Actualmente se discute la vigencia del principio de la culpa en la responsabilidad civil, especialmente por el surgimiento de la responsabilidad por actividades peligrosas. Este escrito realiza un ...análisis crítico del concepto de culpa, desde su surgimiento con la interpretación de la lex Aquilia del derecho romano, hasta la moderna comprensión del instituto por la jurisprudencia civil colombiana, pues una adecuada solución a los problemas actuales solo es posible mediante la comprensión de la tradición que antecede a nuestras instituciones; no sólo con la finalidad de reconstruir su historia, sino también de encontrar, dentro de dicha tradición, eventuales fracturas que podrían ser la causa de las actuales problemáticas.
Roman lawyers interpreted causation in a very specific way, without any abstractions or generalisations, existence or non-existence of causation was established in each particular case ( ad hoc). ...They did not establish the existence of the causation between an act of a tortfeasor and a harmful result, but causation had to exist between the culpa of the tortfeasor and the result. Initially, it was necessary for the causation to be direct, made with active doing body to body (damnum corpori corpore datum). With the time, the narrow understanding of causation was overcome and indirect causation started to be appreciated, while the human behavior could exclusively be omissive. Aquilian's casuistry is very rich with the cases of problematic causation. Meanwhile, these elementary rules for resolving a particular case in practice proved insufficient and incomplete, since unique life circumstances had created a need for a more complex view of causation.
El presente trabajo tiene por objeto hacer un breve repaso de los requisitos que la lex Aquilia exigía para su concurrencia, desde las distintas lecturas que la doctrina romanista moderna ha hecho ...del capítulo tercero. Así, se muestra de que manera las distintas posiciones influyen en la conceptualización de la Murta, en el desarrollo decretal y, por consiguiente en la relación de causalidad, pero especialmente en el daño, que es el requisito al cual la investigación presta más atención. Así se analiza, según estas diferentes visiones, el desarrollo del principio idquod interest. Claramente, como se ha insinuado en este resumen, se enfrentan dos visiones contrapuestas, entre aquellos que ven en la lex Aquilia un estatuto originariamente resarcitorio (negando incluso el principio corpore corpori y adjudicándolo a la interpretación medieval) versus un punto de vista que considera que la ley tenía originariamente un carácter estrictamente penal, derivando paulatinamente hacia un carácter resarcitorio. En el primer punto de vista, el principio id quod interest se presentó desde un comienzo en el capítulo tercero, el que exclusivamente se refería al daño (tesis de Daube); desde el segundo punto de vista, la interpretación permitió la evolución desde el premium corporis hasta el principio id quod interest, en el punto de vista afirmado desde Jolowicz y recientemente sustentado por Valditara.This paper aims to make a brief review of the requirements that the lex Aquilia required for its concurrence, from the various readings that the modern Roman law doctrine has made the third chapter. Thus, it shows how the different positions that influence the conceptualization of iniuria, in the development decretal, and therefore in terms of causality, but especially in the damage, which in that part of that research pays more attention. So is analyzed, as these various visions, the development of the principle id quod interest. Clearly, as has been hinted in this summary, they face contrasting two visions, between those who see the lex Aquilia a statute originally damages (including the principle corpore corpori and awarded to the medieval interpretation) versus a viewpoint that believes that the law was originally a purely criminal, gradually drifting towards compensation. In the first view, the principle id quod interest was presented from the beginning in the third chapter, which only covered the damage (thesis Daube); from the second view, the interpretation enabled the evolution from the premium corporis until the beginning id quod interest, in point of view, and recently said from Jolowicz supported by Valditara.
Abstract
D. 9,2,51, in which a slave is slain twice and dies, and where Julian considers both assailants equally liable for killing, has been interpreted in the context of
causa superveniens
. In ...that case Julian's opinion becomes contradictory. It is argued that the text should be read in the context of the Stoic theories on causality as current among the jurists in the first centuries AD. In these theories there existed no
causa superveniens
as of the modern causality theory. As such its application is ill at place here. Instead, in applying these Stoic theories Julian's view can be explained as his attributing a
causa antecedens
to the first assailant, with full imputation of the effect of the subsequent
causa principalis
to him, and attributing a
causa adiuvans
to the second assailant, while valuing at the same time the latter not just as a reinforcing cause but also as a
causa mortis
and a full effective cause. For other jurists the latter evidently went too far.
The subject of this paper is the analysis of meaning of Digest text D. 9. 2. 27. 14. An overview of different theories devoted to this text has been presented here with a critical review of their ...argumentation, and another possible way of interpretation has been proposed. The author draws the following conclusions based on comparative source analysis. It is certain that neither Celsus nor Ulpian in the text D. 9. 2. 27. 14 doubted that in the case of weed pollution of soil, interdict quod vi aut clam can be given since all conditions for its implementation were fulfilled. With the interdict only the damage caused within a year can be claimed. For this reason this procedural means belongs to either the land owner or, if the land is leased, to the leaseholder. For the same reason along with the interdict, Aquilian claim is given, provided that only one of the two procedural means can be used. It belongs to both the land owner and the lease holder. It is given to the lease holder for the damage caused before the expiry of the lease, and to the land owner for the one caused later. Therefore, the lease holder who uses Aquilian claim has to provide a procedural guarantee that the land owner will not by any subsequent claim request compensation for damages on the same grounds. The claim is given to the lease holder on the grounds of yield owner and not on the grounds of land owner. The claim is given both to the owner and the lease holder not as a direct, but as actio in factum ex lege Aquilia. The reason for this cannot be determined with certainty, as it is possible that Ulpian quoted Celsus's opinion in a different context from the original one.
In the text the author analyzes the excerpt of the work of late republican lawyer Alfenus Varus on the responsibility of slaves for the actions taken on the owner’s order. Text of Alfenus is ...preserved in D. 44.7.20. Its interpretation indicates that the discussed question was the private liability on the ground of lex Aquilia de damno and the perpetrator was manumitted after committing the wrongful act. The rule quoted by Alfenus, that the manumitted slaves should not be released from responsibility for the actions taken on the order of their masters, could refer to liability on the ground of the private and public law.
Abstract
It is commonly assumed that the
litis aestimatio
of the
actio legis Aquiliae
was a penalty which, in practice, was set at the loss suffered by the victim of the wrong and therefore ...functioned as compensation. This assumption is based on the nature of the action as founding in a delict and characterised by the Romans as a penal action. It also shares the elements of penal actions. But this is at odds with other texts which treat the action as directed purely at compensation. It is suggested that in order to understand this we have to distinguish between the origin of the penal actions, which is penal and which carries certain common features such as the fundamental impossibility to sue heirs or descendants of the wrongdoer, and their purpose or object. It is possible to distinguish two groups, one aiming at a penalty, the other aiming at compensation. Only in the latter group the action can be exercised against the heir of the wrongdoer and only restrictedly: it is the compensatory aim which allows for this. Further, the lex Aquilia and its chapters are examined whether a compensatory purpose is distinguishable here as well.
The limits of culpa levissima Tellegen-Couperus, Olga
Tijdschrift voor rechtsgeschiedenis,
01/2008, Letnik:
76, Številka:
1-2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Abstract
In D. 9,2,44pr., Ulpian states that, under the lex Aquilia, even the slightest fault (levissima culpa) counts. Since the time of the glossators, this phrase has been regarded as a general ...rule. Only one Romanist, MacCormack, has interpreted the phrase in a narrow sense: in his view, culpa levissima only referred to the case of scientia domini mentioned in section 1 of Ulpian's text. Later, Gimenez-Candela has argued that scientia domini led to direct liability only in case of damnum iniuria datum. The author aims to prove that culpa levissima only referred to scientia domini but that, on the other hand, scientia domini led to direct liability in all delicts.
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