Suicide is one of the top ten causes of death in all ages. Entrapment plays a key role, characterizing the tunnel vision of individuals experiencing suicidal distress, with suicide becoming the only ...perceived escape route. Failure or loss of intentionality, precipitating entrapment, maybe is another key factor in the transition from suicidal ideation to enactment. There is not a typical suicide victim and the fluctuating pattern of suicidality can be better explained with non-linear models. The cusp catastrophe model can demonstrate the distal and proximal risks of suicide, including the spectrum of disturbed emotional intentionality. For those with high distal risk, a small increase in a proximal risk may push an individual to jump in a suicidal episode, in a non-linear way. On the other hand, a permanent loss of intentionality object dominates in patients with poor insight, who have feelings that do not represent anything outside of themselves. Emotional intentionality theories can enrich our understanding of the transition phase from suicidal ideation to suicidal action.
This paper studies the role of intentionality in the process of generating euphemisms. Intentionality, as the key to human consciousness activities, is not only the starting point of the language ...user’s consciousness activity related to euphemism generation, but also functions through the whole generating process. Its functions can be specified as triggering, orientation, and selection. Collective intentionality restricts individual intentionality and has the function of identifying and integrating individual intentionality. Under the effect of collective intentionality and social environment, the euphemisms are renewed with the time and bear features unique to a particular group.
When we talk about education, we usually mean planned influences that are exerted on the student to develop all his potential on the one hand. On the other hand, the question arises whether there are ...unintended influences in the education process, whether their outcome is positive or negative, and whether pedagogy also deals with such spontaneous, unintended processes. Therefore, the goal of this research was to examine and analyze the views of pedagogues, associate and scientific-teaching professions on the nature of the influence that is realized within the framework of education. The sample has the characteristics of a deliberate and convenient sample, and it is composed of pedagogues with associate and scientific-teaching titles from two public universities in the Republic of Srpska. The paper used the method of theoretical analysis and descriptive statistics, and of the techniques, the survey technique. The results show that pedagogues, associate, and scientific-teaching professions under education imply a synthesis of intentional and unintentional influences on the student, only a small number of pedagogues consider that the term functional education is inadequate for what it represents and do not give suggestions for its redefinition. The pedagogues think that the (un)intentionality of education is still a current and open question of pedagogy, but not a fundamental one. In the context of the environment, they believe that the family community is a synthesis of intentional and unintentional influence, and the same integrations are not renounced in the institutional environment as well as in the educational activities that took place even in the pre-civilization period. The results can serve as an initial investigation of the phenomenon of (un)intentionality in education and serve as a basis for further quantitatively and qualitatively larger research, but also for the theoretical foundations of all those who in any way discuss the theoretical issues of general pedagogy.
Intentionality and Emotions Orestis Giotakos
Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience & Mental Health (Online),
05/2020, Letnik:
3, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Researchers use the terms “emotion” and “intentionality” with different meanings. There are distinctions between the functional emotion state, its conscious experience, our ability to attribute ...emotions to others, our ability to think and talk about emotion, and the behaviors caused by an emotion state. For phenomenologists, affective intentionality is an embodied and enactive process that connects the person to a shared world. For Freeman all actions are emotional having at the same time their reasons, and this is the nature of intentional behavior. Gibson suggested intentionality as the one end of the intentionality arc, which connects us to the world, while Searle suggests “intentional causation”, as an essential connection of intentionality with consciousness. Ratcliffe proposed existential feelings, as kinds of background and «pre-intentional» feelings. Furthermore, Krueger proposed that focusing on disruptions of intentionality can deepen and enrich our understanding of core disturbances involved in different psychopathologies. I believe that affective or emotional intentionality is a prominent research field in neuroscience, for better understanding human behavior, emotion dysregulation, and even psychopathology.
In this article we address two key questions in the application of dynamical systems theory (DST) to second language acquisition (SLA) that have not been resolved in recent debates about this issue. ...The first question relates to reductionism. Is an antireductionist position a necessary element of DST? We show that the radical antireductionist stance put forward by key movers of the application of DST to SLA neither follows from the mathematics of DST nor from the application of DST to science and that radical antireductionism results in an impasse for empirical research. In contrast, we argue that reductionism offers ways in which theory-derived hypotheses can be formed about subsystems that can be studied empirically using DST mathematics. The second question relates to intentionality. Are physical systems and mental systems similar enough to justify applying DST principles based in the physical sciences to processes in the human mind? Following Tschacher, we argue that current evidence suggests that there is a limited class of mental phenomena that can arise from physical phenomena. It is only this class of mental phenomena that can currently be modeled using DST mathematics. We offer a discussion of these perspectives to indicate how important it is to resolve these fundamental questions. In our view, these fundamental issues need resolution to put the application of DST to SLA on a solid conceptual and empirical footing.
In this conceptual article, we argue that defining corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) as opposite constructs produces a lack of clarity between ...responsible and irresponsible acts. Furthermore, we contend that the treatment of the CSR and CSI concepts as opposites de-emphasizes the value of CSI as a stand-alone construct. Thus, we reorient the CSI discussion to include multiple aspects that current conceptualizations have not adequately accommodated. We provide an in-depth exploration of how researchers define CSI and both identify and analyze three important gray zones between CSR and CSI: (a) the role of harm and benefit, (b) the role of the actor and intentionality, and (c) the role of rectification. We offer these gray zones as factors contributing to the present lack of conceptual clarity of the term CSI, as a concept in its own right, leading to difficulties that researchers and managers experience in categorizing CSI acts as distinct from CSR.
Abstract The concept of mind is widely used in today’s debates on the lives, behavior, and cognition of prehistoric hominins. It is therefore presumably an important concept. Yet it is very rarely ...defined, and in most cognitive-archaeological literature, it does not seem to point to anything distinctive. In recent years, talk of minds has also been criticized as being internalistic and dualistic, in supposed contrast to new materialistic and externalistic approaches. In this paper, I aim to defend a different concept of mind which can be used in theorizing about prehistoric hominin cognition. In short, my concept is simply that of the first-person viewpoint, understood in a naturalized manner, and as characterized by intentionality. The discussion proceeds by examining what I perceive to be three prevailing misconceptions about minds, which I derive mainly from the archaeological literature. I use this discussion to outline my own concept of mind, as well as to defend it against the frequently heard criticisms of dualism and internalism. In the final parts, I briefly discuss some potential practical applications of an intentional approach to past minds. Here I focus on certain conceptual problems in debates on symbolic cognition.
Cet article présente les positions de Bolzano puis de Husserl sur le statut de la question dans leurs théories respectives du jugement, puis examine la critique explicitement adressée à Bolzano par ...Husserl dans les Recherches logiques. L’enjeu de l’article est i) de montrer l’importance de la psychologie pour décrire l’acte de la question compris comme désir ; ii) inscrire la question dans ses contextes d’énonciation spécifiques qui peuvent lui donner une signification judicative ; iii) indiquer le rôle crucial que la question joue dans l’invention husserlienne de la théorie du remplissement ainsi que dans l’invention de la phénoménologie en général. L’enjeu est de se demander ce qui apparaît lorsqu’on pose une question, dont nous montrons qu’elle limite l’horizon des possibilités de l’apparaître, et ainsi structure en le limitant le champ de l’apparaître.
Comment la phénoménologie peut-elle conférer au phénomène du questionnement une quelconque irréductibilité ? On sait que la thèse d’intentionnalité permet à Husserl de combattre le psychologisme et ...de prendre la mesure d’une conscience ouverte à la transcendance de l’objet et plus encore aux lois d’essences qui régissent universellement et nécessairement les différentes régions de l’apparaître. Mais cela suffit-il à rendre la conscience questionnante ? Si tel n’est pas le cas, et si la conscience intentionnelle est moins ouverte au « mystère » de la phénoménalité que prescriptive des normes sous lesquelles le donné apparaît, alors n’y a-t-il pas un risque de perdre le bénéfice du concept d’intentionnalité lui-même, en repliant la conscience dans un champ d’immanence contrôlé par une mécanique des opérations de la conscience ? C’est ce dont nous discutons dans un premier temps. Dans un second temps, nous aborderons l’ontologie de Heidegger dans Être et temps en montrant comment elle résout ce problème par la prise en compte de l’irréductibilité de la question de l’être, et concomitamment de l’ouverture à la question de l’être dans le Dasein, cet étant que nous sommes et qui a l’être en question. Enfin, nous interrogerons la pensée du second Heidegger afin de poser le problème de savoir comment maintenir ouverte l’irréductibilité de la question de l’être, alors même que cette question ontologique principielle semble, dans l’Histoire de l’être (Seynsgeschichte), de plus en plus recouverte par l’emprise du paradigme de la technique et de son intensification, plongeant notre monde contemporain, comme le dit Heidegger, dans une absence à peu près totale de questionnement.
PDF
