This paper addresses the analytic dimensions of Hyletics and Genetics in M. Scheler’s early phenomenology of sense perception, characterized by its realistic foundation for the matter and form of ...percepts. Phenomenological Hyletics studies the “matter”, i.e., the qualitative content of lived experiences with respect to the pre-intentional aspect of its unformed sensory input, lacking in objectual form. Phenomenological Genetics studies the “genesis” or formation of intentionality’s relata, starting from the early moments of indistinction at the initial phase of perceptual consciousness. This paper highlights the pivotal role and, above all, the original elaboration of these two analytic dimensions by the author: within Scheler’s work, phenomenological Hyletics and Genetics form part of an inquiry that stresses different aspects of reality, understood as a living phenomenon characterized by the resistance of things to adaptive behavior. According to Scheler, therefore, the perceiver is not a self-conscious subject, but rather an organism, i.e., an agent of information-communication that continuously interacts with his surrounding environment.
Psychology students and professionals alike often do not realize that Edmund Husserl addressed core themes of Jean Piaget's genetic epistemology and that the respective works of Piaget and Husserl ...share various conceptual kinships. This article articulates these kinships and also considers divergences between Piaget's and Husserl's viewpoints. In carrying out the latter, Husserl's philosophical insights are offered as phenomenological critiques of Piaget's theory. Conceptual kinships were anchored in a multideterminant view of cognitive development, a self-regulated perspective on development, attempts to take on Kantian themes in new ways to overcome traditional empirical and rationalist epistemologies, emphases on genesis, world-formation, and world-expansion, an examination of the way science culturally exemplifies world-expansion, and a belief in the convergence of truth and value. Critiques were framed in terms of Piaget's implicit assimilatory bias and his decentration bias. Avenues for approaching Piaget from a humanistic, phenomenological orientation to psychology were also considered.
In what sense can corporality still be considered a constitutive condition for experience in the current digital age? Recent scholarship in the fields of Embodied Artificial Intelligence and the ...philosophy of Embodied Artificial Intelligence has probed the relevance of two approaches to this question. The first queries the relationship between corporality and digitization, i.e., examining how it is possible to simulate, augment, and even construct reality within a space of virtual experience (Augmented Reality and Virtual Reality) by digitizing data. This approach builds on the traditional idea of computing as an activity that uses artificial, mostly electronic, devices to process, manage, and communicate information. The second approach, increasingly favored by computer scientists, considers computing to be a natural activity, and approaches this same relationship from the perspective of emerging research in unconventional computing, specifically Natural Computing. This paper follows the latter approach, addressing the constitutive role of corporality in virtual experience associated with a well-known and still autonomous research area within Natural Computing, that is, Morphological Computing, from the from the point of view of genetic phenomenology.
I start with an immanent critique of Husserls 5th Cartesian Meditation that reveals the weakness of the constitutional Analysis in this text, especially in the view of genetic phenomenology. First I ...argue for a methodically differentiation in concern to different privileged parts of our lived body. Hands and feet seems to be much more suitable for analogical apperception than facial expressions, because we do not know so much about our own mimics. My special interest is a specific genetic phenomenological analysis of our access to the other that is oriented on the function of the type. The type somehow carries all our experiences with others in it and I will argue that the layers of this history are also functioning in every apperception of an other.
Adorno’s intensive criticism of phenomenology is well known, his entire early period during the 1920s and 1930s being marked by various polemical engagements with Husserl. This engagement finds its ...peak during his work at his second dissertation project in Oxford, a dissertation that was supposed to systematicaly expose the antinomies of phenomenological thinking while particularly focusing on Husserl’s concept of “eidetic intuition” or “intuition of essences” (Wesensschau). The present paper will take this criticism as its starting point in focusing on two highly specific aspects of Adorno’s interpretation: the opposition between eidetic intuition and the traditional theories of abstraction and its relationship to genetic phenomenology. In light of this criticism I subsequently show: 1. that, in his later work, Adorno’s understanding of eidetic intuition undergoes a significant revaluation; 2. that he reappropriates key elements of the eidetic method in his own procedure of physiognomic analysis, and 3. that his account of physiognomics is relevant for addressing the aforementioned incongruities of phenomenological eidetics itself.
In this paper I examine how Merleau-Ponty develops Husserl’s genetic phenomenology through an elaboration of language, largely influenced by Saussure’s linguistics. Specifically, my focus will be on ...the unpublished notes to the course Sur le problème de la parole ( On the Problem of Speech ). I show how Merleau-Ponty recasts Husserl’s notion of the historicity of truth by means of an inquiry into the relation between truth and its linguistic expression. The account that Merleau-Ponty offers differs from Husserl’s in two important respects. Firstly, whereas Husserl describes a regressive inquiry of truth, Merleau-Ponty describes a regressive movement of truth, where every acquired truth seizes the tradition that precedes it. Secondly, this new notion of truth, and its dependency on its proper expression, opens up for a new understanding of literature.
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