Abstract
Shane Glackin's 2019 Philosophical Quarterly article aims to (a) offer a framework for understanding the philosophical debate about the nature of disease and (b) utilise this framework to ...reply to several standard objections to normativist (particularly social constructivist) theories of disease. Specifically, Glackin claims his model avoids three central challenges to normativism, which we term the ‘Flippancy Problem’ (which charges that normativism implies diseases can be cured by adjusting our attitudes towards them), ‘Repugnancy Problem’ (which charges that normativism implies we must endorse repugnant historical views regarding ‘conditions’ like Drapetomania as ‘genuine diseases in their day’), and the ‘Explanatory Problem’ (which charges that normativism cannot explain why diseases warrant certain kinds of medical intervention without lapsing into vicious circularity). Although we find Glackin's framework helpful in clarifying the terrain of the debate, we argue these three challenges continue to afflict his preferred construal of the normativist/social constructivist position.
This paper discusses the account of alethic modality as presented by Wilfrid Sellars in his earlier work from 1947 to 1958. Its aim is twofold. First, I discuss Sellars' analysis by exploring its ...historical relationship to Carnap's account of modality. I argue that Carnap's early syntactic treatment of modality profoundly influenced Sellars' own so-called 'regulist' account of modality in terms of rules of inference. Furthermore, it is suggested that Sellars' lesser-known possible worlds analysis was influenced by Carnap's later semantic account of modality. The second aim of the paper is a critical one. I raise a number of objections to Sellars' account of modality and argue that his account confronts some serious limitations. I also argue that Sellars does not provide a satisfying explanation of the relationship between his regulist account and his possible worlds analysis. I offer such an explanation by arguing that his regulist account should be understood as a pragmatic account of what is conveyed by the use of modal sentences, whereas his possible worlds analysis is a semantic account of the asserted content of modal statements. That is, the regulist account and the possible worlds analysis have different explanatory targets.
Alfonso Catania was an important legal theorist in the second half of the last century; his theory reflects the thinking of Kelsen and Hart. However he uses the thought of these authors – Kelsen and ...Hart – to develop a personal vision of the law, in which the decision is always accompanied by the law. This means that legal norms alone are not enough: in fact according to Catania it is necessary that legal norms be integrated by the decision of the individuals. In this sense the legal norm is an interpretative scheme of the individual’s decision.
Este texto plantea el tratamiento de la noción de enfermedad en la obra de Michel Foucault desde su alejamiento del naturalismo y el constructivismo social. La herencia de Canguilhem y de su ...normativismo vital ofrecen las herramientas teóricas que permitirán un tratamiento de la medicina cuyo análisis provoca la explicitación de la pregunta por la ontología de la obra foucaltuiana, la relación entre normativismo social y vital y la posibilidad de una democratización del saber médico.
The article aims to show the transition from the Decisionism to the Institutionalism of Carl Schmitt is not to be considered as a “rupture”, but as a “continuity”. The point of this transition is to ...be found in the lesser importance of the “decision” than the institution, which depends on Schmitt’s need to understand the world after the First World War and to theorize national and international transformations. To this end, in 1919 the founders of the League of Nations give birth to a new international order in which the power of decision making, that is the sovereignty of the European States, gets weaker. As a result, Schmitt produces a new way of approaching the international order by claiming a “concrete order thinking” against the normativism, the decisionism and the juridical positivism. However, he never forgets the importance of the decision-making process not even in this context. In fact, the decision-making process continues to appear as the only way to produce spatial and juridical order. Therefore, the continuity between Schmitt’s two phases of thought can be easily grasped.
The paper analyzes assumptions and manifestations of the normatively adopted rules. The starting point is the presentation of the alternative of normativism vs. descriptivism, as it is understood by ...some contemporary theories of language, mind and cognition. In the next parts, the paper focuses on deontological aspects of processes of thinking and reasoning. In this context the social and cultural function of norms is stressed. Searle’s emphasis on norms as a social ‘glue’ is linked with theories of the deontic introduction. Special attention is paid to considerations that J. Dolník devoted to the cohesive force of language.
Debates about the concept of disease have traditionally been framed as a competition between two conflicting approaches: naturalism, on the one hand, and normativism or social constructivism, on the ...other. In this article, we lay the groundwork for a naturalistic form of social constructivism by (1) dissociating the presumed link between value-free conceptions of disease and a broadly naturalistic approach; (2) offering a naturalistic argument for a form of social constructivism; and (3) suggesting avenues that strike us as especially promising for filling in the details of an alternative approach and addressing the most obvious objections.
Metaphysics of the Bayesian mind Tiehen, Justin
Mind & language,
April 2023, 2023-04-00, 20230401, Letnik:
38, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Recent years have seen a Bayesian revolution in cognitive science. In this paper, I work out the implications of this revolution for the metaphysics of mind. My central claim is that the Bayesian ...approach supports a novel empirical argument for normativism, the thesis that belief has a rational normative essence. The argument I develop draws in part on the causal powers subset account of realization, with the connection being that Bayesians often appeal to Marr's framework of levels of analysis, which carries with it multiple realizability claims that can be understood in terms of the subset model.
PDF
