This study aims to find out the development of business competition law in Indonesia as stipulated in Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition ...and its impact on the dynamics of business competition in Indonesia after the enactment of Law Number 6 of 2023 on Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Government Regulation in Lieu of Law) Number 2 of 2022 concerning Job Creation into Law. This study uses a normative method with a statute approach and a library research approach. The formulation of the problem in this study is the development of business competition law in Indonesia after the enactment of the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law on Job Creation into Law and the impact of the enactment of Law Number 6 of 2023 on the dynamics of business competition in Indonesia. The results showed that the Business Competition Law in Indonesia experienced the first change in terms of substance after the enactment of Law Number 6 of 2023 on the Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 2 of 2022 concerning Job Creation into Law. These changes then led to a shift in the dynamics of the Competition Procedure Law, which was considered regressed.
Since March 2024, the undertakings Alphabet/Google, Amazon, Apple, Byte-Dance/TikTok, Meta, and Microsoft must comply with the obligations of the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Within the first month ...after the 6-months implementation period has ended, the European Commission opened investigations against Alphabet/Google, Apple, and Meta for non-compliance with the obligations in the DMA. All proceedings can be traced back to related competition law cases. However, only two proceedings follow the same reasoning as their competition law role models, while the case against Meta reveals that the approaches under the DMA can and will deviate significantly to those under competition law and data protection law.
•We propose a governance structure for mandatory data sharing on data-driven markets.•A governance structure details investigation, decision making, and enforcement.•Optimal governance combines ...economically efficient centralization with legally necessary decentralization.•We show how and why it differs from current EU legal initiatives (DMA, DSA).
To prevent market tipping, which inhibits innovation, there is an urgent need to mandate sharing of user information in data-driven markets. Existing legal mechanisms to impose data sharing under EU competition law and data portability under the GDPR are not sufficient to tackle this problem. Mandated data sharing requires the design of a governance structure that combines elements of economically efficient centralization with legally necessary decentralization. We identify three feasible options. One is to centralize investigations and enforcement in a European Data Sharing Agency (EDSA), while decision-making power lies with National Competition Authorities in a Board of Supervisors. The second option is to set up a Data Sharing Cooperation Network coordinated through a European Data Sharing Board, with the National Competition Authority best placed to run the investigation adjudicating and enforcing the mandatory data-sharing decision across the EU. A third option is to mix both governance structures and to task national authorities to investigate and adjudicate and the EU-level EDSA with enforcement of data sharing.
Growing centralisation in the tech sector is raising global governmental concern, and the winds of change are blowing. Interoperability - in this context, the ability of internet-connected ...technologies to work together, for example by exchanging data and accessing functions remotely - is gaining traction as a component of the coming regulatory and legislative reforms. Against a backdrop of rapidly evolving law and technology, this paper examines how interoperability fits within the existing landscape for competition law, and where it may be interpreted to be applicable to the complex system of data exchanges whose emergence we call the internet.
In the last eight years Poland experienced an illiberal shift. Key elements of constitutional democracy were undermined. The story is well-known to public law scholars, particularly with respect to ...judicial reforms. However, off most people’s radar have been the changes which increased the role of state-controlled and state-owned firms (SOEs) in the Polish economy which have supported Poland’s illiberal tendencies. Pre-election period is illustrative in this respect, with the ruling majority benefitting from various kinds of support from SOEs which undermined a level playing field. The Polish experience arguably sheds light on constitutional democracies’ weaknesses in effectively addressing the links between political and market power which can further democratic backsliding. In this blogpost, I will highlight why the existing legal framework, in particular remedies available in law aimed at imposing limits on the use of market power, i.e. competition law, are insufficient to address this risk and why a broader debate in public law is necessary in this respect.
The settlement procedure in Slovakia stems from three sources of inspiration: top-to-bottom (European Union law), bottom-up (incentive of an undertaking’s lawyer) and horizontal sources (Czechia). ...After more than ten years of application of this feature of Slovak competition law, there are several cases which were settled. These cases show a certain variety from the point of view of the legal basis, the stage of procedure as well as the character or relevance of the case. This makes it possible to assess their features, practice, effects, and consequences of settlements from the empirical point of view. The present paper analyses the legal framework and practice from a historical point of view. It provides a qualitative overview with evaluation of the settlement procedure in the context of European law and the Slovak legal order as well as a quantitative overview based on data extracted from the decisions of the Slovak NCA (PMÚ) and court rulings. In its conclusions it brings forward fresh suggestions de lege ferenda.
EU Competition Litigation Strand, Magnus; Bastidas, Vladimir; Iacovides, Marios C
2019, 2019-05-16
eBook, Conference Proceeding
Odprti dostop
All EU Member States have now transposed Directive 2014/104/EU on damages actions for breaches of competition law into national law. The Directive (and the soft-law instruments accompanying it) not ...only marks a new phase for private enforcement of competition law but also, more generally, provides a novel and thought provoking instance of EU harmonisation of aspects of private law and civil litigation. Following up on a previous volume in the Swedish Studies in European Law series, published in 2016, this open access book offers contributions from top practitioners and scholars from all over Europe, who present and discuss first experiences from the implementation of the new damages regime in various jurisdictions. Topics covered include theoretical and practical reflections on the state of private enforcement in Europe, the balancing of conflicting interests pertaining to public and private enforcement of competition law respectively, and specific legal issues such as causation and the estimation of harm. The authors explore problems solved, problems created, and future challenges in the new regime of private enforcement of competition law in Europe, offering predictions as to issues that may have to be settled through recourse to the European Court of Justice. The eBook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com. Open access was funded by the Swedish Studies Network.
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