The Primacy of Constitution of the Transitional Object in Marc Richir Among the psychoanalysts, it was primarily Donald Winnicott who helped Marc Richir to clarify and develop genetic phenomenology, ...which had already been outlined by Edmund Husserl. The paper attempts to demonstrate the use Richir makes of Winnicott’s works for his own research devoted to the elaboration of Husserl’s project. According to Richir’s reading, Winnicott insisted on the “primacy of constitution of the transitional object” for the access to the real. By referring to Winnicott’s own words, we seek to show in what sense he privileges the constitutional role of the transitional object, and how Richir adopts and reinterprets his teachings. We explicate that the transitional object reveals its complexity through the function that at once enables and disturbs the process of “hominization.”
This article aims at disambiguation or better say, decontradiction of the concept of ideology by referring to Ricoeur's opinions about ideology. Ricoeur calls his method of studying ideology ...phenomenological. Why phenomenology? Because the term ideology, when placed in a polemical framework, will suffer from both "bad use" and "abuse". Only with a serious semantic approach and a correct explanation of the conditions that this concept depends on, can we put an end to this abuse. Such a task is possible in the light of an approach that Ricoeur calls "developmental phenomenology", "a rising analysis of the concept" and "an attempt to explore the subsurface of the obvious meaning of ideology to reach its fundamental meanings". The attempt is to disambiguate this concept, which is at first glance polemical and controversial, so that a clearer and fairer definition of it would be presented. Based on Paul Ricoeur's work titled Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, which was delivered at the University of Chicago in 1975, and his other articles and works on ideology and phenomenology, this article has tried to answer the two main questions of this field together with Ricoeur: a) Who were the main theorists of the concept of ideology? b) How many major definitions can be extracted from the phenomenological study of ideology? The extract of the intertwined answer to the two mentioned questions is that Ricoeur, while examining the works of people such as Marx, Althusser, Mannheim, Weber, Habermas and Geertz, questions the common and negative perceptions of ideology, and based on a detailed and deep examination of the works of the mentioned thinkers, comes to three major and specific definitions, or in other words, three stages or functions of ideology; the first one based on Marx's definition, the second one based on Weber's attitude and the last one based on Geertz's views about this term. Ricoeur calls these three definitions, stages or functions respectively, ideology as "ambiguity of reality", ideology as source of "power legitimacy", and finally ideology as source of "social cohesion". Based on such an analysis of ideology, in the second part of the article, the different functions of utopia have been discussed, and while emphasizing the positive aspects of utopia, it has been concluded in conformity with Ricoeur that a society without utopia is a dead society.
Noticia y comentario sobre generatividad e historicismo a propósito de la reciente publicación del libro Mundo familiar y mundo ajeno. La fenomenología generativa tras Husserl de Anthony J. ...Steinbock, Salamanca, Sígueme, 2022, 429 pp.
The paper attempts to demonstrate the use Richir makes of Winnicott's works for his own research devoted to the elaboration of Husserl's project. By referring to Winnicott's own words, we seek to ...show in what sense he privileges the constitutional role of the transitional object, and how Richir adopts and reinterprets his teachings. Ce paradoxe est déja bien remarqué et articulé sous la plume de Husserl. Si lego primordial est le point zéro de lorientation, la présence d'un autre ego va soit voler « ma » position centrale, soit doubler le centre dans la méme coordonnée, ce qui est apparemment absurde.2 Il est inimaginable pour une sphere d'avoir deux centres. Pour assurer « lexpérience bouleversante d'autrui » en tant qu'un « second moment » sur la base phénoménologique du primordial, il faut que l'intersubjectivité - ou l'interfacticité en termes proprement richiriens - soit déja mise en fonction avant toute figuration (Richir 2004, 274-275). Selon Richir, l'ici absolu primordial ne peut avoir de sens que par rapport a d'autres ici absolus, dont le modele est la mere, meme si ce proto-rapport ne se figure pas encore.
Abstract Several enactive-phenomenological perspectives have pointed to affectivity as a central aspect of mental disorders. Indeed, from an enactive perspective, sense-making is an inherently ...affective process. A question remains on the role of different forms of affective experiences (i.e., existential feelings, atmospheres, moods, and emotions) in sense-making and, consequently, in mental disorders. This work elaborates on the enactive perspective on mental disorders by attending to the primordial role of affectivity in the self-individuation process. Inspired by Husserl’s genetic methodology and Simondonian philosophy of individuation, sense-making is described as the process of progressive concretization and structuration of the self-world structures that support the intentionality of conscious experiences. Accordingly, affectivity is described as the force that anticipates a partial self-world coherence in sense-making. Structurally different types of affective experiences are integrated into the genetic picture and, on this basis, a reinterpretation and classification of certain mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, depression, and the anxiety spectrum, is provided. In this way, this work contributes to a phenomenologically informed enactive account of mental disorders as disorders of affectivity.
In this paper, I address Husserl’s theory of intentionality focusing on the problems of attention. I claim that without phenomenological reduction the specific phenomenological content of ...modalizations – in intentional acts – would be hard to explain. It would be impossible to understand why constant external factors (for instance, variations in the intensity of a stimulus) are accompanied by fluctuations in attention. It would also be impossible to understand the reasons why only the lived experience of causality – which I sharply distinguish from causality in the psychophysical sense of the term – transforms attention into a factor that allows the understanding of a situation by the subject who lives that experience. I claim at last that only the genetic analysis of Husserl’s late Freiburg period, with its distinction between primary and secondary attention, gives a full account of the relation between the thematic object, focused on an intentional attentive act, and the horizon that surrounds the object and gives it its ultimate meaning.
This paper tries to document Husserl’s reflections on the problem of “situations” in his later manuscripts of the 1930s. These reflections are centered on the phenomenon of “typificiation”, which ...plays an important part in Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. Thus, the paper starts by sketching out a general presentation of “typification” in its relation to expectation and habit. By defining situation as “the intentional living unity of horizontal context and subjective potentiality”, the paper then tries to follow Husserl’s exposition of three essential aspects of situational typification: a.) the habituality of interest; b.) normality and c.) periodicity.
In this paper, relying on both phenomenology and psychoanalysis, I introduce the concept of transbodily intentionality with the aim of exploring the significance of bodily expression for subjective ...constitution. The role of the body for the constitution of subjective experience becomes increasingly important in phenomenological analysis. This faces us with the challenge of understanding the intersubjective relevance of bodily processes together with the genetic turn of phenomenology. On this background, the revaluation of the concept of gesture comes into light. The meaning of the gesture cannot be framed in an exclusively subjective context, but rather requires a communicative and intersubjective horizon.
Ever since the 1960s, media and communication studies have abounded in heated debates concerning the psychological and social effects of fictional media violence. Massive empirical research has first ...tried to tie film violence to cultivating either fear or aggressive tendencies among its viewership, while later research has focused on other media as well (television, video games). The present paper does not aim to settle the factual question of whether or not medial experiences indeed engender real emotional dispositions. Instead, it brings into play the resources of genetic phenomenology in order to ask how the formation of such dispositions would be generally possible. Thus, it aims to further the discussion by overtly employing the framework of Husserl’s later genetic phenomenology to the field of emotional experience. By posing questions with regard to how fictional emotional experiences contribute to the formation of apperceptions and to the specificities of emotional sedimentation, it also points out some shortcomings in Husserl’s account by drawing from Freud’s dynamic theory of drives and emotions.
