Knowing full well Sosa, Ernest
2011., 20101213, 2010, 2011, 2011-01-01, 20110101, Letnik:
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eBook
In this book, Ernest Sosa explains the nature of knowledge through an approach originated by him years ago, known as virtue epistemology. Here he provides the first comprehensive account of his views ...on epistemic normativity as a form of performance normativity on two levels. On a first level is found the normativity of the apt performance, whose success manifests the performer's competence. On a higher level is found the normativity of the meta-apt performance, which manifests not necessarily first-order skill or competence but rather the reflective good judgment required for proper risk assessment. Sosa develops this bi-level account in multiple ways, by applying it to issues much disputed in recent epistemology: epistemic agency, how knowledge is normatively related to action, the knowledge norm of assertion, and theMenoproblem as to how knowledge exceeds merely true belief. A full chapter is devoted to how experience should be understood if it is to figure in the epistemic competence that must be manifest in the truth of any belief apt enough to constitute knowledge. Another takes up the epistemology of testimony from the performance-theoretic perspective. Two other chapters are dedicated to comparisons with ostensibly rival views, such as classical internalist foundationalism, a knowledge-first view, and attributor contextualism. The book concludes with a defense of the epistemic circularity inherent in meta-aptness and thereby in the full aptness of knowing full well.
Abstract
Dasgupta poses a serious challenge to realism about natural properties. He argues that there is no acceptable explanation of why natural properties deserve the value realists assign to them ...and are consequently absent of value. In response, this paper defines and defends an alternative non-explanatory account of normativity compatible with realism. Unlike Lewis and Sider, who believe it is sufficient to defend realism solely on realist terms, I engage with the challenge on unfriendly grounds by revealing a tu quoque. Dasgupta and anti-realists face a similar challenge to that directed against realism: one that not only undermines the objection to realism by legitimising non-explanatory normativity but leaves them facing a significant dilemma.
This article argues that political realists have at least two strategies to provide distinctively political normative judgements that have nothing to do with morality. The first ground is ...instrumental normativity, which states that if we believe that something is a necessary means to a goal we have, we have a reason to do it. In politics, certain means are required by any ends we may intend to pursue. The second ground is epistemic normativity, stating that if something is (empirically) true, this gives us a reason to believe it. In politics, there are certain empirical regularities that ought to be acknowledged for what they are. Both sources are flawed. Instrumental normativity only requires coherence between attitudes and beliefs, and one can hang on to false beliefs to preserve attitudes incompatible with reality. I may desire to eschew power relations, and accordingly I may imagine politics to be like a camping trip. Epistemic normativity, on the other hand, operates critically, striking down existing normative claims. It shows us that politics is nothing like a camping trip, but it doesn’t tell us what we should do about it (beyond abandoning some false beliefs). We conclude by showing that if the two are taken together, they remedy each other’s flaws.
A human being is not only a social and teleological animal, she/he is also a nomic animal, a creature that can act in light of rules. Starting from this new image of humankind, the author extends the ...investigation of normativity to other members of the animal kingdom, posing the question of whether other nomic animals exist outside the human species. Generally, the consensus tends toward the idea that non-human animals are incapable of acting in light of rules, as if this capacity were a specific characteristic of humanity excluded to all other species. The author instead assembles three impactful answers that counter this consensus, posited respectively by a legal expert, an ethologist, and a philosopher, responses that may pave the way for a new field of research: the ethology of normativity. In conclusion, the author points out how these new inquiries advance novel ideas of normativity that deserve investigating further, such as a “normativity without language,” and a “normativity without norms.”
This article presents the results of a broader research project which aims to argue for the normativity of scientific laws. Usually scientific laws are regarded as descriptive, which contrasts them ...to prescriptive norms. To show their normativity, I utilize the logical account of explicitly normative systems by Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin (1971). I identify the characteristic elements of normativity and analyse accounts of implicit normativity in science using those terms to show the affinities of explicit and implicit normativities. The research project continues with the substantiation of the normativity of scientific laws in detail and the results will be presented in Normativity of Scientific Laws (II) (Mets 2018).
We start this article with the exploration of similarities between the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) and stakeholder theory at the time of their origination and then proceed with the ...conversation on what led to distinct developmental trajectories of the two theories. Though RBV has become a leading paradigm in the strategic management field, we argue that in its current form, RBV is yet incomplete. We suggest there are four aspects that stakeholder theory can offer to inform RBV: normativity, sustainability, people, and cooperation. Reconciling stakeholder theory and RBV is a promising path to advancing our understanding of management, and we provide a two-part guideline to management scholars and practitioners who would be willing to take this path.
Eating together is a primordial social activity with robust normative expectations. This study examines a series of instances where appreciative elements about the food during a shared meal are ...treated as noticeably absent and where some of the participants are attributed to exhibit a negative stance towards the food, which furthermore is used as a resource for engaging in membership categorization.
Situated within the cognate approaches of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, this study draws on video recordings of an integrated language and cooking workshop organized for immigrants in the French speaking part of Switzerland. The participants include a French teacher, two chefs and five immigrant women with various native languages. The detailed sequential, multimodal analysis details and explains how the participants treat gustatory features of eating as publicly available and accountable, and how the absence of evaluative elements contribute to the situated achievement of a plural “you” as a group that does not like “this” food. Ascribing (dis)taste for food on behalf of others, occasions accounts for just how to eat, showing the strong normative features that make up to the recognizability of sharing a meal as a competent member – including how sensorial experiences are evaluated and expressed. In this way, this study contributes to our understanding of the (non)ordinary features of eating together as a situated, embodied achievement and social institution that is built in and through interaction.
À quelques rares exceptions près, la philosophie biologique de G. Canguilhem n’aborde jamais directement la question du vieillissement. Néanmoins, cet article vise à montrer que ses réflexions sur la ...santé et la maladie, le normal et le normatif, et plus généralement sur le vivant, constituent, dans leur ensemble, un cadre théorique pertinent pour appréhender ce phénomène. À la lumière d’un exemple, nous montrerons qu’elles permettent d’ouvrir un espace de dialogue entre réflexion philosophique et biologie contemporaine du vieillissement.
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