recommended by F. We provide a necessary condition for rationalizable implementation, called r-monotonicity. This condition, when combined with some other auxiliary conditions, is also sufficient when there are at least three agents.
Critical‐level Sufficientarianism Bossert, Walter; Cato, Susumu; Kamaga, Kohei
The journal of political philosophy,
December 2022, Letnik:
30, Številka:
4
Journal Article
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Sufficientarianism is a general class of distributional principles that assign absolute priority to those below a threshold level that represents a minimally acceptable standard of well-being. This ...topic has received an increasing amount of attention in the recent literature. The notion of sufficientarianism can be traced back to Frankfurt who writes that “what is important from the point of view of morality is not that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough.” This theory relies on the existence of some threshold value of sufficiency: if an individual's well-being is above the threshold, then he or she is deemed to have enough.In this article, we employ an axiological approach to identify a class of sufficientarian principles. Our starting point is the notion of absolute priority, a requirement that we consider to be at the very core of sufficientarian ideas. Absolute priority postulates that attention is to be focused on those whose well-being is below the threshold, and the utilities of those above the threshold only matter as a tie-breaker if the criterion to be applied below the threshold fails to be decisive. The feature that is novel to our approach is that we combine this fundamental sufficientarian principle with axioms that have a distinctly utilitarian flavor. This allows us to develop a sufficientarian theory that is based on utilitarian principles. Our most important observation is that our theory, which we refer to as critical-level sufficientarianism, necessarily follows as a consequence of adding the absolute-priority requirement to utilitarian axioms.The critical-level sufficientarian criteria represent an adaptation of critical-level generalized utilitarianism, a theory of justice that originates in the literature on population ethics. Critical-level generalized-utilitarian population principles are introduced in a fundamental contribution by Blackorby and Donaldson. It employs a fixed critical level of utility that represents the level of well-being such that adding a person at that level does not change moral goodness, provided that no one else's utility is affected by this population augmentation. Our principles lexically apply critical-level generalized utilitarianism to those below the threshold first and, if this criterion results in equal goodness, use a critical-level generalized-utilitarian principle above the threshold as a tie-breaking device. In a sense, our theory can be seen as a refinement of Crisp's proposal which has been examined axiologically in a recent contribution by Hirose. Brown's absolute sufficientism is a special case of critical-level sufficientarianism.Section II reviews important variants of sufficientarianism that appear in the previous literature. The properties that we impose on sufficientarian principles are defined and defended in Section III. They include a formulation of a version of absolute priority compatible with most approaches that can be found in the requisite literature. The other properties that we impose are characteristic of generalized utilitarianism. Section IV presents the definition of our critical-level sufficientarian rankings as adaptations of the critical-level generalized-utilitarian population principles, and then provides the main result of the article—an axiomatic characterization of critical-level sufficientarianism. In Section V, we use well-established transfer principles to identify the subclass of our principles that are compatible with these conditions. Section VI concludes, and more formal statements of our properties as well as the proof of our characterization result appear in the Appendix.
On the transmission of democratic values Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Espinosa, María Paz; Giritligil, Ayca E.
Journal of economic behavior & organization,
August 2022, 2022-08-00, Letnik:
200
Journal Article
Recenzirano
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•We study the level of intergenerational transmission of democratic values eliciting preferences for social choice rules that aggregate individual preferences into a collective decision.•This is ...relevant because a high intergenerational transmission of democratic values would increase the stability of political institutions.•We run an experiment with 186 students and their parents and elicit their preferences in three different profiles. We estimate a panel data discrete choice model.•Our results indicate a significant intergenerational transmission of preferences for social choice rules.
We study whether democratic values that govern the preferences over social choice rules are subject to intergenerational transmission. We focus on five social choice rules, namely, Plurality, Plurality with Runoff, the Majoritarian Compromise, Borda Rule and Social Compromise, that represent very diverse values about how to extract public will out of individual opinions. In our experiment, students and their parents are confronted with hypothetical preference profiles and are asked to decide which alternative should be chosen for the society. The design of the hypothetical preference profiles allows us to interpret a subject’s choice of an alternative as her revealed preference for one of the focused social choice rules. We find significant differences between the rules most often chosen by the parents (Majoritarian Compromise and Plurality) and those by the students (Social Compromise). Analyzing the relation between the preferences over social choice rules for each parent-offspring pair, we find support for the hypothesis of parental transmission of preferences.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies that all anonymous, Pareto-optimal, and single-valued social choice functions can be strategically manipulated. In this paper, we investigate whether there ...exist social choice correspondences (SCCs), that satisfy these conditions under various assumptions about how single alternatives are eventually selected from the choice set. These assumptions include even-chance lotteries as well as resolute choice functions and linear tie-breaking orderings unknown to the agents. We show that (i) all anonymous Pareto-optimal SCCs where ties are broken according to some linear tie-breaking ordering or by means of even-chance lotteries are manipulable, and that (ii) all pairwise Pareto-optimal SCCs are manipulable for any deterministic tie-breaking rule. These results are proved by reducing the statements to finite—yet very large—formulas in propositional logic, which are then shown to be unsatisfiable by a computer.
Lemma 20 in Gori (2021) is not correct. In this note we propose a new version of Lemma 20 and we discuss the impact of that new version on the other results in Gori (2021). Notation and definitions ...are as in Gori (2021).
This book presents a simple geometric model of voting as a tool to analyze parliamentary roll call data. Each legislator is represented by one point and each roll call is represented by two points ...that correspond to the policy consequences of voting Yea or Nay. On every roll call each legislator votes for the closer outcome point, at least probabilistically. These points form a spatial map that summarizes the roll calls. In this sense a spatial map is much like a road map because it visually depicts the political world of a legislature. The closeness of two legislators on the map shows how similar their voting records are, and the distribution of legislators shows what the dimensions are. These maps can be used to study a wide variety of topics including how political parties evolve over time, the existence of sophisticated voting and how an executive influences legislative outcomes.
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